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SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Aleta G. Estreicher*
The received wisdom for fifty years has been that the first
amendment is inapplicable to speech relating to the operation of
securities markets. The assumption that speech by actors on the
securities stage is simply another aspect of regulable business activity pervades the federal system of securities regulation: advertising by corporate issuers is sharply curtailed;1 investment advisers
must obtain licenses to reach their audiences; 2 financial reporters
are subject to restraints that would be constitutionally intolerable
for reporters of nonfinancial information;3 and proxy contests for
corporate control involve preclearance of materials by government
censors. 4 This regulatory scheme-unremarkable at a time when
the Supreme Court recognized a "commercial speech" exception to
the first amendment--seems anomalous after the Court's 1976 decision, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,6 which replaced the preexisting assumption of regulability with the modern "commercial speech
'7

doctrine."

Despite Virginia Pharmacy and its progeny, courts and commentators have continued to accept the regulation of securities-related expression virtually without constitutional demurrer." In* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., 1970, Bryn Mawr College;
J.D., 1981, Columbia University School of Law. I have benefited from insightful comments
by several friends and colleagues who reviewed earlier drafts of this paper, notably, David
Chang, George W. Dent, Jr., Herbert Estreicher, Samuel Estreicher, Karen Gross, Richard
L. Revesz and Lawrence G. Sager. Any errors that persist despite their careful attention are
entirely my own.
1 See infra notes 230-63 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 289-98 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 306-44 and accompanying text.
See
'See,
' 425
See
'See

infra notes 345-64 and accompanying text.
e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
U.S. 748 (1976).
id. at 760-65.
Note, The Federal Securities Laws, The First Amendment, and Commercial
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deed, the Court has casually observed, by way of dictum in Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Association,9 that "exchange of information
about securities" and corporate proxy statements are examples of
"communications" that can be regulated apparently without regard for the first amendment."0
The failure to extend Virginia Pharmacy's teachings to securities markets is in large part due to intellectual and judicial disquiet with commercial speech doctrine. To borrow a phrase from
Justice Jackson, the term "commercial speech" is a counterpane
concealing a disorderly bed.1 There appears to be no agreement
even on what it is: the label has been used to describe both product and service advertising that proposes only a commercial transaction 2 and speech arising in the course of business activity that
furthers some expressive interest of the speaker in addition to imparting information of possible value to its recipients.' 3 More importantly, the Court's doctrine lacks conceptual coherence. While
prepared to extend Virginia Pharmacy to new areas' 4-notably,
Speech: A Call for Consistency, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 57, 61 n.19 (1984). There have been
some recent stirrings in the other direction. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985);
Symposium on the First Amendment and Federal Securities Regulation, 20 CoNN. L. REv.
261 (1988); Panel on Commercial Free Speech, Second Circuit Judicial Conference, 120
F.R.D. 177, 177-82 (1987) (comments by Professor Neuborne).
After this Article was submitted for publication, Professor Neuborne's essay, The First
Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 5
(1989), appeared. Similarly building on the implications of the Supreme Court's commercial
speech decisions, Professor Neuborne argues for a distinctive "hearer-centered" free speech
doctrine as contrasted with "speaker-centered" protections for expression "driven by religious or political conscience." Id. at 13. Despite several common intuitions, my distinction
herein between "expressive" and "nonexpressive" speech better captures the case for protecting the communications media, turning as it does on the presence of speaker interests
whether or not the speech is animated by matters of religious or political conscience. Moreover, I believe the justifications for government regulation of nonexpressive communication,
particularly in the securities area, are somewhat more robust than does Professor Neuborne.
In writing on the sociology of science, Robert Merton has observed that innovation when it
comes is often heralded by the disclosures of many operating independently of one another.
R. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1967). Perhaps this is
true of innovation in legal doctrine as well.
9 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
Id. at 456.
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
12 E.g., Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973).
13 E.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568 (1988); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985).
14 The one case in which the Court appears actually to have retreated, Posadas de Puerto
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restrictions on advertising by professionalslq--the Justices are not
entirely comfortable with what they have wrought. They appear to
have settled upon the view that commercial speech is entitled to
lesser protection than other forms of protected expression, occupy-

ing a distinctly "subordinate position in the scale of First Amend-

ment values. '16 Accordingly, constitutional scrutiny takes the form
of the rather open-ended, deferential balancing test of Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission," , rea set of decisions reflecting, at best, ad hoc linesulting in
i
drawing.1
Before securities-related expression can receive its constitutional
due, commercial speech doctrine must be placed on a firmer analytical footing. To view commercial speech as some second-class
species of expression is to ignore the contribution such speech
makes to the societal commitment to decentralized decisionmaking. This Article will thus explore a theory of commercial speech
that regards such speech as an integral part of the "system of free-

Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), has been savaged in the
literature. See, e.g., Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico: " 'Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing
Strange; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 Sup. CT. Rsv. 1. See infra text accompanying notes 80-99.
" See infra text accompanying notes 216-17.
18 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
"

447 U.S. 557 (1980).

In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566. See also Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct 3028 (1989) (holding commercial
speech doctrine requires "something short of a least-restrictive means standard").
"sSee Posadas,478 U.S. at 328 (holding regulation of casino advertising does not violate
first amendment); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (holding ordinance
regulating billboard advertisement not overbroad); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)
(holding prohibition of practice of optometry under trade name not unconstitutional because it prevents public from being misled); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447 (holding state can
regulate lawyers' solicitation of clients for profit); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding solicitation of litigants by ACLU-for whom litigation is form of political expression-is
entitled to first amendment protection); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85
(1977) (holding municipal ordinance banning use of "For Sale" sign in order to stem "white
flight" violates first amendment). For a further discussion of Posadas,see infra text accompanying notes 80-99.
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dom of expression."1 9
Part I outlines the beginnings of a normative theory for protecting expression that arises out of commercial activity, 0 and Part II
applies that theory to selected provisions regulating three types of
securities-related expression: (1) securities advertising (expression
intended to promote and ultimately to sell securities to investors);21 (2) investment advice and analysis (expression about the
quality, value and nature of particular investments); 22 and (3) intracorporate proxy communications between and among management and shareholders of particular corporate enterprises.2 3 In
Part III, I address the claim of Professors Blasi, Schauer and

others that the inclusion of commercial speech within the first
amendment's ambit of concern threatens to dilute protections
presently afforded to noncommercial speech and render the consti24
tutional guaranty less able to deal with "the worst of times.

19 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970). 1 draw a distinction between Justice Blackmun's recognition in Virginia Pharmacy of the "commonsense" differences between commercial and noncommercial speech, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976), and Justice Powell's conclusion, first asserted in Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56, and restated in Central Hudson, that
"[t]his Court's decisions on commercial expression have rested on the premise that such
speech, although meriting some protection, is of less constitutional moment than other
forms of speech." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5.
Professor Shiffrin has written about the impossibility of a general theory that can integrate traditional conceptions of the first amendment with developments in the commercial
area. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1212 (1983). If his point is that single.
value explanations are hopelessly incomplete and that useful theory must be developed
"from the ground up," after an assessment of speech interests and regulatory concerns in
particular contexts, I wholeheartedly agree, and indeed this Article attempts precisely such
an inquiry concerning securities regulation. But I reject the suggestion that commercial
speech must be tolerated as some unprincipled accretion to the body of first amendment
law.
20 The effort here is to construct a normative theory from first principles rather than
simply to apply the commercial speech criteria articulated in e.g., Posadas,478 U.S. at 328;
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557; and Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748. Conceivably,
some (or all) of those cases may be wrongly analyzed or decided.
2 See infra notes 230-85 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 286-344 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 345-419 and accompanying text.
24 E.g., Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv.
449 (1985); Schauer, CommercialSpeech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1988).
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I. RECASTING THE DOCTRINE

A. Defining Commercial Speech
The term "commercial speech" obscures more than it illuminates. Commercial speech as a distinct category should be confined
to speech that seeks only the promotion of goods or services--"speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs
' In this
in an area traditionally subject to government regulation."25
advertising context, the factors which have been cited to justify a
diminished level of constitutional scrutiny are all present: (1) there
is no expressive interest on the part of the speaker; (2) the promotion seeks to induce behavior over which government has plenary
authority; and (3) the first amendment value of the message is limited to its informational value to the audience.2"

Where these factors are absent, however, it clouds analysis to
use the commercial-speech label simply because the expression
arises in the course of commercial activity.17 Neither the presence
of a commercial motive nor the fact that particular speech relates
to economic activity is inconsistent with an expressive interest on
the part of the speaker.2 8 Such commerce-related expression may
not be political speech, as that term is conventionally understood,
but neither can it be equated, as a constitutional matter, with
product and service advertising. Thus, the Court's occasional formulation that commercial speech is "expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience"2 9 should be
avoided.30

- Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 555, 562 (1980)

(quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)). See also Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973) (discussing
advertisements that "do no more than propose a commercial transaction").
" See infra text accompanying notes 38-132.
See Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1215.
See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (picketing by labor is protected by
the first amendment despite commercial context).
29 CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
30 When considering the messages of participants in labor disputes, for example, the
Court understands that it is not dealing with "simple commercial speech." See, e.g., Edward
J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568
(1988) (holding union leaflets urging boycott of mall to protest substandard wages "not...
typical commercial speech" and thus according it greater first amendment protection).
There is no reason why this insight should be restricted to speech arising in labor markets.
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This is not to suggest that speech interests must always triumph
over regulatory objectives, or even that commercial advertising and
commerce-related speech must be treated the same way as political
speech. Indeed, principled balancing, rather than absolutism, is the
only sensible basis for first amendment adjudication in the real
world, 31 and such balancing may support differences in the regulatory treatment of commerce-related expression in particular settings. The real questions, then, are what is the appropriate starting
point for analysis, and what is the appropriate level of judicial
scrutiny of regulatory claims.
B. Commercial and PoliticalAdvertising: The Contrast Between
Nonexpressive and Expressive Communication
To test the rhetoric of the subordinate-speech position, we begin
with a hypothetical, comparing political campaign promotions (everyone's candidate for fully protected speech) with commercial
product advertising (the focus of the Virginia Pharmacy line of
analysis).
1. The Similarities. Assume Company X places an advertisement in a newspaper, offering its soap powder for sale to the public
at a specified price. The advertisement makes certain performance
claims about soap X indicating that, in testing under laboratory
conditions, soap X removed stubborn stains in both hot and cold
water, stains that other competing brands could not remove. Soap
X also purports to be less expensive than its competitors.
Compare this message with Candidate Y's advertisement in the
same newspaper offering Candidate Y as the best, most honest and
most experienced candidate for governor. The advertisement describes the opponent's record, charging that the opponent is an incompetent administrator who will bring the state to fiscal ruin.
"Tired of Charisma? Try Competence!" Candidate Y proclaims.
Candidate Y asks the public to compare the candidates' records
and visions for the future, and to vote for Candidate Y on election
day.

" Balancing, however, comes in different forms. In the first amendment area, it should
not consist of an unweighted, essentially ad hoc comparison of speech interest and regulatory concerns. See generally Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1978).
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Both messages allege facts and state opinions. The expressive
process-a comparison of the speaker's product with the competitor's-appears to be identical. In each case, an independent decisionmaker, the intended recipient of the message, is faced with
several alternatives from which to choose. Under our constitutional
system of limited government, the state may not dictate either the
correct political candidate or the correct soap powder. The speech
contained in the messages is intended to assist in (and ultimately
to influence) this process of private decisionmaking. Company X is
attempting to generate consumer demand for its product, to sell
that product and to make money from its sale. Candidate Y is attempting to generate a ground swell of political support, to win the
election and to hold the office of governor for a term of years. Both
messages (if successful) will cause the recipients to incur some
costs that will benefit the speaker (in money if the consumers buy
the product; in time and effort and the opportunity cost of having
rejected the rival candidate if the voters are moved to go to the
polling place and vote). In both situations, advertising is particularly important to new entrants to the political or commercial
marketplace.32
Despite these similarities, the two advertisers are subject to disparate regulatory treatment. If Company X has engaged in false
advertising, it faces administrative action by the Federal Trade
Commission3 3 and possible lawsuits under the Lanham Act and
'2McChesney, A Positive Regulatory Theory of the First Amendment, 20 CoNs. L Rm
355, 363 (1988). McChesney suggests that advertising benefits some sellers more than
others: those who need to increase the volume of sales, are selling their products at a discount price or have new products to introduce to the public will benefit more from extensive
advertising than sellers with an established market share. Although unrestricted advertising
within an industry will result in increased demand, it will also result in increased competition and lower prices.
Political challengers also benefit from unrestricted advertising as they must familiarize
voters with their names and records. Incumbents, on the other hand, who are already
known, would benefit from restrictions on political advertising. A similar insight informs the
Court's rejection of limitations on the independent expenditures of well-heeled candidates
for public office. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
" The FTC can issue a "cease and desist" order, prohibiting Company X from making
the false claim about its soap powder. Federal Trade Commission Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. §
53(a) (1988). This process is rarely an effective deterrent since hearings and judicial review
take a long time and advertising text is changed fairly frequently-thus a text containing
problematic claims is likely to have been discarded before action can be taken. See Best,
ControllingFalse Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public Regulation, Industry SelfPolicing,and PrivateLitigation, 20 GA. L REv. 45 (1985). Alternatively, the FTC may order
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state laws.34 Assume Candidate Y's advertisement also contains
false statements, perhaps about the opponent's past performance
as an administrator. There is no blot on the opponent's reputation;
indeed, he has been an exemplary administrator. Candidate Y,
however, would not be subject to any regulation or penalty; the
first amendment bars any federal or state agency regulation pursuant to a "truth in campaigning" law similar to the FTCA.
Why such different regulatory frameworks yielding such potentially antithetical results if the advertising process is the same, involving the same communicative mechanism for attempting to influence private decisionmaking? Are there adequate, principled
justifications for the dissimilar regulatory treatment these
messages-both
speech
events-receive
under
the
first
amendment?
The reason most frequently given for the disparate treatment accorded Company X's advertising and Candidate Y's advertising is
that the former, lies near the bottom of a first amendment hierarchy of expressive values, while the latter stands at its apex. As
second-class or "low value '3 7 expression, the speech of commercial
actors presumably may be regulated in ways unacceptable for firstclass political speech. Before outlining what I believe is the essential difference between the two promotional messages in the above
hypothetical, it is important to review the justifications for the
subordinate status of commercial speech.
2. Inadequate Justificationsfor Subordinate Status. It is com-

Company X to perform various comparative tests before making similar claims and to keep
the test results on file. In the event of further difficulties, the FTC may request that evidence of prior substantiation of the performance claims be submitted to the agency. If lasting damage has been done because of the past false claims, Company X can be compelled to
make corrective advertising statements in its future advertisements. Moreover, the FTC can
seek to enjoin continuation of a false advertising campaign. See Federal Trade Commission
Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1988); FTC v. Southwest Sunsites, 665 F.2d 711 (5th Cir.
1982). But see FTC v. Evans Products, 775 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985).
34 Company X may also face private lawsuits under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a) (1988), see infra note 131, and investigation by attorneys general under state laws
similar to the FTCA.
31 Civil liability for damages in a libel action would require a showing of "actual malice"-knowing or reckless disregard of the truth. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
31E.g., Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 107
(1982).
31 G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1058 (1986).
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mon ground that neither the text of the first amendment' nor the
specific intentions of the framers39 supports the relegation of commercial speech to some inferior constitutional status. Rather, the
argument for subordination takes one of four forms: (a) protection
of such speech is not required by any accepted general theory of
the first amendment; 0 (b) the motive of the speaker and the nonideational content of the message indicate that such speech is less
deserving of protection; 41 (c) such speech seeks to induce a transaction that is subject to plenary regulation indicating that the speech
itself is comparably regulable; 2 (d) regulation is both necessary because of the harms caused by false commercial messages and relatively cost-free given the hardiness of the speech and the benign
motives of the regulator. 43 Each of these claims will be examined in
turn.
(a) Single-Value General Theories of the First Amendment.
Two general theories of the first amendment have dominated the
literature; in both, commercial and commerce-related speech are
deemed to play no important part. The first (the "effective selfgovernment" school), heralded by Alexander Meiklejohn 4 4 but
given greater currency by then Professor Robert Bork,4 holds that
the first amendment is principally concerned with safeguarding the
processes of representative democracy, and that only speech which
directly furthers those processes is constitutionally sheltered. The
second (the "individual self-fulfillment" school), associated with

"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the pres .
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
" Even if one believes that the specific intentions of the framers should control modern
constitutional analysis, "[t]he only firm conclusion solidly based on historical scholarship is
that the framers 'had no coherent theory of freedom of speech.'" BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30
STAN. L. REv. 299, 307 (1978) [hereinafter BeVier, An Inquiry) (quoting Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 22 (1971)).

4' See infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.

" See infra notes 72-107 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
44 See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovERNiENT (1948); A.
MEIKLFJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965);

Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245.
41 See Bork, supra note 39. Professor BeVier is a leading disciple of this view. See BeVier,

supra note 39; BeVier, A Comment on Professor Wolfson's The First Amendment and the
S.E.C., 20 CONN. L REV. 325 (1988) [hereinafter BeVier, Wolfson Comment].
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Professor Emerson 40 and given a rather extreme formulation by
Professor Baker,47 finds in the first amendment a commitment to
that speech which furthers the development of the human personality. Because commercial speech is deemed to make no direct contribution to the world of ideas or the flowering of the human spirit,
we are told, it lies beyond the verge of the first amendment. 48
Both of these grand theories have been subjected to extensive
criticism in the literature,49 which does not need to be fully recounted here. For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to
note that while both self-government and self-fulfillment are important values that plainly deserve constitutional protection, they
are not the only concerns that animate the first amendment. Indeed, despite what then Professor Ronald Cass called the "aggressive reductionist" 0 style of the grand theorists, each has had to
compromise conceptual purity, or permit consideration of the asserted central value at a higher level of generality,51 in order to
See T. EMERSON, supra note 19; T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THIE FIRST
(1966); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE
L.J. 877 (1963).
4' Professor Baker has written a number of articles touching on the subject, beginning
with Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REV. 1
(1976) [hereinafter Baker, Commercial Speech], discussed infra text accompanying note 52.
For other examples of his views, see Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory
of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 293 (1982); Baker, Realizing Self-Realization:
Corporate PoliticalExpenditures and Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 646 (1982); Baker, The Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REv. 964 (1978).
48 E.g., Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First
Amendment, 65 VA.L. REv. 1 (1979). Professors Jackson and Jeffries combine both general
theories but reach the same conclusion:
In our view, the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and press
protects only certain identifiable values. Chief among them is effective selfgovernment. Additionally, the first amendment may protect the opportunity
for individual self-fulfillment through free expression. Neither value is implicated by governmental regulation of commercial speech.
Id. at 5-6.
" Particularly instructive discussion can be found in Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1223-51.
See also Cass, CommercialSpeech, Constitutionalism,Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REv.
1317 (1988).
50 Cass, supra note 49, at 1323.
1 Thus, for example, Dr. Meiklejohn in his later writings recognized that the first amendment protects all "forms of thought and expression ... from which the voter derives... the
capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express,"
including "[e]ducation, in all its phases ....
[t]he achievements of philosophy and the
sciences ....[1literature and all the arts ....[and] [p]ublic discussions of public issues."
40
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embrace other categories of speech whose contribution to self-government or self-fulfillment is at best indirect. Why, then, should
the process of inclusion be aborted when considering speech arising
in the course of commercial activity?
Consider the self-government school. Virtually all concede that
the first amendment protects that speech which enables the people
to participate in the process of self-government. But the ability to
choose-to process information, evaluate options, and ultimately
select one option over another-does not spring full-blown into existence whenever local or national elections draw near. The ability
to exercise judgment must be learned over a lifetime of making
one's own decisions and suffering the consequences of error. Unless
the "judgment muscles" are regularly exercised, they may wither,
leaving the decisionmaker dangerously vulnerable to the influences
of others. Is it so plain that a constitutional guaranty that prohibits the state from denying the people the wherewithal to practice
informed decisionmaking in the arena of politics is completely unconcerned with the people's capacity to function as autonomous
decisionmakers in the aisles of a supermarket or on the floor of a
stock exchange?
As for the "self-fulfillment" school, Professor Baker has an answer of sorts for halting the process of inclusion, for he believes
that only truly uncoerced speech, free of the dictates of profit motive, is entitled to constitutional protection.2 This view has not
Meiklejohn, supra note 44, at 256-57. During his unsuccessful attempt to secure Senate confirmation of his appointment to the Supreme Court, Judge Bork professed a similar intellectual conversion. See Taylor, The Bork Hearings:Bork Backs Away From His Stances on
Rights Issues, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1987, at Al, col 6.
With the exception of Professor Baker, see supra note 47, the self-fulfillment school, as
typified by Professor Emerson, has always advanced a somewhat broader view. Four principles, Professor Emerson writes, support freedom in the marketplace of ideas: (1) self-fulfillment, (2) the attainment of truth, (3) public participation in social and political decisionmaking, and (4) balancing stability and change. T. EwmEsoN, supra note 46, at 3-15. He
would draw the line, however, at commercial speech. See infra text accompanying note 54.
52 See Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 47.
[C]ommercial speech is not a manifestation of individual freedom or choice;
unlike the broad categories of protected speech, commercial speech does not
represent an attempt to create or affect the world in a way which can be expected to represent anyone's private or personal wishes. Therefore, profit-motivated or commercial speech lacks the crucial connections with individual liberty and self-realization which exist for speech generally, and which are central
to justifications which in turn define the proper scope of protection under the
first amendment.
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been widely followed and, in my view, betrays a naive, restrictive
understanding of why people speak and why they should be protected in doing so.as But for other members of the "self-fulfillment" school-notably Professor Emerson " -who offer a more
catholic perspective, it is difficult to understand why a self-fulfillment norm that seeks to facilitate "participation in decision making by all members of society" 5 stops short of protecting from government restriction the flow of information affecting the
meaningful exercise of economic freedom.
Analyses that would extend only minimal constitutional protection to Company X's advertisement overlook the first amendment's central role in preserving from state encroachment the autonomy of individuals engaged in the continuous process of
decentralized private decisionmaking. The importance of maintaining a free flow of information, faith in the people's ability to distinguish truth from cant, and a profound skepticism about government intervention are axiomatic in the realm of political and
ideological discourse. But equally important to free participants in
a democracy is the right generally to make their own choices. One
need not go as far as Professor Coase, who maintains that the same
arguments used to support freedom in the market for ideas apply
with equal force to the commercial marketplace." Within the

Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
" See infra text accompanying notes 61-68.
" See supra note 46 and accompanying text.

5 T. EMERSON, supra note 19, at 7. In a separate article, however, Professor Emerson
notes that "[c]ommunications in connection with commercial transactions relate to a separate sector of social activity involving the system of property rights rather than free expression." Emerson, supra note 46, at 948 n.93.
Cease, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977).
It seems to me that the arguments which Emerson uses to support freedom in
the market for ideas are equally applicable in the market for goods...
[F]reedom to choose one's occupation, one's home, the school one (and one's
children) attends, what is studied at school, the kind of medical attention one

receives, how one's savings are to be invested, the equipment one uses or the
food one eats are surely equally necessary for self-fulfillment-and for most
people are considerably more important than much of what is protected by the
First Amendment.
Id. at 14. Accord Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & EcoN, 1, 6

(1964); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the

Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 442 (1971). But see J.S. MILL, On
Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LMERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 150-51 (Everyman

ed. 1951). Mill proposes that
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range of choices permitted by law, our society's commitment to a
free marketplace entails a right on the part of the public to receive

truthful information, commercial or otherwise, that will enable intelligent, autonomous, decentralized decisionmaking.

Under our system of limited government, decisionmaking is decentralized in the economic as well as ideological realm. Although
the marketplace for goods and services is subject to plenary regulation, the state has at best a limited role to play in dictating the
individual lifestyle choices that must continuously be made for so-

ciety to function. Each person must choose a job, a faith, where to
live, whether to join a political party, whether to run for office,
which candidates to vote for, whether to join a union or trade association, which products to buy and which to reject, which investments to make, etc. These decisions, which in the aggregate
amount to our free enterprise system, cannot be made-if they are

to be intelligent, socially productive decisions, rather than blind
grab-bag choices-in an informational vacuum."
It is precisely this insight that led the Court over the last two
decades to broaden the focus of the first amendment to include
audience interests, defining speech interests in terms of the pub-

lic's right to know even where the speaker itself was unable to invoke the constitutional guaranty.5" This right to know expanded
the range of constitutionally protected expression to include the
information required to maintain an educated and autonomous
[r]estraints [on trade] affect only that part of conduct which society is competent to restrain, and are wrong solely because they do not really produce the
[desired] results .... [T]he principle of individual liberty is not involved in
the doctrine of Free Trade, so neither is it in most of the questions which arise
respecting the limits of that doctrine ....
Id.
' The demise of the doctrine of substantive due process no longer permits the judiciary,
as a general matter, to preclude state intervention in the marketplace. The doctrine is not
entirely dead, however, for there may well remain substantive limits on the ability of government to dictate economic lifestyle choices of the type listed in the text. In any event,
even if the Constitution does not require a free marketplace of goods and services, such
freedom in allocational decisions remains an important feature of our society which government has chosen (wisely) not to disturb. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). Within the sphere of allowable
choices, the public has a right to receive truthful information about those choices. Contrary
to the claim of Professors Jackson and Jeffries, this is not substantive due process through
the backdoor of the first amendment. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 48, at 30-32.
1 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 775 (1978); Virginia
Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 748; see also infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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citizenry.

With the emerging understanding that the first amendment
erects safeguards not only for the speaker but also for the receiver
of the message, the theoretical barrier to protecting commercial
speech was properly and fatally breached. Speech may be constitutionally protected even where it makes no direct contribution to
the world of ideas and involves no expression of the inner self," as
long as it generates truthful information concerning legally permissible activity about which the public has a right to know.60
(b) The Characteristicsof Commercial Speech. Those who advocate a subordinate position for Company X's advertisement also
focus on certain characteristics that allegedly render it less deserving of protection than Candidate Y's advertisement: (i) the presence of a commercial motive on the part of the speaker, and (ii)
the absence of any ideational content to the message. Neither suffices to support a categorically different treatment of Company X's
message.
(i) The Role of Motive. Underlying the subordinate-position
view is what Professor Neuborne calls a "materialist critique."0 "
The view that commercial advertising is constitutionally
subordinate because it is intended to benefit only private economic
interests is perhaps the best explanation for Valentine v.
Chrestensene2 and its progeny, cases in which the Court displayed
indifference to the rights of speakers in search of profits. In the
early solicitation cases, the fact that the speaker charged for his
materials brought what the Court considered a decisive commercial
feature into the cases, notwithstanding the protected status of the

" Professor Wolfson suggests that an advertisement about, say, shampoo embodies an
expression of "shampoo" as an idea, not just a product. Wolfson, The First Amendment and
the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265, 270 (1988). Professor Redish makes a somewhat more plausible claim that because of the creative input of designers and advertising agencies, advertising must be viewed as an aspect of self-expression. Redish, supra note 56, at 446-47 (1971).
But see infra text accompanying note 139.
So Of course, predicating first amendment rights on audience interests is a double-edged
sword. If expression is protected solely because of its informational value to the listener,
protection is lost if the information lacks such value. See infra text accompanying notes
133-44 & 163-69.
61B. NEUBORNE, FREE SPEECH, FREE MARKETs, FREE CHOICE 15 (1987); see also Shiffrin,
supra note 19, at 1279-82.
62 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (upholding statutory ban on distribution of "purely commercial"
handbills). See infra text accompanying notes 63-68.
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distributed materials themselves."
Professor Baker suggests that if speech is prompted by economic
profit motive, it is not a truly uncoerced expression of the human

personality worthy of protection."' This position, an extreme version of the antimaterialist preferences of the subordinate-position

advocates, is fraught with difficulties. First, and most salient, if the
first amendment addresses the informational interests of audiences
as well as expressive interests of speakers, there is no reason that

the constitutional status of truthful commercial information about
soap powder should turn on the profit motive of its disseminator,
Company X.
Second, this view would require disparate constitutional treatment for the same message depending on the subjective motivation
of the speaker. Company X's truthful, nonmisleading advertisement criticizing a competitor's soap powder would be unprotected;
Consumer Reports' identical critique presumably would be protected, provided the members of the organization were genuinely
committed to consumer welfare goals.
Third, a motive test, if taken to its logical extreme, would present potentially devastating consequences for the political or ideological speech of Candidate Y-speech Professor Baker plainly
means to protect. As illustrated by the facts of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan65 and the communicative activities of parties in a

Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951); Jones v. Opelika 316 U.S. 584 (1942),
vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943). In its more recent decisions, however, the Court has not been
so quick to discount speech interests because of the presence of a commercial motive. See,
e.g., Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 108 S. Ct. 2667 (1988) (invalidating law requiring
professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors percentage of previous year's collections actually distributed to charities).
Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 47, at 13-14. "[C]ommercial speech is in principle separate from the speaker's decisions about the world or investigations into its nature
.... A standard given and enforced by the structure of the competitive market rather than
the speaker's value choice or prejudice lies at the source of commercial speech."
65 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Although the allegedly libelous statement in Sullivan was a paid
advertisement, the Court concluded it was not commercial in the sense that the handbills in
Valentine were commerciah
That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in
this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold ....

Any

other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying "editorial advertisements" of this type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have
access to publishing facilities.... The effect would be to shackle the First
Amendment in its attempt to secure "the widest possible dissemination of in-
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labor dispute,"6 disparagement of the constitutional value of expression because it advances private economic interests fails to
grasp the mixed-motives characteristic of virtually all speech. In all
areas of life, including the political arena, the first amendment
protects expression that simultaneously serves both a public and a
private interest. It would be extraordinarily naive to suggest, for
example, that Candidate Y's political advertisement is entirely or
necessarily altruistic. The first amendment does not distinguish
between nonprofit speech and profitable speech. Both can be
equally valuable or worthless from a constitutional perspective.
Finally, motive tests are always problematic.6 7 If the applicability or severity of a regulatory regime is made to depend on the
presence or absence of commercial motivation, speakers desiring to
come within the more permissive framework will, as was true in
Valentine itself,68 attempt to obscure a commercial motive by including a protected public interest message. Mixed-motive cases
will abound.
For all of these reasons, any disparity in constitutional status
that depends on the presence or absence of a speaker's commercial
motive is misconceived.
(ii) The Nonideational Content of the Message. Admittedly,
Company X's advertisement makes no direct contribution to the

formation from diverse and antagonistic sources."
Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
66 In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762-63 (1976), Justice Blackmun referred to labor disputes as a prime example of
speakers animated by economic self-interest who are nevertheless protected by the first
amendment. See also supra note 30.
7 The Court's efforts to discern whether a "commercial element" was present in Jones,
316 U.S. at 593-98 (and other early solicitation cases) illustrate the difficulty of the enterprise. See also Douglas v. Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (vacating Jones). Nor was there
unanimous agreement that the "commercial element" was absent simply because a religious
element was present. Id. at 169-70 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
" The advertiser in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), attempted to protect
itself from the prohibition against distributing "commercial" handbills by printing a political protest against New York City docking policy on the reverse side. The strategem did not
succeed: "It is enough for the present purpose that the stipulated facts justify the conclusion that the affixing of the protest against official conduct of the advertising circular was
with the intent, and for the purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance." Id. at 55.
But see Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941) (Clark, J.), rev'd, 316 U.S. 52
(1942). "[I]f intent and purpose must be measured, how can we say that plaintiff's motives
are only or primarily financial? Is he just engaged in an advertising plot, or does he really
believe in his wrongs?" Id. at 516.
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world of abstract ideas. However, despite the prominence of the
"marketplace of ideas" metaphor in first amendment history,"" it is
a mistake to confine the first amendment's reach to the production
and evaluation of ideas. Cases like Cohen v. California,70 and the
implications of the self-fulfillment theory which underlies it, suggest that we protect speech for a number of reasons. Sometimes, as
in Cohen, we want individuals to be able to express the intensity of
their feelings even if they choose a highly offensive manner for doing so and cannot realistically hope to gain adherents or further
intellectual discourse.7 1 At other times, as in the case of commercial speech, we are seeking to maintain a free flow of truthful information because of a judgment that this will better enable the public to function as autonomous decisionmakers. No particular
advertisement in isolation is vital to the system of free expression;
what is key is the overall structure for informing consumers of the
price, quality and availability of products and services.
(c) The Regulability of the Underlying Transaction. (i)The
Regulability of the Speaker. It has been argued that because Company X is a manufacturing corporation subject to pervasive state
regulation, its speech is entitled to lesser first amendment protection. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 2 however, the

Court rejected the notion that the state is free to restrict the mode
and content of corporate ideological expression simply because corporations are heavily regulated creations of state law.7 3 The plain-

tiffs in Bellotti were corporate business and banking organizations
that intended to publicize their opposition to a referendum to
amend the Massachusetts Constitution to permit the imposition of
a personal income tax. A state statute permitted business corpora-

" See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing

that ultimate good will be reached by free trade of ideas in competition of market).
70 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (wearing jacket bearing words "Fuck the Draft" is protected by first
amendment).
71 Id. at 26 (Harlan, J.) (stating that expression "conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well"). The
criticism might also be made that advertising is not only bereft of ideas but is particularly
pernicious because it operates through symbols and subliminal suggestion to manipulate the
audience. As cases like Cohen illustrate, neither the use of symbols nor the subliminal dimension of such expression provides an appropriate basis for relegating truthful information
to a categorically subordinate position.
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
73Id. at 778 n.14.
7
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tions to make contributions and expenditures to influence public
opinion only where the question submitted to the voters was one
"materially affecting" corporate property, business or assets.74 The
Supreme Court, per Justice Powell, struck down the measure, observing that, if the speaker were a natural person, "no one would
suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech.

7

How-

ever, it was unnecessary to decide whether the right of corporate
free speech is coextensive with that of individual free speech 8 as
the message itself had inherent constitutional value, apart from
the nature of its source.77
Bellotti and Virginia Pharmacy together delineate a constitutionally protected expressive cycle that includes a speaker, a message and a listener. In the early ideological speech cases, analysis
always began with the speaker's rights because it was the speaker,
intent on exercising the right to express controversial opinions and
beliefs, who had the standing and motivation to challenge the regulation. But, as later cases have shown, constitutional analysis can
also profitably begin with the first amendment rights of the recipient of the information (whether ideological or commercial), rights
7, Id. at 784. This statute imposed on corporations a kind of expressive ultra vires doctrine. Justice White, in his dissent, suggests that the first amendment permits the states to
prohibit the expenditure of corporate funds on the expression of views not "integrally related to corporate business operations." Id. at 821 (White, J., dissenting). This archaic view
of proper corporate conduct would, if adopted, undo decades of progress attempting to encourage the growth of corporate social responsibility. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984). Moreover, although the state may regulate the
framework by which corporate management obtains authorization from the firm's owners-the shareholders-and thus may insist that certain decisions require a particular level
of shareholder support, it may not disable properly authorized managements from communicating corporate positions on controversial issues, nor may it interfere with the public's
right to receive truthful corporate information just because the corporation is a creature of
law and its internal affairs are regulated. See infra text accompanying notes 75-78, 218-29 &
365-76.
11 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
7' This was the question framed by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. Id. at 765.
77 Id. at 775.
The Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves significant
societal interests. The proper question therefore is not whether corporations
"have" First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with
those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the Massachusetts statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to
protect.
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which are reflected onto the willing speaker whether or not the
speaker has constitutional standing (or is inclined) to seek relief
from state regulation. 8 Bellotti suggests an analogous result where
the constitutional focus is on the message itself: a message "that
the First Amendment was meant to protect" can reflect protected
status onto both its speaker and its recipient.7 9 Bellotti admittedly
involved political speech. But there is no reason in principle why
its message-centered approach to free-speech adjudication should
not apply equally to corporate commercial information.
(ii) The Power to Prohibitthe TransactionIncludes a Power to
Regulate its Promotion. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,80 then Associate Justice Rehnquist
held that if the state has the power to control an activity, it must
have the power to control the commercial advertising of that activity.81 In other words, the greater power to prohibit a transaction
includes the lesser power to prohibit or regulate its promotion.
This "greater includes the lesser" approach (similar to the now disfavored right-privilege doctrine once prevalent in due process jurisprudence 2 ) has thus been given new life in the commercial advertising context.
At issue in Posadas was a statute that, while permitting casino
gambling in Puerto Rico, prohibited outright the advertising of
such lawful activity to Puerto Rican residents.8 3 Although Puerto
78 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-65 (1972) (finding that "right to
receive" is basis for first amendment rights on part of those wishing to hear foreign Marxist
speaker, but ultimately upholding denial of visa by executive branch due to separation of
powers concerns); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969) (holding
FCC-imposed fairness doctrine for broadcasters constitutional based on paramount right of
listening and viewing public); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (striking
statute requiring affirmative request to'post office to receive materials deemed "communist
propaganda" as unconstitutional limitation of recipients first amendment rights).
7' See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 775; see also supra note 77.
90 478 U.S. 328 (1986).

81Id. at 345-47.
'2 See Van Aistyne, The Demise of the Right/Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 H v. L REv. 1439 (1968) (arguing that the Holmesian right-privilege distinction is
no longer viable). Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to be particularly enamored of "greater
includes the lesser" reasoning. He attempted to apply a similar approach to the procedural
due process cases (really a resuscitation of the right-privilege doctrine) in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), but failed to command a majority. The Court decisively rejected
it in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
"Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 330-32
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Rican residents were not barred from the casino tables, the legislature wanted to promote such gambling only by tourists, not residents. All tourist-directed advertising had to be submitted to and
approved by a local administrative board before publication. The
argument that this was an unconstitutional prior restraint on
truthful commercial advertising was swept aside by the Court. 8 '
Justice Rehnquist explained that because the Puerto Rican legislature could have prohibited casino gambling by Puerto Rican residents altogether, 5 a fortiori, that same legislature could regulate
the advertising of an activity it could prohibit."'
This argument has the superficial appeal of simplicity and certainty. One need only inquire whether the state has the power to
regulate an underlying activity (e.g., the manufacture and sale of
soap powder) to determine whether the state can limit concededly
truthful expressions uttered in furtherance of that activity such as
Company X's advertisement. Since economic activity is almost
universally regulable, this rationale would render vulnerable to
proscription virtually all commercial advertising, including any
truthful advertising seeking to promote activity lacking affirmative
constitutional protection.8 7 "Greater includes the lesser" reasoning,
of the type present in Posadas, has been subject to devastating
criticism elsewhere, 88 which need not be repeated here. If adopted
generally, this approach would strip the first amendment of its
force, for, with the decline of substantive due process, precious little-not the process of running for political office, nor the operation of the public schools, nor the entry into the professions-is
constitutionally immune to regulation. The very point of the free
speech principle is that speech is protected even where the under-

(1986).
11 Id. at 344.
85 It is not entirely clear, as a matter of equal protection or what Justice Stevens called
"reverse privileges and immunities" law, id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting), that Puerto

Rico could prohibit gambling by only its own citizens, while permitting tourists to engage in
such activity. See infra note 91.
Posadas, 478 U.S. at 345-47.
87 Id. at 345 (distinguishing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes 91-99.
E.g., Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HAnV. L.
REV. 1413 (1989).
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lying activity is regulable8 9
If first amendment protection of the free speech principle is to
retain any meaning, therefore, government's power to prohibit or
withdraw funding from an activity cannot imply a lesser power to
restrict expression arising out of or in connection with that activity. In the context of the modern activist state, recognition of such
a doctrine would expand enormously governmental power to manipulate its citizens and to distort the flow of ideas and information, both of political and commercial import. The pernicious potential of this doctrine is vividly illustrated by Posadas itself.
Why did the Puerto Rican legislature wish to ban admittedly
truthful advertising of activity specifically authorized by law? Apparently, it believed that "[e]xcessive casino gambling among local
residents... would produce serious harmful effects on the health,
safety and welfare of the Puerto Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the
fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the
infiltration of organized crime." 90
Even assuming that such evils could result from increased demand for casino gambling by Puerto Rican residents, 91 and conceding for the purposes of argument that the restriction of advertising
directed toward-as opposed to restriction of actual access to casino gambling by-local residents might diminish those evils, the
fact remains that (for economic reasons) Puerto Rico has chosen
not to prohibit casino gambling. The legislature wants to have its
cake and eat it, too: it hopes to reap the economic rewards of luring tourists into its casinos, without subjecting its own citizens to
the same temptations, and without incurring the political costs of
excluding them from the casinos. Although the Court characterizes
the advertising ban as a "less intrusive step" than would be the

Greenawalt, Free Speech Justification, 89 COLUM L REv. 119, 120 (1989).
Brief for Appellee at 37, Posadas,478 U.S. at 341 (No. 84-1903). It is interesting to
note that the legislature was not equally alarmed by the prospect of Puerto Rican residents
participating in the state-run lottery or in the other forms of gambling such as horse racing,
cock fights and "picas," that, according to the Superior Court, "have been traditionally part
of the Puerto Rican's roots." Id. at 342.
91 Justice Stevens, dissenting in Posadas, suggests that Puerto Rico is engaging in a kind
of audience discrimination. Id. at 363. It amounts to a "reverse privileges and immunities
problem: Puerto Rico's residents are singled out for disfavored treatment in comparison to
all other Americans." Id. at 360.
"

'o
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outright prohibition of the activity, 2 in fact the use of censorship
to influence public behavior is more destructive of accountable
self-government than any outright prohibition of the activity could
be.
When the state openly prohibits casino gambling, the issue is ensured a level of prominence and public exposure that will occasion
open debate over the merits of the prohibition. If the people
strongly favor legalization, their representatives will either bow to
the public will or risk replacement at the next election. In this
manner, the state will be openly accountable to the people for its
actions with regard to casino gambling.
The state's difficulty is clear: the state perceives certain activity
as undesirable, perhaps even dangerous, but for one reason or another (whether because of affirmative constitutional protection, because the people will resist an outright prohibition, or because of
cynically pragmatic economic motives) the activity is lawful within
the state. The pattern is the same, whether it involves abortion
procedures as in Bigelow v. Virginia,93 the use of contraceptives as
in Carey v. Population Services International,4 or casino gambling by residents as in Posadas.In each case, the state is attempting to keep in ignorance members of the public competent to engage in particular lawful activities,9 5 in the hope that what the
people do not know about they will not do. The first amendment
does not permit the state to manipulate public preference by mandating ignorance of underlying lawful activity, however.9 Posadas
not only cannot be reconciled with Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission,9 Virginia State Board of
92 Id. at 346.

" 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
"
These were not attempts to protect minor children from exposure to potentially harmful advertisements, nor did they involve the special circumstances surrounding the media
where access restrictions may be necessary because of likely exposure to children. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825 n.10; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); infra note 157.
'

For a discussion of the status of advertising concerning socially condemned activity

that the state has declined to criminalize, see infra text accompanying notes 156-62.
97 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Posadas contemplates the regulation of truthful speech about lawful activity with uncritical deference to the regulator, applying a sort of "rational basis combined with commercial 'bad tendency' " test under which the state baldly asserts that advertising may, by increasing local patronage of the casinos, bring about certain evils the
state wishes to avoid. The Court accepted at face value the state's virtually unsupported
assertions, ignored its own precedents and relieved the state of the burden of justifying a
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Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,"" or with the
first amendment's commitment to the people's right to receive

truthful commercial information about lawful activity;99 it also
demonstrates the poverty of "greater includes the lesser" reasoning
as a basis for constitutional analysis.
(iii) Inducing an Imminent Transaction. An attempt to make
sense of Posadas by arguing that commercial advertising may be
subject to state regulation because its objective is to induce imminent action by recipients of the message is not persuasive. Quite
unlike the factual settings in the criminal advocacy cases, ' adver-

prohibition of expression. See Kurland, supra note 14, at 6, 7 n.22, 8-12. Such a lackadaisical approach to the state's burden of proof with regard to its "substantial interest" would be
unprecedented even if the activity being advertised were illegal--compare the state's burden
of proof in the "clear and present danger" cases involving advocacy or incitement of illegal
action. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
"' 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Posadas decision implicitly casts doubt on over a decade of
Supreme Court precedent rejecting state attempts to regulate truthful advertising about
lawfully offered products or services. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466
(1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85 (1977); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
" Professors Jackson and Jeffries argue that commercial advertising has no value independent of the underlying regulable transaction:
[T]he legislature rationally might conclude that the sale of cigarettes should be
allowed but that advertising should be banned to discourage new users. In such
a case, according to the reasoning of Virginia Boardof Pharmacy,governmentul control over price advertising would offend the first amendment. This conclusion only makes sense if one assumes a first amendment value in the advertising of cigarettes independent of its role in encouraging or facilitating the
sale of cigarettes .... If independent first amendment significance did exist
.... it would also exist when the state has declared the underlying transaction unlawful. So, for example, some legitimate function would arise for the
advertisement, "I will sell you X drug at the Y price," even where the sale is
forbidden by law. That no such independent purpose in fact can be identified
confirms the hypothesis that the significance of ordinary business advertising
lies entirely in its relation to the contemplated economic transaction.
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 48,at 35-36. To the extent this argument does not depend on
"the greater includes the lesser" reasoning of Posadas, it simply restates the point previously refuted that commercial speech has no value because it is about transactions the state
can regulate rather than ideas. Again, within the realm of legally permissible transactions,
truthful product and service information is of value to its recipients, and this is simply not
negated by the often remote possibility that someday the state may change its mind and
prohibit the transaction altogether-a result that should occur after open debate and not
through suppression of knowledge of the availability of the product or services.
110 See Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 Nw. U.L Rsv. 1081
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tising is directed at a diffuse public and typically allows its recipients time to consider the import of the message and possibly to
hear competing messages. 10 1
Professor Farber offers a more restrained version of the verbal-

conduct claim.102 Analogizing to United States v. O'Brien,103 he argues that commercial speech can be separated into informational

and contractual components, and that state regulation of the contractual aspects of such expression, like the prohibition of draftcard destruction in O'Brien, would be permissible:
Similar to the language of a written contract, the language in advertising can be seen ds constituting part of
the seller's commitment to the buyer. Thus, advertising
can function as part of the contractual arrangement between the buyer and seller. Of course, in addition to serving this contractual function, advertisements also serve

an informative function to which the first amendment
applies. The critical factor seems to be whether a state
rule is based on the informative function or the contractual function of the language. So long as a regulation re(1983) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion] (discussing constitutional limits on
criminal coercion); Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645 [hereinafter Greenawalt, Speech and Crime]; Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined:
Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970) (discussing free
speech in criminal context).
101 Although perhaps not in complete agreement with my general approach, Professor
Greenawalt would concur here:
The theory of freedom of expression relies heavily on the possibility of the
listener's according reasoned consideration to the message of the speaker and
on the speaker's uttering what he believes to be true. In some situations the
listener is literally incapable of assessing the accuracy of an assertion before he
must act upon it. The often cited example of someone shouting "Fire" in a
crowded theater is an illustration. The members of the audience may have to
react to this factual claim before they can tell if it is true. In such circumstances, the argument that society may punish false statements is especially
strong. On other occasions, most listeners, say, to an advertised health claim,
may have time to check the accuracy of the claim but lack the practical means
or inclination to do so. Again, they may act on the claim without being able to
subject it to the kind of reasoned consideration that matters in this context,
though here members of the audience are not as defenseless as in the theater
example, because they could await verification of some sort before proceeding.
Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, supra note 100, at 678.
102 Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 372
(1979).
103 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See generally Ely, supra note 31.
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lates to the contractual function of the utterance, the
regulation should not be subjected to the intensive scrutiny required when a regulation directly implicates the
first amendment function of language."'
As developed below, some aspects of commerce-related expression might be viewed as a form of verbal conduct subject to state
regulation, 05 but this does not work as a general approach for all
commercial speech. Advertising, the focus of Professor Farber's article, is typically-like Company X's soap powder advertisement-an appeal to the general public inviting its consideration of
the advertised product or service. It is, however, rarely in a form
capable of acceptance in contract-law terms; it is not "situationaltering" in the sense that the words themselves actually change
legal entitlements. 06 That Professor Farber's analogy to implicit
contracts is inapposite is clear when one considers campaign
promises by political candidates. Candidate Y promised to be honest, energetic and effective. Certainly, such an appeal is not
thought to give rise to binding contracts with voters, and the state
can neither enforce the promises nor punish a failure to perform
them. 0 7 Since Company X's promises are in this sense functionally
identical to Candidate Y's, state regulation of the truthfulness of
Company X's promises must be premised on other grounds.
(d) The Argument Based on a Generic Cost-Benefit Analysis.

104

Farber, supra note 102, at 387.

105 See infra text accompanying notes 217 & 302-05.
1

Professor Greenawalt writes:
Given the law and the practices of social morality, the utterance of some
kinds of words in some kinds of circumstances actually changes the settings in
which we live. These utterances are situation-altering ....
Agreements between people to perform certain acts often have legal force, and even when
they do not, they alter moral obligations. An offer to enter into an agreement

also alters the normative setting, because, unless and until it is revoked, the
offer empowers the person to whom the offer is made to close the agreement by
his or her consent. Simple promises also alter one's moral responsibilities; the
person who makes a promise undertakes a new obligation, or makes even
stronger an obligation that already exists.
Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion, supra note 100, at 1091.
11 Cf. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982), where the Court struck down a Kentucky
statute that prohibited a political candidate from promising to give anything to voters in
exchange for their, support, as applied to a campaign promise to reduce official salaries:
"there are constitutional limits on the State's power to prohibit candidates from making
promises in the course of an election campaign." Id. at 55.
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Judge Posner suggests that questions concerning the scope of the
first amendment may profitably be analyzed by an economic model
of the costs and benefits of regulating speech.10 8 He concludes that
commercial speech is entitled to a lower level of protection because
the costs of regulating such speech-both in terms of the social
loss from suppressing information and the legal-error costs in attempting to distinguish harmful commercial communication from
valuable expression-are lower than the harm caused by untruthful and misleading advertising (after an appropriate discount for
the probability of its occurrence).10
Judge Posner's analysis formally expresses a view that essentially consists of three propositions: (i) the social loss from suppressing commercial speech is likely to be low because such speech
is particularly resistant to government overbearing (the "hardiness" claim); (ii) legal-error costs are likely to be low because distinguishing between truth and falsity will usually depend on questions of empirical fact rather than elusive value judgments and
because the government is not likely to be a biased regulator (the
"unbiased, competent regulator" claim); and (iii) the harm sought
to be avoided is likely to be great because false and misleading
commercial speech is likely to persuade consumers and unlikely to
be rebutted in the marketplace (the "persistent harm" claim).
(i) The "Hardiness" Claim. There are two senses in which commercial speech is said to be an especially "hardy" form of expres1 1 0 posits that political
sion. One, implied by Virginia Pharmacy,
speech is "fragile" because it may embrace particularly unpopular
minority viewpoints, i.e., it is susceptible to overdeterrence by
overbroad statutes and layers of censorship. Accordingly, to avoid
such a chilling effect, there is a need for certain protective doctrines, such as those permitting overbreadth challenges and disfavoring the imposition of prior restraints. Commercial speech, by
contrast, because of the profit motive, is more likely to prove resis-

108

Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1 (1986).

Judge Posner offers a slightly modified version of the formula used by Judge Learned Hand
in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950) (whether gravity of evil sought
to be prevented, discounted by its improbability, justifies invasion of free speech), afl'd, 341
U.S. 494 (1951).
109 Posner, supra note 108.
11 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 772 n.24 (1976).
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tant to such a chilling effect. Since the commercial speaker will
continue to speak despite state regulation, why not regulate?
This contrast attempts to prove too much. As a general matter,
"hardiness" is a function not of the commercial content of the
message but of the economic position of the speaker. In the commercial sphere, if Company X has a strong market share, it is
likely to be able to withstand even overbroad regulation and attempt to insist on an appropriate narrowing of restrictions. The
same can be said of incumbent candidates and well-funded challengers in the political sphere, or of powerful newspapers and
broadcasters in the libel context.
First amendment protection is most needed for the marginal
speaker, the new entrant in a particular industry, the rival political
candidate with limited resources, the small radical newsletter, and
so on. For such speakers, the hardiness of their powerful opponents or other establishment institutions is irrelevant."'
Judge Posner offers a somewhat different version of the hardiness claim: "The creator of product-specific information ordinarily
can recoup all or at least most of his investment through selling
the product, and.., in an information market that operates without substantial externalities, regulation is not so apt to carry us far
away from the optimal level of production. 1 11 2 The point here is
that unlike the producer of ideological speech, whose main benefits
of information dissemination are deemed to be external and hence
is quite sensitive to anything that raises the costs of production,
the commercial advertiser is capable of capturing virtually all of
the benefits of the information produced. Therefore, the commercial advertiser is a more "robust" speaker, better able to withstand
overbroad regulation.
This observation may well explain the Court's resistance to overbreadth challenges and tolerance of prior restraints in the advertising context, but it does not provide a basis for distinguishing Com-

"I The advocates of censorship observe that commercial advertising grew and flourished
long before it received the imprimatur of first amendment protection; it continues to do so
despite its second-class constitutional status. A patient may survive a dose of the wrong
medicine, yet mere survivial is no validation of his treatment. Moreover, what we cannot
ever know is how much useful commercial information was chilled by state regulation. Regulation raises transaction costs substantially. At the margins, such additional expenses may
have affected decisions whether to enter (or remain) in the market at all.

"2 Posner, supra note

108, at 40.
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pany X's advertisement from archetypical political speech such as
Candidate Y's promotional campaign for political office. 113
(ii) The "Unbiased, Competent Regulator" Claim. The risks of
legal error in the regulation of advertising, it is asserted, are likely
to be low because the issues are likely to hinge upon matters of
demonstrable fact." 4 The state is more likely to be genuinely interested in keeping false, misleading information out of the marketplace than in harboring a bias in favor of one viewpoint over
another.
The claim that regulatory bias is absent in the commercial
speech arena is overdrawn for a number of reasons. First, it is difficult to understand the suggestion that the risk of bias is associated
with the presence or absence of a commercial motivation for the
message being regulated." 5 From a constitutional standpoint, the
Consumer Reports critique of ABC Soap Flakes and Company X's
advertisement disparaging its competitor's product should be
treated identically: concern about over-regulation is not a function
of the likelihood of partisan bias on the regulator's part. Even if we
"'3 Professor Cass writes, "In good measure, it would seem, the political advertisement is
no different from any other brand-specific promotion in the degree to which the sponsoring
firm can be expected to internalize the benefits of the message." Cass, supra note 49, at
1369.
"' Company X's advertisements may contain empirically verifiable propositions about
the properties of its soap powder, the truth or falsity of which presumably can be ascertained. Some advertisements, however, are based on qualitative assessments by consumers
or experts-subjective opinions that cannot be verified through product testing. Moreover,
regulation of "misleading" advertisements or "misleading" solicitations of business by professionals presents a considerably more difficult enterprise. The issue here is how recipients
of the advertisement are likely to construe its message and raises questions about the extent
to which government may act out of paternalistic impulses. See Shiffrin, supra note 19, at
1219.
For example, Professor Shiffrin writes:
Although no one supposes the FTC is infallible, we have significantly less
doubt about government's capacity to define truth when it moves against a
deceptive advertiser who makes an allegedly false statement about its own or
another's product, than we do when the government moves against a source
that has no profit motive in the sale of a product. The first amendment will
ordinarily bar the latter action even if the false statement were the same one
that had been made by an advertiser. Consider, again, for example, an injunction action against a consumer magazine or an author of a book who has no
financial interest in the product discussed. The first amendment would prevent
such an injunction because we fear that the government has no other reason
for restricting the publication except a desire to suppress a certain version of
truth.
Id. at 1265.
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assume a well-intentioned regulator, the regulator's conception of
the public good (that of protecting the allegedly unsophisticated
consumer) may give rise to a "bias" of sorts in favor of regulation
rather than any particular viewpoint."' The regulator's paternalistic bias may serve to impede the flow of truthful commercial information, thereby distorting the process of private, decentralized
decisionmaking. Such an outcome is antithetical to the first
amendment premise that the people are likely to be better informed and to make better decisions (whether affecting them privately or as a collective whole) if a free marketplace for information controls. 1 7
Secondly, there will be situations where the regulator cannot be
presumed to be wholly unbiased. In some instances the bias may in
fact be benign, such as the SEC's purported solicitude for the
small, unsophisticated investor. In others, the "benign" regulatory
purpose may mask a predisposition to favor the entrenched
1 "
establishment."
Finally, fear of official bias, while it may explain some aspects of
the first amendment's protective apparatus, is not the sole basis

11 The regulator may be influenced (consciously or unconsciously) by the urge to justify
his existence. As Justice Brennan observed, "the censor's business is to censor, [and] there
inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive than a court-part of an independent
branch of government-to the constitutionally protected interests in free expre_-sion."
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965).
11
As will be demonstrated in Part II, I am not suggesting that government cannot act to
bar false or misleading commercial advertising, or that truthful information, even in the
noncommercial sphere, can never be made actionable when it causes demonstrable injury to
third parties. See infra text accompanying notes 163-69, 271-85 & 338-44.
118 The presence of such bias may in fact inform many of the commercial speech cases
involving regulation of advertising by professionals. In these cases the rules themselves are
often the product of negotiation with establishment practitioners, the regulators are drawn
from their ranks, and the regulatory attitude is one of reflexive distrust of new forms of
competition. Compare Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (state may not
prohibit lawyers from soliciting business by direct mailings to potential clients); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (state may not prohibit use of illustrations in attorney advertising); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (state may not restrict advertising by lawyers to ten limited categories of information); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state may not prohibit lawyers from advertising); and Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (state may
not prohibit licensed pharmacist from advertising prices of prescription drugs) with Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (state may prohibit practice of optometry under trade
name and require regulatory board members to be members of professional organization of
optometrists); and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (state may prohibit
lawyers from soliciting clients in person). See generally McChesney, supra note 32.
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for constitutional protection. The Sullivan standard of "actual
malice,""' 9 for example, is designed to encourage criticism of official conduct, and is not a response to likely bias in the courtroom.
There may not be a similar need for "strategic protection for falsehoods" in the commercial area, 120 but the societal commitment to
decentralized decisionmaking in economic matters supports close
scrutiny of regulations impairing the free flow of commercial
information.
(iii) The "PersistentHarm" Claim. Although, as Justice Powell
observed in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' there is no constitutional value in a false statement of fact,122 the Constitution does
require the state to tolerate, up to a point, 12 3 false statements of
fact made in the marketplace of ideas. Commercial advertising, by
contrast, is given no such latitude; false commercial information
may be systematically barred by the state. Is false speech in the
commercial marketplace likely to generate harms so resistant to
correction that it merits, as a categorical matter, a lower level of
first amendment solicitude than false statements in the marketplace of ideas?
The argument is often made that advertisers know the truth
about their products and, because consumers cannot easily verify
quality and performance claims (at least not without first purchasing the products being advertised), it is not unreasonable to impose liability on advertisers for false statements of fact. 2 4 Because
the rewards of capturing the market are great, the temptation to
puff (if not to misrepresent outright) is equally great. Accordingly,

"'See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254

(1963) (holding state cannot award

damages to public official for defamatory falsehood unless he proves "actual malice"--knowledge or reckless disregard).
120 Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1269. Arguably, the Sullivan "actual malice" test may be
appropriate for product-disparagement expression. See infra text accompanying notes 18386.
121 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
122

Id. at 340.

123There are instances when false statements of fact can be punished despite their occurrence in a noncommercial context. For example, perjury-the deliberate falsification of factual testimony-is a criminal offense. Moreover, Sullivan in no way created an absolute
barrier to causes of action for libel; it merely created a "breathing space" to encourage criticism of official conduct, that might otherwise be deterred by excessive self-censorship for
fear of liability for good-faith error.
12 See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 777 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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the state is deemed to have a particularly strong interest in protecting the gullible and helpless consumer by aggressively policing
commercial advertising for accuracy.
Assuming the state's concern for the easily misled consumer is a
legitimate justification for the regulating of Company X's advertising, does not that analysis also apply to political advertising? Political candidates are also better able to assess the truthfulness of
their factual campaign claims than the voters; the rewards of successful persuasion are great; and the resulting temptation to exaggerate personal successes and an opponent's failures is equally
great. The public is at least as susceptible to the blandishments
and misrepresentations of manipulative politicians as it is to the
false claims of advertisers.1 2 5 The consequences of misguided decisionmaking may, in fact, be far graver in the political arena.
It is inconceivable that a political candidate could be required to
utilize only a prescribed format for campaign advertisements, 2 ' or
to submit the text of voter solicitation materials to a "Political Exchange Commission" 12 7 for approval prior to distributions. 12 8 Modern society depends upon countervailing private institutions to ferret out deception in the political sector. Political campaigns today
involve more than discreet editorials in local newspapers. Candidates compete for the spotlight on a national scale and increasingly
are subjected to intense examination upon all the details of their
lives. Their political records and life histories are scrutinized and
brought into people's homes via both the print and broadcast media. Debates are televised, as are press conferences. These mechanisms serve as "truth-testers" helping the public to make informed
judgments about the candidates.
Although it is perhaps unrealistic to expect that the same bright
spotlight directed toward political campaigns will be turned on
commercial advertising, it is wrong to assume that there are no
analogous "truth-testers" in the commercial marketplace, where
consumer advocates and competitors are quick to challenge false
12 In reality, however, the public may view both advertising and politics with equal skepticism as enterprises engaged in the business of creating and selling an image to the public.
"2 See infra text accompanying notes 230-85 (discussing regulation of securities advertising under Securities Act of 1933).
127 Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1266.
'28
See infra text accompanying notes 345-419 (describing regulation of shareholder proxy
material).
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advertising claims. Organizations like Consumers Union now play
an active role in providing useful comparative information on
products and services. 129 Not surprisingly, stories of defective
products, misleading advertisements, and other instances of consumer fraud generate sufficient audience interest to warrant considerable attention from the broadcast and print media. 130 Moreover, product competitors themselves increasingly do not hesitate
to challenge advertising schemes they consider misleading or
false. 31 Government, too, plays a role in generating corrective information through consumer affairs offices.
It would seem, therefore, that the likelihood of the consumer
succumbing to Company X's false advertising is not necessarily
greater than the likelihood of the voter succumbing to Candidate
Y's false campaign promises. Admittedly, there is often a difference in the time frame in which decisions must be made. An election campaign takes place over a period of (at least) weeks or
months, during which time the press and the airwaves are filled
with competing informational messages concerning the candidates
in the upcoming election. Consumers, by contrast, are exposed to a
barrage of commercial advertisements concerning a multitude of
products on a daily basis. They may see an advertisement for Com-

129 Indeed, groups like Consumers Union have earned the trust of the public over many
years of evaluating products. In a 1982 poll by Louis Harris & Associates, the Consumers
Union was found to "do[] a better job protecting the interests of consumers" than "the
Reagan Administration, private industry, Ralph Nader, state or federal government agencies
or the Consumer Product Safety Commission." deCourcy Hinds, How Consumers Union
Puts Teeth into "Let the Seller Beware", N.Y. Times, June 11, 1988, at 37, col. 2.
130Nearly every local television news program has a consumer "trouble shooter"; David
Horowitz has his own television show; and Ralph Nader (a minor folk hero to some) is a
frequent guest on popular talk shows.
' Private actions by business competitors alleging false advertising may be brought
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988). See, eg.,
McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 848 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1988) (challenging
Advil's televised commercial message that "like Tylenol, Advil doesn't upset my stomach").
The number of such lawsuits has recently begun to increase substantially. See Best, supra
note 33, at 29. However, the Act has been held inapplicable to false claims concerning competitors' (rather than the advertiser's own) products. See, e.g., Bernard Food Indus. v.
Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970). A bill, sponsored by Senator DeConcini, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights
and Trademarks of the Judiciary Committee, to amend the Act to make explicit its application to claims about competitors' products was passed by the Senate on May 13, 1988.
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).

1990]

SECURITIES REGULATION

pany X's soap powder mixed in with the dozens of other products
being advertised, but may or may not see advertisements for competing brands of soap powder before heading for the store. Even
under these circumstances, those who are so inclined can make it
their business to investigate competing products, and are likely to
do so where major "one-time" purchases are concerned (cars, major appliances, audio equipment, etc.). As we shall see,' 3 2 government has a proper, though limited, role to play in regulating false,
misleading product and service advertising. But it cannot be said,
as a categorical matter, that the audience for commercial messages
is so unsophisticated and vulnerable to deception, the harms
caused by erroneous commercial information so great and enduring, or the market for such information so incapable of generating
corrective data that government must be accorded plenary authority over the content of commercial advertising and its dissemination to the public.
3. The Essential Difference: The Presence or Absence of
Speaker Interests. This Article has surveyed the conventional justifications for the disparate regulatory treatment accorded Company X's soap powder advertisement and Candidate I's political
advertisement. Intuitively it seems right that there should be some
difference in treatment, but is there a justification for different
rules governing these two functionally identical communications
that does not depend on some anterior assignment of second-class
status to the speech of commercial actors?
The answer, I suggest, lies in the fact that society may wish to
protect Candidate Y's self-promotion for entirely noninstrumental
reasons, even if it is false and misleads voters to their detriment.
Candidate Y's advertisement involves an element of speaker selfexpression, whereas Company X's promotion expresses no element
of the essence or ideas of the advertiser. The first amendment thus
protects Candidate Y's false or misleading (though expressive)
speech even if it makes no useful contribution to the marketplace
of ideas; there is no comparable reason to protect Company X's
false or misleading speech.
The presence of speaker interests in expressive communications
is central to understanding the permissive standards that apply in

132

See infra text accompanying notes 163-214.
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If the first amendment was not a

shield to protect a speaker's expressive interests, would it be reasonable to say, as Justice Powell declares in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 34 that no ideas are "false"? 3 5 Certainly there are ideas that
society condemns as false, even abhorrent-e.g., espousals of racial
and ethnic hatred. We risk terrible consequences if these false
ideas gain broad acceptance and take root in the community. Nevertheless, society tolerates the expression of dangerous, wrongheaded beliefs; we are left to rely on the marketplace of ideas to
generate corrective true beliefs to counteract the false.' It is unreasonable to say that these abhorrent ideas do not cause harm.
They often do cause harm-at least in the short run-to susceptible listeners whose perceptions about self and others may be irreparably distorted, and, more importantly, to the objects of groupbased vilification who must continue to confront widely-held
prejudice.
Despite the risks, we tolerate the circulation of such beliefs because, under our Constitution, even if the truth of an idea could be
known-if one could determine conclusively which beliefs were
true and which false 3 -the first amendment would still protect
13 In reviewing an earlier draft of this paper, Professor Lawrence G. Sager of New York
University School of Law suggested that the first amendment's protection of false, misleading expressive communications is better viewed as a protection of "speech events" rather
than speaker interests. He offered the hypothetical of a recently discovered abandoned text
or film for which the original speaker could not be identified, and yet the suppression of
which would not be tolerated under the first amendment. The hypothetical suggests, however, that there would typically be a "speaker interest" present-say, someone wishing to
republish or exhibit the work; if not, a potential listener could rely upon the "right to receive" decisions culminating in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
See supra text accompanying note 78.
.34 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
131 Id. at 339.
". See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an
opposing view from a left-wing political perspective, see Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in
R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MARCUSE, A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE (1969).
"' A current example of such a "false" statement of ideas would be the disputation of the
historical events commonly described as the Holocaust, notwithstanding the mountains of
empirical evidence that it occurred.
No doubt part of the explanation for such tolerance is that a "true" idea is in the eye of
the beholder. It is too slippery to grasp with certainty, too linked with individual opinion,
and too unknowable in any empirically verifiable way. But even if we could conjure examples in which we control the variables to screen out (to the fullest extent possible) statements of elusive opinion, leaving only statements of verifiable fact, we would still treat political and commercial "falsity" differently. What accounts for this disparate treatment of false
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the right of the believer in untruth to express his ideas and to try
to persuade others of his beliefs. This is so because the believer in
untruth, as a speaker, has expressive rights entirely independent of
the truthfulness of the message. He has the right to achieve the
satisfaction of speaking his mind, right or wrong, because of
whatever value the expression of his personal urgings may have for
the development of his sense of self-at least until he commands a
sufficient following or musters the daring to translate his ideas into
actions that harm others.
As for Candidate Y's advertisement, the public has no interest in
receiving (and perhaps believing) false, or misleading, self-serving
political promotions. There is, in fact, no audience-centered reason
to erect Sullivan-type1 81 barriers against liability for such false
statements. If the Constitution provides a "breathing space" for
false, misleading political speech by Candidate Y, it is because
there exists a protected interest in self-expression even where audience interests are not plausibly furthered. Often in the clash of opposing campaigns, tinder the glare of a vigilant media, the "truth"
will emerge, but there is no assurance that this must always occur.
Such falsehoods are tolerated because we are freer as a society
when individuals are permitted to engage in unhindered selfexpression.
It is this self-expressive component that is missing in conventional commercial advertising. However interestingly or artistically
presented, 8 9 Company X's soap powder advertisement is devoid of

nonexpressive promotional advertising is the absence of protectible speaker interests on the

part of the advertiser.
IS

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963).

The creative presentations of commercial designers or advertising firms should not
change the analysis. Notwithstanding Professor Redish's suggestion to the contrary, see
Redish, supra note 56, at 446-47, an advertisement that merely proposes a commercial
transaction is nonexpressive even though it may reflect the creative and artistic efforts of
commercial design or advertising firms. The message cannot be analyzed except in relation
to the speaker, and the speaker is not the advertising firm, it is the aduertiser.Conceivably,
government intervention to disable particular artists from functioning in an industry or to
limit the range of materials or artistic devices to be employed might raise separate first
amendment concerns. However, insofar as regulation is directed at the content of the promotional message, the involvement of creative personnel does not alter the fact that the
message seeks merely to promote a transaction; therefore it does not implicate the advertiser's interests as a speaker.
Of course, advertisers might, under certain circumstances, form their own "in house" advertising departments, vertically integrating both the speaker and the artist. The creation of
159
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any speaker's expressive interest in the communication of ideas (or
sentiments). 140 Advertising that "does no more than propose a
commercial transaction"'" reflects no speaker interest beyond the
desire to stimulate consumption of the products or services being
offered, and is protected only insofar as it furthers the consumer's
constitutional right to receive truthful economic information.
The test is not the motivation of the speaker but the content of
the message. If the message communicates a point of view or espouses something other than a commercial transaction, it is irrelevant that the speaker hopes to generate corporate good-will (that
may someday lead to sales) in addition to imparting information. 1 42 If, on the other hand, the message seeks directly to induce
consumption of a particular product or service, it is a nonexpressive communication entitled to constitutional protection only to

an "advertiser-artist" might be viewed as introducing an expressive element to otherwise
nonexpressive communications. To that extent, promotional advertisements would analytically resemble dual-content messages. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42. Just as the
presence of an expressive message does not immunize a promotional advertisement from
regulation designed to prevent falsity, the presence of artistic expression cannot immunize
the nonexpressive promotional content of an advertiser's message. A graphic design, if hung
in an art gallery, would enjoy the same degree of protection as any other artwork. However,
the same design, if presented to the public on a soup can or advertisement to sell a product,
may be regulated for falsity.
140 There may be instances when those who advertise a product or service sincerely believe they are advancing a "cause." The fact that they believe in their products in no way
alters the nonexpressive content of the advertising itself, which proposes a commercial
transaction.
14 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973). Some advertisements both propose a commercial transaction and present the advertiser's views on a particular subject. Regulation of the promotional message should be
treated like that of any other commercial advertising, whereas the ideological or ideational
message falls under the rules governing expressive communications generally. Difficulties
may arise, however, where regulation takes the form of requiring the advertisement to carry
a "public interest" message, say, a warning about the health hazards of smoking. Although
such a regulation could not constitutionally be applied to a purely ideological message, it
may be warranted in the interests of preventing false or misleading product and service
advertising. An advertiser is certainly free to separate the advertisement into two different
messages. However, where the advertiser insists on including both messages in the same
communication, it is not thereby immunized from requirements which permissibly apply to
promotional advertising.
112 Consider the newspaper editorials by Mobil Oil Company or the Grace Corporation's
controversial televised "mini-dramas" about the dangers of an unchecked economic deficit.
They contain substantive messages expressing points of view to be communicated to the
public. That they also remind the public about the company's name does not detract from
the expressive content of the communications.
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the extent it furthers audience interests, even if the advertiser is
passionately committed to his product or service.
The distinction between nonexpressive promotional communications and communications charged with a speaker's expressive interests offers the courts a more meaningful tool for first amendment analysis than the hitherto clumsy distinctions drawn between
so-called "commercial" and "noncommercial" speech. All speech
arising in the course of commercial activities is speech. One subset
of such expression-promotional advertising that "does no more
than propose a commercial transaction" 143--differs from the rest in
that it is protected only to the extent that the speaker provides the
recipient with truthful information concerning lawful products or
services. Other subsets of commerce-related speech (such as the
speech of lawyers, investment advisers or other professionals, the
intracorporate communications of shareholders, 14 4 or the communi-

cations of parties to a labor dispute) may be expressive in nature
despite their commercial subject matter. Under this approach,
there is no category of subordinate "commercial speech," no Central Hudson1

45

intermediate level of scrutiny.

46

Rather, speech

lacking in expressive interests (purely promotional advertising) can
be regulated in order to promote audience interests in the receipt
of truthful commercial information;1 47 and speech imbued with a
speaker's rights to self-expression can only be regulated under
principles that would be applicable to any other expressive communication, whether it be political, religious, artistic or economic
in content.
C. Permissible Regulation of Promotional Advertising
Because promotional advertising derives its constitutional value
solely from audience interests in the flow of truthful commercial

143

Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385.

144 See infra text accompanying notes 286-419.
145

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).

I" Although the first amendment affords commercial speech a lesser protection than

other speech or expression, id. at 562, state restriction of such speech must still directly
advance a substantial government interest and be no more broad than necessary to advance
this interest. Id. at 566.
147 That is not to say that any and all measures intended to promote accurate, nonmisleading promotional advertising would pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 272-85.
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information, there is an appropriate, albeit limited, role for certain
state regulations that would ordinarily be proscribed in the context
of expressive communications.
1. Advertising May Be Prohibited When the Underlying Activity is Unlawful. One rule that informs all of the Court's commercial speech decisions is that advertising that promotes unlawful activity is beyond the protection of the first amendment.14 8 By
contrast, public debate concerning unlawful activity may not be restrained by the state. Consider, for example, advertisements placed
by the National Rifle Association urging the public to resist an unjust law in states where the sale and possession of handguns are
prohibited. Such editorial advertisements (assuming they stop
short of creating a "clear and present danger" '14 9) may either contribute to the marketplace of ideas or advance the speaker's interest in self-expression; in any event, this example demonstrates that
the legality of the subject matter does not always define the protected sphere of ideological expression.
Advertisements by a local mail-order house offering handguns
for sale within a state that prohibits such transactions'0 might,
however, be treated very differently. This is because commercial
advertising receives constitutional protection only insofar as it advances audience interests, and the public has no legitimate interest
in learning about and effecting an unlawful transaction. Information contained in advertisements directly promoting the illegal sale
of handguns is of no legitimate use to people forbidden to purchase
and possess them and, hence, is unprotected.'
The illegality of the underlying activity stripped a gender-based
"help wanted" advertisement of whatever first amendment protection it might otherwise have had in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.152 This Pittsburgh Press
"48 See, e.g., Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64; Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973).
149 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (first articulation of "clear and prosent danger" standard).
180Regulatory difficulties arise from our federal structure. See infra text accompanying
notes 152-55.
11 That the advertisement is unprotected does not necessarily mean that the newspaper
in which it appears can be subjected to administrative penalties or held liable in tort, without proof that the newspaper knew or should have known that unlawful activity was being
solicited.
1.2413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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rule required some qualification in view of the limited regulatory
reach of a particular state's laws, however. In Bigelow v. Virginia,153 decided two years later, an advertisement for abortion services in New York had been placed in a Virginia newspaper. Virginia prohibited abortions at the time, but New York did not. The
Court explained that, unlike the gender-based offers of employment in Pittsburgh Press, both traveling to New York and obtaining an abortion there were entirely lawful acts in which Virginia residents were free to engage.1 Under Bigelow, then, a state
may not bar advertising promoting activity lawful elsewhere in the

country, even though it can and does proscribe the transactions
themselves from being consummated within its borders. '
Notwithstanding Posadas' bizarre revision of first amendment
principles, 15 1 the logical corollary of Pittsburgh Press and Bigelow
is that, as a general matter, truthful advertising may not be barred
when the underlying activity is lawful.1 57 Until the state takes the

421 U.S. 809 (1975).
15

Id.

at 821-22.

Id. at 824-25. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), the activities advertised in Bigelow were
not only lawful but constitutionally protected under Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Admittedly, the Court in Bigelow was not required to consider "the precise extent to which the
First Amendment permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State
may legitimately regulate or even prohibit." Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825. Given the geographically limited legislative jurisdiction of a state, the state cannot extend its prohibition to
conduct outside of its borders. Because the people have a constitutional right to learn about
the availability of products or services that are lawful elsewhere in this country, the state
may not prohibit truthful, nomuisleading advertising promoting such products or services.
Hence, the affirmative constitutional protection that attached to the underlying activity in
Bigelow is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for voiding such an advertising ban.
State regulation of the sale of securities ("Blue Sky Laws") varies from state to state. See
generally L. Loss & E. Cowurr, BLUE SKY LAws (1958); L. Loss, FuNDAENTALS OF SECwUTIES REGULATION 8-23 (1988). It has been suggested that aspects of this system of Blue Sky
regulation may violate the first amendment. See Schoeman, Subscription Advisers, Blue
Sky Registration and the FirstAmendment, 33 Bus. LAw. 249 (1977). Whatever the status
of those state law provisions regulating the intrastate sale of securities, any attempt to regulate out-of-state advertising would presumably raise first amendment questions under
Bigelow.
"I"See supra notes 80-99 and accompanying text.
15 The prohibition of cigarette and liquor advertising on the broadcast media does not
compel a different view. The current regulatory scheme does not constitute an absolute ban
on the advertising of liquor or cigarettes, which are still advertised in print. Indeed, for the
reasons suggested in the text, if Congress were to follow Canada's lead, and mandate a total
advertising ban (without first prohibiting smoking itself), such a measure would be invalid
under the first amendment. See Burns, CanadaPasses Law To Ban Tobacco Ads and Curb
15
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step of outlawing the particular commercial activity, it may not attempt to dissuade participation in that activity by suppressing
truthful speech that would inform the public about its existencel"S

All well and good, some would say, but doesn't this criticism
overlook the fact that legislatures decide to legalize certain activities for different reasons? Some activities are made lawful because
they are within the zone of socially acceptable behavior. Others are
legalized in order to minimize attendant evils-such as collateral
criminal activity or mob influence. In the latter circumstances, the
state is admitting defeat-it has failed to prevent the activity in
question. The state hopes by legalization at least to address some
of the curable evils associated with the activity. Surely, it is contended, the state should not be disabled from dampening demand
for the underlying activity, simply because it has found it infeasi-

ble to ban that activity? 159

Yet there are reasons to be hesitant about approving the suppression of advertising a lawful activity, however much the state
disapproves of it. Some activity may be noisily condemned by powerful and influential minorities who create the appearance of widespread public disapproval, even though they are unable to marshal
sufficient support to outlaw the activity they disfavor. It is exceedingly difficult to determine why activity deemed harmful by some
sectors of society remains lawful. Consider the controversy over

Smoking, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1988, at Al, col. 1; infra text accompanying notes 158-62.
Moreover, the courts have often referred to the "unique characteristics" of the electronic
media, rendering them "especially subject to regulation in the public interest." Bigelow, 421
U.S. at 825 n.10 (quoting Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584
(D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972)); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748 (1978) (stating broadcasting of offensive sexual and excretory language merits limited
first amendment protection); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (discussing fairness doctrine that requires public issues be presented on broadcast stations and
each side be given fair coverage). The special regulatory issues that surround the broadcast
media are beyond the scope of this Article. Commercial advertising, of course, does not
receive a higher level of protection than other speech. If the Court is prepared to condone
content-based regulation of expressive speech on television and radio in order to limit the
exposure of minor children to potentially harmful programming, the same would apply to
promotional advertising messages on the broadcast media.
158 Other forms of persuasion may be open to the government. See M. YVDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION (1983); Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565 (1980) (discussing government's role in communicating and
influencing societal values in context of models to integrate government speech into constitutional framework).
189 For a forceful expression of this position, see Cass, supra note 49, at 1379-80.
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cigarette smoking. Despite considerable evidence about the health
dangers of smoking (to smokers and nonsmokers alike), there is, as
yet, no prohibition on smoking by adults. 160 Do state legislatures
decline to prohibit smoking because they know (remembering the
disaster of Prohibition) that it would not work anyway? Or because of the power and influence of the tobacco lobby? Or because
legislators suspect that the majority of citizens would reject such a
proposal as an infringement on personal lifestyle choices?
How would the true motivation for permitting smoking (while
prohibiting its promotion) be determined? Would it suffice for the
legislature to issue a self-serving statement to the effect that, although resigned to the inevitability of some people smoking, it
wishes to prevent its proliferation and therefore prohibits all advertising of tobacco products? How great must the dangers that
flow from the activity be in order to justify the suppression of
16
speech?

1

This rationale for suppressing truthful promotions about lawful
activity, if it is not to curtail drastically the public's informational
rights and embroil courts in difficult questions of legislative motivation, must be confined to activity that is either universally condenmed or nearly so. Narcotics abuse (and possibly prostitution)"6 2
may come within this category; tobacco and alcohol use seem less
obvious candidates. In any event, this line of argument is inapplicable to the commercial activity that is the subject of typical government regulation.
2. Postexpression Remedies for Fraudulent or Misleading Advertising are Permissible. The public's first amendment right to
receive information is nowhere absolute. Even with respect to noncommercial information central to self-government-criticism of
official misconduct-intentional or reckless falsehoods may be
made actionable.'6 And negligently false statements of fact that
injure the reputations of individuals who are not public figures lose

I" Various states and cities have enacted restrictions on smoking in public places, but the
manufacture and sale of tobacco products are nowhere prohibited.
"I'Consider that the activities being advocated in the "clear and present danger" cases
were invariably unlawful.
162 Prostitution is not outlawed everywhere. It has been legalized in Nevada and abroad.
See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 201.354 (1987) (excepting licensed houses of prostitution from
general prohibition).
'" New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963).
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all first amendment protection.164
The permissible scope of state regulation of commercial advertising is broader still, because the necessity for tolerating falsehood to
provide "breathing space" for self-expression drops out of the balance. Since false or misleading advertising is of no informational
value to consumers engaged in the process of private decisionmaking, it is unprotected. Assuming the regulatory scheme currently in
place to check false or misleading advertising is constitutionally
permissible, its constitutionality is based on the lack of both a
speaker's expressive interest and any informational value to the recipient consumer, rather than on the supposed constitutional inferiority of commercial speech."" 5
(a) Misleading, Though Literally Truthful Advertising. Although there is no first amendment barrier to the regulation of
false or misleading commercial advertising, it is not always easy to
distinguish the true statement from the false. The fact-opinion dichotomy looms as large here as in the libel area. 16 Moreover, an
advertisement may contain statements which are literally true and
yet convey a false message to the consumer because of its context
or its omissions.
There are many ways partially truthful advertising can mislead
" "[S]o long as [states] do not impose liability without fault," they are free to punish
defamatory falsehoods that cause injury to such individuals. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
I'l I do not dispute Professor Shiffrin's point that in some contexts we may also have less
reason to fear that government regulators will be acting out of improper censorial motives.
See Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1265. The decreased likelihood of such bias may be relevant
in deciding whether certain protective doctrines, such as those concerning overbreadth and
prior restraints, need be extended to commercial advertising. See infra text accompanying
notes 187-96. However, if advertising is viewed as fully protected speech, and the absence of
government bias would not justify regulation of false or misleading noncommercial speech,
then existing regulations of commercial advertising must be justified on other grounds, if at
all.
.6 Presumably, the fact-opinion distinction recognized in Gertz would apply to commercial advertising as well. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40. Bona fide testimonials by disinterested consumers, for example, should be absolutely protected. Although the question is
somewhat closer, subjective evaluations by an advertiser of its product's relative merits
(which do not involve false assertions of fact) should also be protected. The difficulties inherent in disentangling opinion from fact, which pervade the noncommercial sphere as well,
are considered in Best, supra note 33. See also Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc) (holding defamatory statements in newspaper column not actionable assertions of fact, but constitutionally protected expressions of opinion), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1127 (1985); Note, The Fact-OpinionDeterminationin Defamation, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 809
(1988) (arguing that Olrman test underprotects speech on matters of public concern).
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the consumer: by selectively omitting certain (i.e., negative) testing
results, by selectively editing legitimate product testimonials, or by
manipulating the context in which claims are made. Although Virginia Pharmacy1 67 cautions that the state may not indulge in excessive paternalism on behalf of consumers,1 68 an advertisement
that would tend to mislead the "reasonable consumer"-someone
reasonably intelligent and reasonably skeptical-is failing to perform its constitutionally protected informational function. A finding that an advertisement would be misleading to such a consumer
is equivalent, from a first amendment standpoint, to a finding that
it is false. Therefore, a proper final adjudication that an advertisement is misleading may subject it to state regulation without violating first amendment principles even though it contains literally
truthful statements. 6 9
(b) The Role of Scienter. Assuming that the state is capable of
identifying the false or misleading advertising statement, the question remains what the appropriate level of culpability should be
before penalties may, as a constitutional matter, attach to such
statements. The argument could be made that Sullivan's actualmalice scienter standard17 0 is a sine qua non for fully protected
speech, and that if the Sullivan privilege does not extend to a particular category of speech, the status of that speech is subordinate.
As the Gertz'7 1 Court's refusal to extend Sullivan generally to
"matter[s] of public or general interest"17 2 illustrates, however, a
decision to withhold Sullivan-level protection is not an indicator of

167

Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 Us.

748 (1976).
16 Id. at 770.
i" See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980) (state may ban communications more likely to deceive public than inform it) (citing
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447

(1978).
170

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963) (holding state cannot award

damages to public official for defamatory falsehood unless he proves "actual malice"-knowledge or reckless disregard).
171 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
11 Id. at 346. A plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44
(1971), maintained that Sullivan should be extended to defamatory statements injuring
nonpublic figures, as long as they involved a "matter of public or general interest." This

suggestion was rejected by the Court in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346. See also Dun & Bradstreet,

Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756 (1985) (Powell, J., authoring plurality
opinion).
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the constitutional value of the speech in question.
Sullivan provides "strategic protection for falsehood" 17 3 in the
context of a particularly vulnerable category of expressive communication: criticism of the conduct of public officials and public
figures. Because such expression is to be encouraged, it is protected-even at some cost to reputational interests. Without such
protection, speakers might be chilled by the prospect of liability
and avoid such expression altogether. Certain characteristics of
promotional advertising-the strong incentives that motivate commercial advertisers, the relatively greater verifiability of claims
made about products or services, and that false information, regardless of scienter, is of no value to its recipients-may justify
withholding this special measure of strategic protection from promotional advertising.
Consider the FTC's regulatory authority over false, misleading
advertising.17 When the FTC finds that an advertiser has engaged
in an "unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce"
under section 5 of the FTCA17 5 by making false or misleading advertising claims, the agency will issue a "cease and desist" order
prohibiting the advertiser from continuing to engage in the unlawful practice. 176 Because such advertising has failed (and will continue to fall) to perform its informational function, thereby losing
its constitutional protection, the state may order the discontinuation of a false advertising campaign whether or not the advertiser
knowingly or intentionally (or even carelessly) misrepresented the
truth.17 7 Put another way, there is no reason to require scienter (or

Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1269.
Although I offer a brief consideration of FTC regulation of false, misleading advertising, see infra text accompanying notes 175-84, a treatment of all of the complexities of
advertising regulation would be beyond the scope of this Article.
27 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988) ("Unfair methods or competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.") The
FTC is charged with "prevent[ing] persons.., from using" unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Id.
173
174

178 Id. When the FTC has reason to believe that an advertiser is engaging in such a practice, it may "in the interest of the public" hold an adjudicative hearing to determine
whether or not to issue a "cease and desist" order. Any advertiser who subsequently violates
such an order may be subject to fines of up to $10,000 per day per violation. The FTC also
has the power preliminarily to enjoin false advertisements where such action "would be to
the interest of the public." Id.
177 Intent to deceive is not an element of a deceptive advertising violation. See, e.g.,
Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 763 n.70 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
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indeed a culpable mental state of any kind) before prospectively
restricting the republication of false or misleading advertising. 17 8

In addition to its power to issue cease and desist orders, the FTC
has the power to penalize knowing violations of its rules and or-

ders."' But where the agency seeks not simply to prevent republication of false, misleading advertising but to penalize the advertiser as well, there can be no strict liability for factual errors.18 0 As
Gertz suggests, even false statements of fact may not, without

some degree of fault, be made the basis of civil penalties amounting to more than the equivalent of rescission.181 Thus, the FTC itself requires there to be a knowing violation of a cease and desist
order before seeking to impose financial penalties through a civil
action." 2

Although the Gertz standard is sufficient protection for nonexpressive promotional advertising,1 83 expressive communications
arising out of commercial activity-e.g., Consumer Reports' evalu-

ations of particular product performance-should enjoy the greater
degree of
malice.'"
products
speaker's

protection afforded by the Sullivan standard of actual
Nonpromotional publications that analyze commercial
and attempt to educate the consumer convey the
opinions based on comparative analyses, expressing a

950 (1978); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
983 (1977).
18 Indeed, where commercial transactions occurred on the basis of false or misleading
advertising, there is no first amendment scienter requirement if the state chooses to compel
the advertiser to rescind the transaction or otherwise make the consumer whole. Cf. 1933
Securities Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1988) (no "due diligence" defense available to
issuer for misstatements or omissions of material fact in registration statement).
179 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). See supra note 176.
180 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (state free to define tort of
defamation as long as it requires finding of some fault).
181 Id.
182 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1988). A strict liability rule here would advance the government's
regulatory interest only minimally, moreover, for marginal commercial speakers (or newcomers to the market) it would create undesirable incentives to prefer unadorned puffery to
factual assertions about their products or services.
18I See, e.g., 1933 Securities Act § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1988) (providing "due
diligence" defense for nonissuer signers of registration statement containing material misstatements or omissions); id. at § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988) (providing defense for
those who neither knew nor in exercise of reasonable care could have known of misstatements or omissions in prospectus).
18 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (accepting lower court's
application of Sullivan rule to products disparagement); see also infra note 186.
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point of view. Such publications thus serve a function in the com-

mercial marketplace analogous to the role of political criticism and
commentary in the marketplace of ideas. They, too, may generate

public benefits that cannot be entirely captured in subscription
fees, and hence may be driven to avoid controversial topics if held
liable; 18 5 if so, they may be in need of the expressive "breathing
space" the Sullivan privilege affords. This might also be true of
comparative advertisements by commercial advertisers that evaluate the merits of their competitor's products or services, and for
whom the response to liability for negligence may be to take the
path of least resistance-confining their messages to laudatory assessments of their own products."8 '
3. Prior Restraints Against False or Misleading Advertising are
Permissible.The question of immunity from prior restraints1 8 7 also
may warrant a different answer in the commercial advertising context.18e Like the Sullivan malice rule, the policy against prior re-

185See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
186See Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1269; Note, CorporateDefamation and Product Disparagement:Narrowing the Analogy to PersonalDefamation, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 963 (1975)
(urging adoption of Sullivan standard in all product disparagement cases).
187 As a practical matter, any measure that deters expression before it is first disseminated could be called a prior restraint. See Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The
Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981) (listing registration requirements, film classification systems, probation conditions, press gag orders and taxes on publishing businesses as
examples of prior restraints). Professor Mayton would include within the classification
"prior restraint" any "restraint of speech imposed without the checks and examinations of
judicial review." Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of
Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CoiNELL L. REV. 245, 281 (1982).
The prior-restraint classification has been broadened beyond an initial concern with licensing of speech to include many, if not most, injunctions against protected speech. Commentators are divided in their views about the validity of applying prior-restraint doctrine
to virtually all injunctions of speech, a complex issue beyond the scope of this Article. See
Blasi, supra;Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint,92 YAE L.J. 409 (1983) (arguing doctrine
of prior restraint should be retired from use in first amendment analysis); Mayton, supra.
' Two explanations have conventionally been offered for the policy against prior restraints. One is the potential for prior restraints to inhibit lawful expression by inducing
more self-censorship than would any system of subsequent punishment. "A criminal statute
chills, prior restraint freezes." A. BicKEL, THE MORaLITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975); Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973). This view
has failed to achieve a consensus among the commentators. Cf. Blasi, supra note 187, at 26
("In some respects, licensing systems and injunctions seem preferable to criminal prohibitions and civil liability rules in terms of minimizing the deterrence of protected expression."); Mayton, supra note 187, at 261 (finding injunctions less chilling to speech than subsequent punishment because injunctions involve judicial review while self-censorship that
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straint does not extend to all utterances of fully protected speech.
Judicial "gag orders" and injunctions not to repeat adjudicated libels or other unlawful messages are commonplace features of our
legal system.1 89 In the context of commercial advertising,19 0 the
reasons that inform the rule against prior restraints-concerns
about excessive speaker self-censorship and censorial government
motives-apply with less force. Because commercial advertisers operate under fairly strong incentives"9 ' to continue pressing their
messages, and are entitled to constitutional protection only insofar
as their messages advance audience interests in the receipt of
truthful information, 9 2 a presumption against a particular form of
government intervention that is concerned only with the timing of
such intervention would seem generally inappropriate.
Thus, analyzing the constitutionality of a prior restraint in the
commercial advertising context need not be substantially different
from analyzing the constitutionality of regulating such speech generally. Whether or not a prior restraint on commercial advertising
passes constitutional muster will initially depend on the reasons
for suppression: If the suppression were to occur after the message
had aired, would the reasons for the suppression meet generally

results from subsequent punishment does not).
The second justification for the presumption against prior restraints is a concern over the
potential risk to free expression posed by governmental bias. Where the power to silence is
lodged in administrators functioning as censors, the state may be tempted to overstep the
constitutionally mandated bounds of neutrality. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365
U.S. 43, 67-68 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see also Mayton, supra note 187, at 250.
189 See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 698
(1978) (holding injunction was "a reasonable method of eliminating the consequences of the
illegal conduct"). Professor Jeffries believes that only official licensing schemes are true
prior restraints and therefore the command "not to repeat" publication of malicious, scandalous and defamatory commentary about public officials in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931), was not so much a prior restraint as a repackaging of the law of seditious libel.
Jeifries, supra note 187, at 416.
190 In the commercial area, three familiar types of regulation raise the specter of the prior
restraint- licensing requirements (such as those imposed on investment advisers under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940); administrative orders (such as cease and desist orders
issued by the FTC and the SEC and enforced by court injunctions); and preclearance requirements (such as those that apply to registration and proxy materials under the securities acts). For a discussion of "prior restraint" issues particular to securities-related expression, see infra notes 265, 267, 271-85, 299-337 & 397-402.
191 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
192 See supra notes 133-47 and accompanying text.
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applicable substantive standards? 1 93 If this test is passed, a second
level of inquiry-shorn of any presumption against prior restraints-would still be needed to ensure adequate "procedural
safeguards that reduce the danger of suppressing constitutionally
9 the delay inherent in the scheme
protected speech";"'
or the absence of standards governing the agency's regulatory discretion
must not create an undue risk of suppression of truthful commercial information. As long as the state's prior restraints upon advertising are substantively limited to demonstrably false or misleading
advertising claims, and adequately provide for prompt adjudication and judicial review, 9 5 no first amendment interests are impaired by the imposition of a reasonable delay for the purpose of
screening the truthfulness of the message. 9"
4. Advertising may be Compelled to Carry Certain Public
Messages. The freedom to speak carries with it the freedom to refrain from speaking. 197 The Court has not hesitated to strike down
measures that attempt to compel unwilling affirmation or expression of opinions or beliefs,' absent sufficiently compelling state

I'l As Professor Jeffries observes, the problem is not necessarily whether a measure regulates through the prior imposition of an injunction or subsequent prosecution and punishment; the critical element is the "substantive standard for authorizing suppression." Jeffries, supra note 187, at 416.
194 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
See id. at 561-62.
196 Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission, suggested that "a system of previewing advertising campaigns"
in order to determine whether the advertisements contravene important state interests
would be an acceptable alternative to an outright ban on expression. 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13,
Nevertheless, when the state elects to proceed via prior restraints to attempt to prevent
false or misleading nonexpressive advertising, there is no reason to tolerate blanket prohibitions as to advertising content or format. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1984) (holding state cannot impose blanket prohibition on illustrations
where case-by-case review is possible). For application to securities advertising, see infra
text accompanying notes 271-85. Moreover, there may also be serious problems with blanket
requirements that impinge upon expressive communications. For a discussion of proxy regulations, see infra text accompanying notes 365-419.
" The Court first articulated the first amendment right not to speak in invalidating a
state statute requiring children in public school to pledge allegiance to the flag of the United
States. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Mi.
nersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)); accord Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977) (striking criminal conviction for covering up state motto on automobile license
plate); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating "right of
reply" statute for political candidates with respect to print media).
" See supra note 197.
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interests.1 91 However, this principle-which shields speakers from
being forced to espouse views not their own-has only a limited
role to play in the commercial advertising context. Because of the
absence of speaker interests, compelled speech works no infringement of "individual freedom of mind."2 00 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel20 1 offers an instructive example. In that case an
attorney was sanctioned for advertising a contingency-fee arrangement in connection with Dalkon Shield litigation ("[i]f there is no
recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients"), without disclosing
that the clients would have to pay "costs," a legal term of art indistinguishable to many laymen from the term "fees. 20 2 The Court
ruled that the attorney could be reprimanded for failing to disclose
certain "purely factual and uncontroversial information" which the
state deemed necessary to avoid misleading potential clients. 0 3
Zauderer correctly holds that the nonexpressive nature of advertising allows the state a somewhat freer hand to compel disclosure
designed to ensure the flow of accurate information to the public
whose interests the first amendment protects. 20 Nevertheless, the
state's power to compel speech is not unlimited even here. The
state may compel disclosure to further the public's right to receive
truthful commercial information, but nothing more.20 5 Moreover,
the mandated disclosure should be reasonably designed to cure a
false or misleading implication of the advertisement. Thus, assum-

I" See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (prohibiting shop-

ping center from excluding those wishing to engage in political speech on its premises).
11 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 11943). Since the advertiser is not engaged in an expression

of its views or any other revelation of its personality, forcing the advertisement to carry a
message not its own does not violate the integrity of the expressive, thinking self as did the

regulations struck down in Barnette, id., and Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705 (automobile license
case). There are, however, limits to the extent that product and service advertising may be
pressed into service as a medium for third parties. See infra text accompanying notes 20114.
201 471 U.S. 626 (1984).

Id. at 633-34.
Id. at 651.
204 Professor Wolfson rejects any distinction between mandatory disclosure and outright
prohibition, whether in the context of political-ideological-artistic expression or in expression arising in the course of commercial activity. See Wolfson, supra note 59, at 278-79. It is
revealing that, although his criticism is leveled at the Court's regulation of nonexpressive
advertising, he illustrates his point with examples drawn from the realms of politics and the
arts, involving ideological and political expression, not the nonexpressive factual disclosures
the Court is addressing in Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626, and other advertising cases.
202
203

205

But see infra text accompanying notes 403-11.
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ing the mandated Surgeon General's warnings on cigarette packages are constitutionally permissible, the mandate is constitutional
because it is in response to a history of misleading messages from
tobacco companies suggesting that smoking poses no health hazard
or, indeed, is consistent with a robust lifestyle. 0e Even where there
is no history of misleading advertisements, the state may compel
advertisers to warn that their products' intended uses pose dangers
to public health or safety. This is routine in the case of poisons
and hazardous chemicals. 0 7 The state has a compelling interest in
ensuring that the public is aware of the known dangers attendant
to the lawful decisions the advertising seeks to promote. And the
advertiser has no constitutional ground for complaint since his
nonexpressive promotional message is constitutionally protected
only to the extent the public's informational rights are being
served. 08
The advertiser may complain, however, if the state strays beyond this corrective measure to compel the advertiser to serve as a
medium for another person's ideological communications. In such
circumstances, the advertiser's expressive interests-here, the right
not to speak-are being infringed.
A recent example is Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities
Commission of California.09 The case involved the attempt of a
state regulatory agency ("Commission") to compel Pacific Gas to
allow a ratepayers' watchdog group (TURN-Toward Utility Rate
20' Companies once made express claims about the healthfulness of smoking their (as opposed to their competitors') brand of cigarettes. See generally Calfee, The Ghost of Cigarette Advertising Past, REGULATION, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 35. In the 1940s, the FTC began a
campaign to prohibit health claims by cigarette companies as deceptive to the public. Id. at
37. In the 1960s, the FTC was able to negotiate an industry-wide, self-imposed ban on assertions concerning tar and nicotine on the ground that such claims contained implicit health
claims. Id. at 42. In 1965, Congress enacted a provision requiring warning labels to be included on all packages of cigarettes. At the present time, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988), requires such printed warnings and prohibits
all broadcast advertising of cigarettes.
11 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing
OSHA's "right to know" regulations).
208 There are, however, limitations on the size and format of the required warnings. The
state cannot require a warning that overwhelms the commercial message. Nor can it require
the advertiser to endorse the warning if contrary to the advertiser's own views. Thus, for
example, it is significant that the cigarette advertisement and package warnings occupy a
small area within the advertisement and state the Surgeon General's-not the
advertiser's-views.

209 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
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Normalization) to mail its own communications (containing political views antagonistic to those of Pacific Gas) to Pacific Gas' ratepayers using the "extra space" in Pacific Gas' billing envelopes.21 0
The Supreme Court invalidated the Commission's order as an impermissible attempt to force Pacific Gas to assist in promulgating
*
211
its opponent's views.
Pacific Gas thus involved an attempt to compel a public utility

to disseminate ideological and political beliefs that were not its
own. Justice Powell's opinion for the majority had little difficulty
distinguishing such infringement of expressive rights from com-

pelled disclosure involving billing, ratemaking or other matters related to the utility and its dealings with its ratepayers2 12 Justice
Marshall, concurring in the judgment, stressed the difference between ordering communication of political views not shared by the

utility company and ordering communication of information "relevant to commercial transactions between the ratepayer and the
utility."2 1 3 Compelled distribution of messages in the latter cate-

gory are constitutionally acceptable because such mandatory disclosures impart factual information pertaining to the purchase of
21
energy by the ratepayers and implicate no expressive interest. '
210 Id. at 5-7. Pacific Gas had for many years mailed a monthly newsletter to its ratepayers in their billing envelopes. TURN challenged the right of Pacific Gas to utilize the "extra
space" in those mailing envelopes to distribute political views, alleging that the extra space
actually belonged to the ratepayers. The ratepayers' fees paid for the postage, although the
utility owned the envelopes, the newsletter and the billing inserts. Id. at 17. The Commission concluded that the ratepayers owned the empty space. Id. at 5. The Pacific Gas Court
rejected the notion that this odd "ownership" of the empty space could compel the utility to
use its envelopes to spread someone else's unwelcome message. Id. at 17-18. For a contrast
with shareholder proxy solicitations, see infra text accompanying notes 403-11.

S11
Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 20-21.

n.12.
n.2. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
214 Justice Stevens, dissenting, saw no substantial difference between compelling Pacific
Gas to carry its ratepayers' message and the various federal disclosure requirements pertaining to "credit card bills, loan forms, and media advertising" as well as mandatory disclosures
required under the federal securities acts. Id. at 38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens overlooks the substantial difference between requiring a business not to
mislead the customers with whom it is engaging in commercial transactions and requiring a
business to disseminate the views of its opponents. Moreover, his analogy to the proxy rules
is inapposite, particularly the suggestion that SEC Rule 14a-8, 17 CFR §240.14a-8 (1989), is
analogous to the Commission's ruling. 475 U.S. at 39-40, 40 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Rule 14a-8 requires corporate management, under certain circumstances, to include in its
proxy statement the proposals of dissenting shareholders. As a general matter, the proxy
rules regulate a state-created mechanism enabling the agents who manage a corporation to
212 Id. at 15
213 Id. at 23
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D. Permissible Regulation of Expressive Commerce-Related
Speech: Selected Issues
Expressive speech arising in the context of commercial activity is
not fundamentally different from expressive speech arising in any
other area of human endeavor. The presence of a commercial motivation does not negate the fact that the speaker is engaged in selfexpression at the same time he imparts information to his listeners.2 15 Presumptively, then, the first amendment rules that restrain
state regulation based on the content of the message and that require considerable tolerance for erroneous communication should
apply. The commercial context does, however, sometimes involve
unique issues of regulatory justification not often present in other
settings.
1. The State May Regulate the Verbal Conduct of Professionals. Professionals functioning in the commercial arena, whether
lawyers, accountants or investment advisers, pose a knotty problem for first amendment analysis. These professionals ply their
trade primarily through words, thereby implicating the speechconduct distinction that is a major premise of Professor Emerson's
work on the first amendment.2"" Although the advice and other
services they furnish involve expressive communication, their role
as intermediaries in the commercial marketplace renders them
subject to regulatory controls; they cannot claim a complete immunity from regulation simply because the tools of their trades are
2 17
words and symbols.

The professional-client relationship (involving in-person communication with a client or prospective client who places his affairs in
the professional's control) implicates speaker and audience interests protected by the first amendment. The state nonetheless justi-

communicate with its widely dispersed owners, the shareholders. The proxy system, then,
involves internal decisionmaking, and the speakers are typically co-owners of the enterprise.
As Justice Powell rightly observes, "the regulations govern speech by a corporation to itself." Id. at 14 n.10 (emphasis in original). For a further discussion of proxy regulation, see
infra notes 345-419 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
216 See generally the works of Emerson, supra note 46.
217 A complete theory of professional speech is beyond the scope of this Article; I explore
one aspect of this issue in Part II, addressing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985), and the
SEC's authority to regulate publishers of investment advisory newsletters. See inlra notes
289-344 and accompanying text.
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fies its fairly extensive regulation of this relationship because of
the obvious disparities in knowledge and power between the
speaker and the listener. Moreover, because the professional is rendering a service which, by law, only someone with an official license
can render, the state has a strong interest in ensuring the competence and integrity of individuals so licensed.
When a professional addresses the general public, however,
speaker interests rise to the fore and outweigh regulatory concerns.
The newsletter publisher may be offering advice, but it is not advice tailored to the particular circumstances of a client or prospective client. Under these circumstances, the risk of undue influence
is minimal despite the professional's greater expertise, because listeners are aware that this is at best general advice; they are therefore better able to elicit other views, evaluate and, if necessary, discount what they hear.
2. The State May Regulate the Process by Which Corporate
Managers (Agents) Obtain Authorization from Shareholders
(Their Principals).As discussed above, 218 the Court in Bellotti2 9
rejected the notion that corporations are entirely without first
amendment protection because of their status as creatures of state
law.220 Nevertheless, corporations are not natural beings; when a
corporation "speaks" it speaks through the voice of its officers and
directors, who are agents exercising derivative power on behalf of
their widely dispersed shareholder-principals. The state has created a structure to facilitate this delegation of authority so that
the enormous aggregation of power and wealth that is the modern
corporation can function efficiently, without paralyzing diffusion of
decisionmaking.2 21 The same state that enables corporations to operate through centralized management has a substantial interest in
ensuring that the manager-agents are in fact chosen by and act on
behalf of their principals. There is, then, an appropriate role for
reasonable state regulation intended to ensure that the agents act
with requisite authorization, even if the regulation involves some
interference with the expressive communications between manage2'8

See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.

219 First

Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).

220

Id. at 778 n.14.

221

For a discussion of the proxy machinery regulated under section 14(a) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 and authorized by state law, see infra text accompanying notes 346-

64.
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ment and principals.22 2
The state may, therefore, establish a procedure requiring management to obtain the authorization of the principals before implementing certain decisions. Moreover, it may also require corporations to provide minority, or dissenting, shareholders with
reasonable access to their fellow shareholders.2 23 The state must,
however, at all times respect the corporate speaker's expressive interests and, therefore, may not indirectly pursue its own paternalistic policies or attempt to censor the ideational content of corporate expression.
The proxy system is, in effect, a long-distance substitute for the
in-person shareholders' meeting. 224 Because shareholders can vote
by proxy, it is possible for the numerous, widely dispersed shareholders of publicly held corporations to satisfy statutory quorum
requirements and engage in essential decisionmaking. But, in the
proxy system, the state has authorized a drastic departure from
the traditional norm of shareholder attendance at a meeting, where
an agenda would be presented for the consideration and vote of all
shareholders present. Whereas at one time a concerned shareholder could attend a meeting and, by speaking out, reach a full
complement of voters, that option is no longer available for today's
shareholders as the proxies of absent shareholders are executed
and mailed to the corporation long before the meeting occurs. The
requirement that management transmit certain shareholders' proposals together with management proxy materials is therefore
nothing more than a practical concession to the nature of voting by

22 For Professor Brudney, the question is not only whether the first amendment protects
corporate speech, but more precisely "who, within the corporation, may authorize it to utter
that speech." Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 248 (1981) (emphasis in original). He thus believes that the
state may properly require unanimous shareholder authorization of such noncommercial expression, at least to the extent that such speech may amount to a waste of corporate assets.
See id. at 241 n.32.
I would agree that the first amendment is not offended where shareholders freely choose
such a rule for the corporate charter or bylaws. This would simply be an instance of the law
giving effect to private choice. The state also may give effect to dissenting views. See, e.g.,
Communications Workers v. Beck, 108 S. Ct. 2641 (1988) (upholding right of dissenting
union members to receive rebate of portion of their dues utilized for union political speech).
But Professor Brudney's proposal would be the corporate equivalent of a statutory prohibition of union political activity in the absence of unanimous member authorization.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 403-11.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 366-69.

1990]

SECURITIES REGULATION

proxy.2 2 5

By contrast, in Pacific Gas,228 the dissident ratepayer group was

not composed of co-owners of the utility company 221 or the members of the regulated organization. 228 The group seeking access to
the billing envelopes consisted of third parties, participants in a
consumer-supplier relationship that was not substantially different

from that of any other consumer. That the state has the power to
require disclosures that further the full flow of relevant factual information to the ratepayers in no way suggests that it can compel
the utility to transmit the views of third parties to those ratepayers. The state may regulate expressive intracorporate communica-

tions only in the interest of establishing a framework for ensuring
that the agency has been authorized by and is responsive to its
widely dispersed principals.22 9

Proxy materials serve both a mechanical function (in facilitating long-distance voting)
and an informational one. It is clear that the state has the power to regulate the proxy
mechanism, and to require a certain uniform format and the disclosure of particular relevant information. It is possible, however, that the proxy rules, formulated before the Court
recognized the protected status of communications that arise in the course of business activity, are constitutionally overbroad. See infra text accompanying notes 377-95.
"ePacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). See supra text
accompanying notes 209-14.
2
Although the argument below was, in part, that the ratepayers paid for the postage
and therefore owned the empty space, see supra note 210, they were not owners of the
company. A similar analysis might well be appropriate (or even required) if the business
entity were a utility or insurance company organized on a mutual basis. In those circumstances, the government might be justified in imposing rules assuring ratepayer and policyholder access to the mechanism for firm-wide communication.
'" Although the members of a labor union are not co-owners of the organization, they are
in a very real sense the principals of that organization. Not surprisingly, at common law, the
members of a labor union could be held personally liable for obligations of the organization.
See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). This rule was partially abrogated by 29 U.S.C. §
301(a) (1982). However 29 U.S.C. § 301(a) was repealed by 29 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982 & Supp.
V 1987). See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981). Thus, the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1982), contains fairly
extensive federal regulation of the internal union election process not very different in scope
and purpose from SEC proxy regulations for internal corporate elections. See, e.g., United
Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) (upholding union rule that prohibits candidates from accepting contributions from nonmembers of the union).
It may be argued that this approach to proxy contests can be logically extended to
2
political elections, where, after all, the public at large is being asked to choose its agents for
a term of years. But, as Chief Justice Warren recognized in the somewhat analogous context
of union representation elections, there is a critical difference between contests where "what
is basically at stake is the establishment of a nonpermanent, limited relationship between
the employer, his economically dependent employee and his union agent," and "the election
of legislators or the enactment of legislation whereby that relationship is ultimately defined
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SECURITIES REGULATION: THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT

Securities are written instruments, as are contracts for goods or
services, legal briefs and pleading forms, financial statements, disclosure documents, and proxy forms and materials. That the market for capital formation proceeds through the verbal conduct of
professionals in no way detracts from the state's plenary power to
regulate either the market or the activities of those professionals.
There are, however, certain aspects of the regulatory system that
may unreasonably interfere with constitutionally protected securities-related expression.
A. Regulation of Nonexpressive Communications:Securities Advertising Under the Securities Act
1. The Statutory Scheme. The Securities Act of 1933280 (the
"1933 Securities Act") regulates the primary distribution3

1

of se-

curities in large part through the requirement that a registration
statement 232 must be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") prior to offering securities for sale. 233 No offer to

sell or offer to buy securities can be made until the registration
statement has been filed; no sale can take place until after the registration statement has been declared effective (the "effective
2

date").

34

Advertising of securities is strictly regulated. From the filing of
the registration statement until the effective date-the so-called

and where the independent voter may be freer to listen more objectively and employers as a
class freer to talk. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)." NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969). A characteristic of such "limited purpose"
elections, suggested by the citation to Sullivan, is the likely absence of the watchdog,
"truth-testing" role of the news media.
220 Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988).
231 L. Loss, supra note 155, at 87. All public offerings of securities must be registered
unless they qualify for a statutory exemption or exclusion from the 1933 Securities Act. 1933
Securities Act §§ 3, 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77d (1988) (listing exemptions for securities or
transactions). Subsequent trading of securities in the secondary market is regulated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter 1934 Exchange Act], codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-7811 (1988).
22 1933 Securities Act §§ 2(8), 6, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(8), 77f-77h (1988) (defining registration, and describing registration process and effects of registration).
233 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
234 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1988).
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"waiting period ' 23 5-virtually no advertising is permitted except
through distribution of the statutorily defined "prospectus"2' 3 and
to buy registered securities must be made
all solicitations of offers
37
by prospectus only.
An important exception written into this rule of advertising by
prospectus only is contained in the definition of "prospectus,"
which makes it possible to utilize certain advertisements (so-called
"tombstone advertisements"2' 38 ) that do little more than identify
13 It generally takes up to twenty days for a registration statement to be declared effective. § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1988). The period between the filing of a registration statement
and its effective date is commonly referred to as the waiting period. See, e.g., L Loss, supra
note 155, at 89.
11 A prospectus is "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale
of any security." § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1988). The section authorizes two limited
exceptions to this blanket definition: (a) a post-effective date communication is not a "prospectus" (not subject to the statutory requirements described below) if it was preceded or
accompanied by a written "prospectus"; and (b) a so-called "tombstone" advertisement,
limited to specific information as prescribed in 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1989), is not a "prospectus." See infra note 238.
The Act contemplates the use of three permissible types of prospectuses: (1) the preliminary prospectus, with appropriate legend, which lacks price-related information and can be
distributed during the waiting period, see 17 C.F.R. § 230.430 (1989) (outlining proper form
for prospectus); (2) the summary prospectus, also permissible during the waiting period,
which omits some portions and summarizes other portions of the prospectus, see 17 C.F.R. §
230.431 (1989) (outlining form for summary prospectus); and (3) the final prospectus, containing all pricing information in final form, which is distributed after the effective date. For
a thorough analysis of the chronology and regulation of public offerings under the 1933
Securities Act, see generally L. Loss, supra note 155, at 87-120; R. JENNINGS & EL MAns.
SECURITIES REGULATION 63-109 (6th ed. 1987).
237 See § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1988) (outlining prospectus requirements). Because a prospectus is defined as a written communication, oral offers during the waiting period are
permissible. See L. Loss, supra note 155, at 89 (such offers are permissible even if communicated by interstate telephone).
Prospectuses are first submitted to the SEC in preliminary form, and later finalized. Summary prospectuses may be used by qualified registrants (subject to §§ 12 or 15(d) of the
1934 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988)) under appropriate circumstances. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.431 (1989); see also Instructions as to Summary Prospectuses in Forms S-1 and
S-2, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) U 7126, 7146 (1983) (outlining proper method for recordation of S-1 and S-2 form summary prospectus).
Many offerings that qualify for exemptions under the Securities Act are nevertheless subject to significant restrictions with respect to their advertising. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.256
(1989) (limiting written advertising of offerings under Regulation A to "offering circulars"
and tombstones); 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1989) (prohibiting advertising of offerings under
Regulation D by way of general solicitations or general advertising, including but not limited to "[a]ny advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or radio").
''
See 1933 Securities Act § 2(10)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)(b)(1988); 17 C.F.R. § 230.134
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the issuer and the security, state its price and advise interested
parties where a prospectus can be obtained.2 " Tombstone advertisements convey limited information; they are "intended to be
limited to announcements identifying the existence of a public offering and the availability of a prospectus and they are not to be
selling literature of any kind.

24'

Their primary function is to iden-

tify investors seriously interested in upcoming offerings and to facilitate the distribution of prospectuses during the waiting period. 241 Even after the effective date, all written or broadcast

advertising for a public offering of nonexempt securities
must be
24 2
preceded or accompanied by a statutory prospectus.

Effectively prevented from independently locating and attracting interested investors through a general advertising campaign, issuers typically market their offerings through the efforts of
middlemen-the underwriters-who distribute information (also
via statutory prospectuses) to potential purchasers.243 Underwriters, like issuers, are prohibited from engaging in direct writing
campaigns or any media advertising. They can, however, utilize
(1989) (detailing permissible contents of tombstone advertisements).
I3Before the 1954 amendments to the 1933 Securities Act, a "tombstone" advertisement
could appear only after the effective date and could contain only the identity of the security,
its price, from whom a prospectus could be obtained and by whom orders would be oxecuted. Although bare-bones tombstones are still utilized today, the current rules now also
provide for somewhat expanded advertisements (sometimes referred to as "identifying
statements") that can contain fourteen categories of information; each tombstone must,
however, make it clear that no money or offer to buy can be accepted until the effective
date. § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)(1988); 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1989) (detailing permissible
content of tombstone advertisements).
240 Exchange Act Release No. 33-3535, [1952-1956 Trans. Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 76,333 (1955) (proposing Rule 134, 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1989)).
"I As a practical matter, tombstones are rarely published during the waiting period. See
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 236, at 87. Of course, tombstones may appear after the
effective date as well, in which case they sometimes inform the public that the issue has
already been sold. In such circumstances, it has been suggested, their purpose is to advertise
the underwriters, rather than the securities. L. Loss, supra note 155, at 107 n.34.
2I The 1933 Securities Act contemplates the use of supplementary selling literature after
the effective date; however, such literature must be preceded or accompanied by a full prospectus. § 2(10)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)(a) (1988). The Act does not require the filing of
these materials, although the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) does. See
L. Loss, supra note 155, at 114 n.49 (citing NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, § 35(a)(c), CCH NASD Manual 1 2195).
2,2The issuer typically turns to underwriters (firms of broker-dealers) who maintain established lists of potential customers. The preliminary negotiations and agreements between
issuers and underwriters are permitted under the 1933 Securities Act. § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. §§
77b(3), 77e(c)(1988).
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their substantial lists of established customers to advertise orally,
conditioning the market and attempting to solicit offers to buy
through personal telephone calls 2 " throughout the waiting pe-

riod.24 5 Their activities during the waiting period, then, are limited

only by the prohibition on "free writing" (advertising unaccompa-

nied by
prospectus) and the antifraud provisions of the securities
246
acts.

As the above thumbnail sketch makes clear, no promotion of an
upcoming offering is possible until the registration statement, including the preliminary prospectus, has been filed for review with

the SEC. As originally conceived, the "waiting period" between filing and effectiveness was intended to enable the agency to preclear
the registration statement-to review and demand the correction
of misrepresentations or omissions in the statement while at the
24 The loophole in the definition of prospectus, see supra note 236, that permits oral
solicitation is certainly anomalous: although impersonal advertisements, whether in print or
in the broadcast media, are strictly prohibited, in-person solicitations are not. The Supreme
Court has often indicated that the risks of overreaching and fraud are far greater when
there is a direct one-on-one encounter between professional and client or prospective client.
Compare In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434-35 (1978) (finding transmittal of informational
letter does not afford significant opportunity for overreaching or coercion) with Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (upholding regulability of direct, in-person
solicitation because such communications exert pressure and often elicit immediate response
without opportunity for comparison or reflection); see also Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210
(1985).
Underwriters generally have both the customer lists and the telephone lines to undertake

an organized and efficient telephone advertising campaign. Issuers can also take advantage

of the "oral" communications loophole, but, lacking a known pool of potential customers,
would probably be limited to contacting existing shareholders, customers and employees.
See Schoeman, The FirstAmendment and Restrictionsof Aduertising Under the Securities
Act of 1933, 41 Bus. LAw. 377, 390 (1986) (concluding that 1933 Securities Act's regulation
on advertising is too restrictive and Act's objective of providing full disclosure prior to
purchase can be served by requiring delivery of the prospectus). Although underwriters can
attempt to solicit offers to buy during the waiting period, they must take care not to make
offers to sell that might (under principles of contract law) be accepted by investors prior to
the effective date. See L Loss, supra note 155, at 101-02.
241 It is, therefore, partly the established track record of underwriters, typically working
in syndicates, in locating potential investors that justifies the additional expense of their
commission. However, one commentator has observed that, while the underwriting syndicate may be adequate to the task of marketing the offerings of well-known, substantial issuers, smaller issuers (or issuers of more speculative securities) may be locked out of this
network entirely if major underwriters are either unable or unwilling to represent them. See
Schoeman, supra note 244, at 390.
246 See Offers and Sales of Securities by Underwriters and Dealers, Securities Act Release
No. 4697, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 3257-3260 (June 5, 1964) [hereinafter Securities Act
Release No. 4697], quoted in R. JENNINGS & H. MISH, supra note 236, at 90.
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same time ensuring sufficient time for the information contained in
the statement to be communicated to market professionals for
careful consideration. 47 Once the registration statement has been
filed with the SEC, the prospectus, in preliminary form, with appropriate legends, can be distributed.24 s
The agency's review of the registration statement during the
waiting period is limited to the determination whether the
mandatory disclosures are complete and in the correct format. If
any inadequacies are discovered, the staff informs the issuer, who
will then have the opportunity to file corrections or clarifications.2 49 The SEC lacks the power, however, to disapprove of any
security or interfere with its sale because it lacks value or merit. 5 0
Indeed, every prospectus must bear a printed caption to the effect
that the SEC has not approved or disapproved of the securities
being offered for sale.251 The SEC does have the power to refuse to

permit a registration statement to become effective or to issue a
stop order, effectively prohibiting the sale of a securities offering,
until the disclosure documents are amended to comply with regula-

147 See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASh. L.
REv. 29, 34-35 (1959) (describing legislative history of Securities Act from drafter's point of
view); see also Securities Act Release No. 4697, supra note 246. "It is a principal purpose of

the so-called 'waiting period'

. . .

to enable dealers and, through them, investors to become

acquainted with the information contained in the registration statement and to arrive at an
unhurried decision concerning the merits of the securities." Id.
248 The preliminary prospectus must have the so-called "red herring" legend, to the effect
that the registration statement is not yet effective, and the preliminary prospectus is not an
offer (or the solicitation of an offer) to buy or to sell securities. See 17 C.F.R. §
229.501(c)(8)(1989) (requiring such message to be printed on outside front cover in red ink
together with caption "Preliminary Prospectus").
249 See 1933 Securities Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1988).
0 This is in contrast to the so-called "Blue Sky" laws of some jurisdictions which require
the state securities administrators to review securities for fairness and merit. See, e.g., CAL.
CORP. CODE § 25140 (West 1977) (authorizing Commissioner of Corporations, under certain
conditions, to refuse to issue permits to sell securities in the state unless "the proposed plan
of business of the applicant and the proposed issuance of securities are fair, just, and equitable, [and] that the applicant intends to transact its business fairly and honestly"). For an
interesting discussion of the contrast between a regulatory structure based on merit and one
based on disclosure, see L. Loss, supra note 155, at 25-35.
251 "THESE SECURITIES HAVE NOT BEEN APPROVED OR DISAPPROVED BY
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION NOR HAS THE COMMISSION
PASSED UPON THE ACCURACY OR ADEQUACY OF THIS PROSPECTUS. ANY
REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE." 17 C.F.R. §
229.501(c)(5)(1989) (emphasis in original).
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tory requirements.2 52

In addition to the advertising restrictions and preclearance requirements described above, the SEC administers a complex

mandatory disclosure system applicable to all issuers of registered
securities. 5 3 Although the system recently has been considerably
streamlined, the SEC still requires the filing of many documents,
including the registration statement.2 5 Under the new integrated
22 1933 Securities Act § 8(b), (d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(b), (d) (1958). It has been argued that
prior agency review, although it cannot shield an issuer from all litigation, creates "precautionary overdisclosure" to avoid litigation. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L.Rv. 669, 704 (1984).
"1 See 1934 Exchange Act §§ 12, 13, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78m (1988). Issuers who meet certain qualifications and are not exempt and whose securities are offered to the public must
register them as required under 1934 Exchange Act § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1988). All issuers of securities registered under § 12 are required to file certain periodic reports with the
SEC. 1934 Exchange Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988).
The original proposals for what later became the Securities Act contemplated both considerable mandatory disclosure (a registration statement and a shortened prospectus to be
distributed with all written and oral offers or advertisements of future offerings) and the
possibility of general advertising. See Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and ForeignCommerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-9 (1933) [hereinafter House Hearings]; Hearings on S. 875 Before Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., Ist
Sess. 1-8 (1933) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. The initial proposal for a standardized advertising format requiring certain specific disclosures met with considerable criticism. Although a bill permitting general advertising albeit with mandatory disclosures was initially
approved by the Senate Committee, S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 1-7 (1933), the
House Committee approved only the use of tombstones, HR. REP. No. 5480, 73d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1933). Schoeman, supra note 244, at 383.
11 See 1933 Securities Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1988) (outlining
schedule of information required in registration statement). An issuer becomes a so-called
"reporting company" (a company subject to the periodic reporting requirements of the securities acts) in two ways: (1) by registering a securities offering under the Securities Act,
1934 Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 780(d) (1988); see supra text accompanying notes
232-35; or (2) by registering a class of equity securities, 1934 Exchange Act § 13(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(a)(1985). The 1934 Exchange Act also requires issuers to register all nonexempt securities that are either listed on an exchange (§ 12(a)) or (if equity) held of record
by at least five hundred persons where the issuer engaged in interstate commerce has assets
totalling in excess of $5 million. See 1934 Exchange Act § 12(g)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
781(g)(1)(1988); Adoption of Amendments to Exemptions For Small Issuers, Exchange Act
Release No. 18,647, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2 83,204 (April 15,
1982); Adoption of Revisions to Reporting by Small Issuers, Exchange Act Release No.
23,406, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,012 (July 8, 1986). Both
types of reporting companies are required to maintain a process of continuous disclosure
through the filing of various periodic reports with the SEC. The forms include the 8-K
("current"), 10-K (annual), and 10-Q (quarterly) reports.
An important difference between a company reporting under § 13(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act and a company reporting under § 15(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act is that the
15(d) company is not subject to the proxy rules so it does not have to distribute annual
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system of disclosure, it is often possible to incorporate by reference
into the registration statement the information contained in the
various periodic filings that issuers of registered securities must
make under the securities laws.2 "
The integrated disclosure system not only mandates what information (about the issuer and the transaction) must be disclosed; it
also controls the format for presenting that information. Regulation S-K specifies what nonfinancial and financial information is to
be provided under the securities acts,25 and Regulation S-X, the
general accounting regulation, stipulates the proper SEC form and
content of any required financial statements. 57

reports to its shareholders. See 1934 Exchange Act § 14(a).
115While the basic disclosures required about the offering itself remain essentially unchanged, see Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1989), issuers already "in the Exchange Act
reporting system" for a specified period of time and meeting other financial criteria for particular transactions may qualify to use Form S-2 (deliver copies of their annual reports to
potential investors along with a prospectus) or S-3 (prepare a streamlined prospectus incorporating by reference existing periodic disclosure reports). Issuers without a proven disclosure record, however, or which do not for other reasons qualify for the S-2 or S-3 forms, must
prepare the basic Form S-I, which consists of a full prospectus (Part I) plus additional
information about the issuer (Part II). See generally L. Loss, supra note 155, at 144-64.
In addition to the registration statements and periodic filings, issuers having equity securities registered under the Exchange Act (and hence subject to its proxy rules) must generate
and distribute to their shareholders a statutory annual report containing standardized financial statements and other information, in narrative form, concerning matters such as the
identity and activities of the directors and officers and the nature of the business. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(11) (1989).
256 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1989). Regulation S-K details, for example, the SEC's policy favoring
the inclusion of "management's projections of future economic performance that have a reasonable basis and are presented in an appropriate format." 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (1989). It
also details how to determine which format is appropriate, and cautions against presentations that might be "susceptible of misleading inferences through selective projection of
only favorable items." 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(2) (1989). Indeed, the rule goes so far as to
suggest certain presentations "generally would be misleading." Id. Regulation S-K stresses
the importance of facilitating investor understanding of any projections presented, suggesting the disclosure of the key assumptions upon which the final results depend. 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.10(b)(3) (1989).
.57 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1989). In an effort to achieve uniformity of presentation,
the agency
has promulgated its own accounting standards, the details of which are beyond the scope of
this paper. See generally L. Loss, supra note 155, at 157-64; see also Kripke, The SEC, The
Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151 (1970) [hereinafter

Kripke, Myths and Realities] (urging SEC to use statutory powers to determine accounting
matters). Professor Kripke's piece was prophetic in that it urged the SEC to abandon its
policy refusing to countenance the disclosure of forward-looking financial statements and to
permit the use of earnings projections. See supra note 256 & infra text accompanying notes
268-70.
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In addition to specifying what "hard" data had to be disclosed
and in what format, the Commission in the past prohibited the
disclosure of certain types of "soft" information -notably, projections258 and securities ratings (which are now permitted under certain circumstances 259), and certain types of presentations, such as
photographs and trademarks (also now permitted).60
21
Without further description of the regulatory scheme, it is suf-

ficient to observe that the SEC, in administering the Securities
Act2 62 and the Exchange Act,263 prohibits general advertising in the

offering of securities, and requires prior submission of mandatory
disclosure documents, the content and format of which it rigidly
prescribes.
2. Constitutional Issues. Preliminarily, it seems fairly clear that
the prior submission and preclearance of the registration statement
as to form and content, as well as the mandatory disclosures themselves, present no substantial constitutional issues. The restrictions
on securities advertising are, however, problematic.
(a) Prior Submission and Preclearance.The documents comprising the registration statement submitted for prior SEC review
(notwithstanding their detail and complexity) are essentially promotional materials, designed to induce investor demand. Such
communications lack any cognizable speaker's interest in self-expression and are constitutionally protected only insofar as they
supply the public with truthful, nonmisleading information that

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1989). This "safe harbor" rule concerning forward-looking
statements was promulgated in 1979. See also supra note 257.
'59 17 C.F.R. § 230.134(a)(14) (1989).
260 Adoption of Amendment of Registration

Guide No. 8, Security Act Release No. 5171,
[1970-71 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 78,155 (July 20, 1971). An absolute
prohibition of all illustrations or graphic presentations, whether or not deceptive or misleading, plainly would be constitutionally problematic. Even under its current commercial
speech doctrine, the Supreme Court has refused to countenance a state provision regulating
attorney advertising that absolutely prohibited the use of illustrations. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), discussed supra text accompanying notes
201-08. In order to justify such a prohibition, the state would have to show that all graphs,
photographs, or other visual aids are per se false or misleading. Of course, if a particular
illustration is deceptive or misleading the state is free to require its elimination or correction. But a flat prohibition of a potentially useful (perhaps more readily comprehensible)
technique for imparting information should not pass constitutional muster.
261 For a good general source, see L. Loss, supra note 155, at 405-38.
262 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78m (1988). See supra note 253.
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facilitates the making of private investment choices. 2 4 Undoubtedly, the preclearance scheme-including the review procedure,
policing of the documents' contents and format, and the required
cautionary legends-constitute a prior restraint. But prior restraints pose no independent first amendment problem in the context of nonexpressive, promotional speech, unless they are imposed
for some purpose other than ensuring full disclosure of material
information and avoidance of fraud or deception, or the procedures
themselves raise an effective barrier to dissemination of the promotional message. 2661
Aside from the advertising ban, the preclearance procedures
themselves do not hinder the flow of information to investors; prospectuses, in preliminary form, can be disseminated prior to the
effective date. 2 6 Thus, again setting aside the advertising ban, the
delay caused by the prior restraint itself affects only sales to the
public. Accordingly, given the nonexpressive nature of the registration materials, prior submission for agency review is consistent
with the first amendment value of protecting informed private
267
decisionmaking.
(b) Mandatory Disclosure. When a consumer purchases goods,
the information he needs about the product can be found on its
label, the accompanying promotional and warranty literature or by
firsthand examination of the product. When an investor selects a
security, however, she is buying a piece of paper that represents an
interest in a business enterprise. When the SEC compels issuers to
comply with disclosure requirements, it is, in a sense, insisting on
the provision of the equivalent to up-to-date product information.
The SEC is attempting to prevent fraud and to ensure full and
accurate disclosure concerning the real-world enterprise a securi-

...See supra text accompanying notes 133-47.
262 See supra text accompanying notes 187-96.
266 See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
267 It has been suggested that in its registration process, involving prior clearance and
mandatory disclosure, the SEC "wields tools of censorship akin to those long ago found
intolerable in the English licensing system .... Editorial review ... is at the heart of the
SEC's regulatory function." Lively, Securities Regulation and Freedom of the Press: Toward a Marketplace of Ideas in the Marketplace of Investment, 60 WASH. L. REV. 843, 84849 (1985) (citations omitted). This condemnation of the SEC fails to consider, however, the
difference between the SEC's editing of nonexpressive promotional materials and speech
charged with speaker's interests. See supra text accompanying notes 133-47 & 164-65,
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ties offering represents.2 6
Again, because we are dealing with nonexpressive, promotional
speech, regulations requiring additional disclosure in the service of
a more complete, accurate picture of the business enterprise offering its securities do not violate the first amendment, provided that
the extent of the mandatory disclosure does not overwhelm the
promotional message. 2 9 Government may act to enhance audience
interests as long as its regulation does not hinder the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading information to the investing
27 0
public.
(c) Restrictions on Advertising. The problem, from a first
amendment perspective, arises not because the government requires timely and full disclosure of what it deems material information prior to any sale of securities, nor because it demands uniformity (and, hence, accessibility) in presentation of that
information. 7 1 Rather, the constitutional difficulty occurs at the

168 Professor Kripke has long been an outspoken critic of the SEC's disclosure system.
See, e.g., Kripke, The Objective of FinancialAccounting Should Be to ProvideInformation
for the Serious Investor, in CORPORATE FINA~cuL REPORrNo (A. Rappaport & L. Revine
eds. 1972); Kripke, Myths and Realities, supra note 257. Kripke has suggested that the
entire regulatory goal-the provision of adequate and accessible securities information to
the layman investor-is misconceived. Writing at a time when the use of financial projections was prohibited and the SEC required the issuer to "put[] one's worst foot forward," he
described the registration process as "a useless, but lucrative [for attorneys], bit of paper
work." Kripke, The Myth of the Informed Layman, 28 Bus. LAw. 631, 631 & n.1 (1973)
[hereinafter Kripke, Informed Layman]. He urged the SEC to provide "[all] the information to the people straight and [to] let them make their own judgments in their own
way .... [T]hose who try to use disclosure rationally are going to use professional help in
doing so anyway." Id. at 637.
The SEC ultimately followed some of Professor Kripke's advice by authorizing the use of
"forward-looking" financial statements that are made in good faith and for which there is a
reasonable basis. See supra notes 256-58.
2"9 See supra text accompanying notes 204-08.
2170
There may be constitutional difficulties with the SEC's rigid restrictions on the format
of mandatory disclosures. See supra note 260. If the advertising ban were removed, however, and dissemination of truthful commercial information could occur outside of the required format, these difficulties might be overcome. See infra text accompanying notes 28286.
2" Professor Dooley suggests that the extension of first amendment protection to securities-related expression will imperil the uniformity of financial information: "the market for
financial information is very different from the 'free marketplace of ideas.' Whereas the
latter demands diversity, the former depends upon some measure of uniformity to function
at all." Dooley, The First Amendment and the SEC: A Comment, 20 CoNN. L REv.335, 339
(1988). This view overstates the constitutional limitations applicable to regulation of nonexpressive communications. Financial data may well require uniformity of presentation in or-
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beginning of the offering process, when, in a uniquely restrictive
approach to advertising, the government prohibits the use of any
and all printed or broadcast advertisements (however truthful and
nonmisleading) unless accompanied by a mandatory prospectus.
It is in this respect that the regulation of securities advertising
differs markedly from schemes imposed on other forms of commercial advertising.1 2 Unless accompanied or preceded by a statutory
prospectus, ordinary advertisements such as those pervading the
marketplace for other goods or services are strictly prohibited,
however truthful and nonmisleading their messages may be.2 'a
That the scheme is different does not necessarily mean it violates the first amendment. We must ask what constitutional interest is infringed by limiting the advertising of securities to the
bone-dry tombstone and the statutory prospectus. On the premise
that nonexpressive promotional materials lack a cognizable
speaker's interest, the first amendment injury is not, at least in the
first instance, sustained by the advertiser. And if the investor can
ultimately obtain the full disclosure documents, who is injured by
the scheme?
On reflection, however, the prohibition on general written or
broadcast advertising does work an injury to the investing public.
Although many individual investors choose their investment portfolios solely through the advice of broker-dealers (sometimes in
der to make it accessible to the investor audience.
272 The Martin Act, for example, which requires registration of offering circulars promoting real estate syndications, permits the use of truthful, nonmisleading advertising that is
not inconsistent with the contents of the offering circulars. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 352e.1(c) (McKinney 1984). See also Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1988). As Schoeman points out, the sales of vacant lots were often
subject to fraudulent sales practices. Schoeman, supra note 244, at 386. The ILSFDA requires registration and delivery of a sales prospectus ("property report") before any sales
can take place. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(1)(B), (C) (1988). However, truthful, nonmisleading advertising is permitted so long as it is not inconsistent with the information required to be
disclosed prior to sale. 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(1)(D) (1988). The registration and disclosure
scheme otherwise resembles that of the Securities Act, even to the point of requiring a cautionary message: (1) advising interested parties to send for the property report, and (2)
reminding them that no governmental authority has approved or disapproved the property
in question. 24 C.F.R. § 1715.50(a) (1989).
2173See 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (1989) (manufacturing companies can provide only general
information about products); see also Adoption of Rules 134 and 135, Securities Act Release
No. 3568, [1952-1956 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,359 (Aug. 29, 1955)
("[flinancial information or detailed descriptions of the business or the security" may be
transmitted only by statutory prospectus).
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their role as underwriters for new offerings), those investors who

evaluate 6fferings directly are deprived of the opportunity to benefit early in the offering process from additional promotional information. In much the same way that other competitive merchandising catches the eye of prospective buyers, enabling them to focus
their inquiries on specific products that seem well suited to their
needs, so would general advertising by competing issuers attract
the attention of at least some investors.
By withholding from the public at this initial stage relevant,
truthful information about particular offerings, the state imposes
costs on investors who may needlessly expend time and effort investigating offerings that do not meet their needs. Moreover, if
general advertising-which (unlike a general distribution of prospectuses) is a practical technique for generating investor interest-were available, the public might receive information they
would otherwise overlook about upcoming issues of the smaller,
less widely known and/or first-time public issuers, i.e., those less
likely to attract the interest of a substantial underwriting syndicate.2"4 Therefore, the effect of prohibiting truthful and nonmisleading securities advertising is a diminished flow of useful information to those members of the public engaged in the process of
choosing and rejecting securities for investment.
In light of the constitutional implications of the advertising prohibition, what justifications can be found for subjecting securities
advertising to such a unique regime?
The argument has been made that securities are somehow fundamentally different from goods or services offered for sale. Securities are "claims to the future income of firms,"2 "intricate merchandise"27 6 and written instruments reifying bundles of rights and
interests in a business. 7 Their value depends upon the success or
See Schoeman, supra note 244, at 390.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 252, at 673.
"' Kripke, Informed Layman, supra note 268, at 632. Indeed, Professor Kripke rejects
the "myth" that prospectuses should be intended for "the man in the street" since neither
the issuing companies, their financial postures nor the complex securities they intend to
market are comprehensible except to the most sophisticated market professionals. It is the
assertedly futile effort to render this information palatable to the layman that, in his view,
has rendered the prospectus "fairly close to worthless." Id. at 632-33. See supra note 268.
27

21

2" Much can, has been and no doubt will be written about precisely what a statutorily
defined "security" is. See 1933 Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988) (defining
"securities" for purposes of Act); 1934 Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10)
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failure of an ongoing enterprise. If a consumer purchases a car, refrigerator or audio equipment, examination of the goods will yield
a considerable amount of information; labelling and accompanying
sales literature will supply additional details. If, however, an investor purchases a security, the investor holds in her hands only a
symbol representing her interest in something else. The investor
can tell nothing about the future value of that security by examining it. The mandated disclosures are needed to inform the investor
not only about the terms of the particular security, but, equally if
not more importantly, about the financial health and viability of
the enterprise itself. Investors are therefore required to deal with
fairly lengthy and detailed disclosure documents containing financial statements and other highly technical information.
Few dispute the importance to investors (and even to those advising them) of accurate and timely disclosures concerning the enterprise making a securities offering. Indeed, the unsophisticated
or inexperienced individual attempting to choose among many alternatives needs either accessible information, expert advice, or arguably both. However, modern consumers are not infrequently
faced with comparably subtle and difficult decisions concerning the
purchase of goods and services2. 7 But (certainly after Virginia
2 s0 the regulatory response to the vulnerability of the
Pharmacy)
inexpert consumer should not be the suppression of truthful advertising, pending the receipt of a weighty, somewhat inaccessible fulldisclosure document. 8 Is there some justification for the fiat advertising ban of the securities laws other than the alleged vulnera-

(1988) (same). See generally R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 236, at 220-93; L. Loss,
supra note 155, at 165-246.
278 Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel suggest that the SEC's current regulatory
structure based on mandatory disclosure may not be beneficial, but that the system first in
line to replace it-based on fraud and material omission rules, enforced in state
courts-would be no better. See Easterbook & Fischel, supra note 252, at 714-15,
279 Any decision is difficult for an uninformed decisionmaker, whether it involves choosing
the right electrician, the right camera or the right investment. Indeed, there is arguably
more expert advice available (at a price) to the securities investor than to consumers at
large. For a discussion of the role of investment advisers, see infra text accompanying notes
289-344.
2"I Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
2'1 These prohibitions found in what has been called the "truth in securities act" have no
counterparts in the "truth in advertising act." See supra text accompanying notes 174.82.
Obviously, there could be no "truth in political campaigning act."
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bility of unsophisticated investors?

It could be argued that the justification for this prohibition, as
for the antifraud 2 ' and mandatory disclosure rules, lies in the
overarching need to maintain investor confidence in the integrity
of the market. The Securities Act was enacted in the Depression
that followed the Crash of 1929.83 It was considered essential that
government somehow restore investor confidence and erase the
widely held perception of the market as an institution manipulated
by well-placed investors with informational advantages. But the
goal of insuring investor confidence does not seem particularly
well-advanced by the proscription of truthful advertising; the general strategy of the legislation is, after all, the provision of more
useful information, rather than less. 28' The elimination of all general advertising is neither necessary to restore investor confidence
in the stock market nor a sufficient reason for depriving the investing public of available, truthful information.2

8

5

21
Both the Securities Act and the Exchange Acts contain antifraud provisions. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 77q, 78r (1988). This Article does not question the constitutionality of such provisions, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's scienter requirements in Aaron v. SEC.
446 U.S. 680 (1980) (requiring SEC to establish scienter as element of civil enforcement
action to enjoin violations of § 10(b) of 1934 Exchange Act); and Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring private party to establish scienter as element of
private action for damages for violations of § 10(b) of 1934 Exchange Act.). See also the
discussion of prohibitions against false and misleading advertising at supra text accompanying notes 148-96.
See Statement of President Roosevelt of March 29, 1933, quoted in J. SEIuGm, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 56 (1982); 77 CONG. REc. 2918 (1933) (remarks of Rep.
Rayburn). "The purpose of this bill is to place the owners of securities on a parity, so far as
is possible, with the management of the corporations, and to place the buyer on the same
plane so far as available information is concerned, with the seller." Id. See also Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 195 (noting that primary principle of 1934 Exchange Act is to protect
investors against manipulation of stock prices).

See L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEoPLE's MoNEY 92 (1914). "Publicity is justly commended as

a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman." Id; see also L Loss, supra note 155, at 32; J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 283, at 42; Werner, The S.E.C. as a Market Regulator,40 VA. L Ray.
755 (1984).
' Even under the Supreme Court's recently narrowed, deferential test for the regulation
of commercial speech, any regulation interfering with truthful advertising concerning lawful
activity must directly advance a substantial state interest and must be no broader than
reasonably necessary in doing so. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033-35
(1989); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Clearly, general securities advertising concerns lawful activity and those advertisements that
are not misleading therefore merit protection. Although the prevention of fraud and deception in securities markets is certainly a substantial interest, it is difficult to understand how
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Regulation of Expressive Communications: Investment
Advisers and Proxy Solicitation

There are aspects of securities regulation not directly concerned
with the sale of securities that have a significant impact on securities-related expressive communications. Two such areas are the
regulation of investment advisers under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940,286 and the regulation of intracorporate proxy communications under the Exchange Act. 8 7
Neither of these types of expression fits neatly into the category
of commercial speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction. Indeed, much of the speech generated by investment advisers more closely resembles communications of opinion
(professional judgments concerning aspects of the economy, the
market generally and specific investment strategies and choices)
than it does promotional advertising. Similarly, intracorporate
proxy communications combine factual disclosures to shareholders
with other clearly expressive elements (including debates among
management and shareholders as a prelude to the election of directors and voting on proposed corporate actions requiring shareholder approval).
The presence of speaker interests in both the investment adviser
and proxy solicitation contexts precludes reflexive reliance on the
principles that justify regulation of purely promotional speech.
Neither the commercial context in which such expressive communications arise, nor the commercial motive informing their utterance, provides a basis for treating them differently from any other
protected speech.28 8 If such communications may be regulated, the
justifications for regulation, while responsive to the securities context, must be reconcilable with general first amendment principles.
The task in this section of this Article is to evaluate the regulatory
schemes in place for such expressive communications in light of

an outright ban on all advertising directly advances that goal or how such an approach is
"narrowly tailored to achieve its desired objective." Fox, 109 S. Ct. at 3035. For a discussion
of cases invalidating flat bans on truthful advertising concerning lawful activity, see supra
text accompanying notes 80-99.
286 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 to 80b-20 (1988). The Investment Advisers Act requires all those
subject to the Act to register with the SEC and to comply with various disclosure requiremeats. See infra text accompanying notes 289-98.
281 1934 Exchange Act § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1988).
2
See supra text accompanying notes 27-30 & 61-71.
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the presumptive applicability of conventional first amendment
safeguards.
1. Regulation of Investment Advisers under the Investment Advisers Act.
(a) The Statutory Scheme. Like the Exchange and the Securities Acts, the Investment Advisers Act was intended to prevent
abuses in the securities industry that had contributed to the Crash
of 1929 and the Great Depression.2 8 9 It has two major objectives:
the registration of investment advisers and the prevention of fraud
in their dealings with clients.2 90

Under section 203(a) of the Investment Advisers Act,2 91 it is un-

lawful for any "investment adviser" 2 2 to utilize the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce "in connection

with his or its business as an investment adviser" without first being registered with the SEC.29 3 The registration process involves

certain mandatory disclosures 94 about the investment adviser's education and qualifications, the nature and scope of the business,

compensation and whether or not he or any associate is "subject to
'"Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 190 (1985) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963)) (citation omitted).
"o The Investment Advisers Act, like the Securities and the Exchange Acts, see supra
note 282, makes it "unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly" to defraud a client or a prospective client. Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1988). The antifraud section prohibits (1) the use of any "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client"; (2) "any transaction, practice or course of business which operates as a
fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client"; and (3) without first obtaining a client's informed consent, acting as a principal in a transaction with a client, or acting as a
broker for a third party in a transaction with a client. Id.
291 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1988).
292 An investment adviser is "any person who, for compensation, engages in the business
of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who,
for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates anal)ses or reports
concerning securities." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1)(11) (1988). The definition of investment adviser contains an exception for "the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or
business or financial publication of general and regular circulation." 15 U.S.C. § 80b2(a)(1)(11)(b) (1988). Such an exception is almost certainly required by the first amendment. See infra text accompanying note 309.
29- 15 U.S.C. § 806-2(a)(1)(11) (1988). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(c)(1)(A)-(H) (1988)
(discussing registration procedures necessary for certification as an investment adviser).
29 § 207, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7 (1988), prohibits any person from "willfully ...mak[ing] any
untrue statement of a material fact in any registration application or report filed with the
Commission ...or willfully... omit[ting] to state in any such application or report any
material fact which is required to be stated therein."
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any disqualification" that might be a basis for suspending, revoking or denying registration under the Investment Advisers Act.""s
Once registered, an investment adviser is subject to certain reporting requirements. 29 8 The effect of the registration requirement is
that no one can hold himself out to be an investment adviser and
sell advice to clients unless that person has obtained a license from
the state. If, for some misconduct, an adviser's license is suspended
or revoked, 97 the adviser must cease all advisory activities. Any
violation of the Act may be either enjoined or criminally
prosecuted.2s
(b) ConstitutionalIssues. (i) Licensing. The licensing aspect of
the Investment Advisers Act, standing alone, does not raise a serious first amendment question, even though the scheme inescapably
involves the licensing of speech. Like lawyers and doctors, investment advisers may not render professional opinions to clients without first registering with a governmental body and obtaining a license. As a general matter, advisers must conduct their
professional practice in conformity with state requirements. 2 9 This

license, embodying the state's certification of competence, confers
on the professional speaker the benefits of special prestige (and
therefore commercial desirability). In the Investment Advisers Act
context, it allows investment advisers to hold themselves out to the
public as experts within the securities industry, adjudged by the
state to be worthy of that title.
Id.
The Act requires all investment advisers utilizing the mails and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce to "make and keep ... records" and to file and distribute them as the
SEC requires. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (1988).
2" The SEC has the authority, under § 203(e) of the Act, to "censure, place limitations on
the activities, functions, or operations of, suspend [for a period of months] or revoke the
registration of any investment adviser if it finds . . . that such censure, placing of limitations, suspension or revocation is in the public interest... ." 15 U.S.C. § 80b.3(e) (1988). See
also § 203(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(f) (1988) (authorizing similar bar or suspension from association with an investment adviser).
299 See § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1988).
21'That the speaker is holding himself out as someone of unique expertise in possession
of a state-endowed credential creates a justification for regulation of expressive speech that
is not present in the case of speakers not seeking this official imprimatur of expertise. Thus,
for example, although the expressive speech contained in an attorney's brief is not entirely
bereft of first amendment protection, an attorney can be required to cite opposing authority
in the jurisdiction; and doctors may be required to comply with state law requirements as to
the form of patient release forms and required warnings. See generally Amen, SEC v. Lowe:
Professional Regulation and the First Amendment, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 93.
295
20
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Although a licensing scheme confers considerable benefits on the
license holder, 00 it, conversely, disables individuals who are unable
to qualify or are stripped of their registration. The state is free,
within broad limits, to specify the qualifications of a licensed professional 30 1 and, therefore, to exclude from the practice of a profes-

sion those who fail to qualify or to maintain minimum standards of
conduct. This is easily understood and presents few constitutional

problems if the profession involves physical work.302 But when lawyers or investment advisers lose their professional licenses, their
exclusion from the profession disables them from performing cer-

tain verbal conduct which constitutes the practice of their profession.3 0 3 Obviously, there is considerable tension here between the
legitimate regulatory goals of the state as licensor of professionals
and the first amendment's protection of free expression.3
300 It seems reasonably clear, however, that the licensing and registration of professionals
increase the cost of obtaining their services. Licensing reduces the number and availability
of professionals, therefore driving fees upward. It is this inevitable result that accounts in
large part for the "interest group" explanation for state regulation of professionals-a recurring theme of the so-called "public choice" literature. Although the state and the courts
claim to engage in regulation to protect the public, the big winners, so this theory goes, are
the professional special interest groups. See generally McChesney, Commercial Speech in
the Professions: The Supreme Court's Unanswered Questions and Questionable Answers,
134 U. PA. L Rxv. 45 (1984).
301 Of course, the state is not free to be arbitrary or discriminatory in the application of
its standards. For example, no state would be able to refuse to license women or Democrats,
or to reject applicants because they had advocated the right to life or the passage of gun
control laws. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 n.10 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Kreimer, supra note 88. Nevertheless, reasonable requirements as to
education and achievement, as well as standards of integrity in the performance of professional duties, are plainly permissible.
302 For example, a surgeon who does not qualify for (or who is stripped of) her license
may not operate on patients; a pilot who loses his license may not fly airplanes.
303 By "verbal conduct," I do not mean to suggest that such communications necessarily
lack cognizable speaker interests. Indeed, much of a professional's verbal work involves expressive speech, including the exercise of analytical judgment and the expression of an individual's opinion based on research, training and experience. Perhaps the most obvious example is to be found in the legal profession, where advocates of particular ideologies or
points of view pursue their own social agenda (at times pro bono) through the practice of
their professions. One need not look to ideologues in order to recognize that a professional
practice can (although it need not) serve as an outlet for creativity and self-expression. Although the state may not prevent the defrocked professional from expressing his or her
views on any subject, it may bar the rendering of personalized services to clients. See infra
text accompanying notes 304-37.
3o, As we shall see shortly, the first amendment protects the right of defrocked "speaking
professionals" to express their views on any subject. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 220 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). They may, however, be prevented from holding themselves out as

296

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:223

There is a heated debate over the wisdom of regulating the professions (or at least over the advisability of certain regulatory measures).30 5 But the first amendment, as a general matter, is not a
guarantor of wise regulation of professional conduct. The conventional form of state monitoring of the quality of professional services and the integrity of those who, wrapping themselves in a
cloak of "professionalism," persuade people to place their trust (as
well as their money) in professional hands raises no serious constitutional question. A surgeon who operates unnecessarily or injures
more than he cures can be stripped of his medical license. A lawyer
who embezzles clients' funds or suborns perjury can be disbarred,
and an investment adviser who abuses the trust of clients can have
his registration revoked by the SEC. That the speaking professions
entail verbal work does not alter the state's responsibility and
power to punish professional misconduct.
(ii) Subscription Newsletters. But what if our disbarred lawyer
wants to go into the business of publishing a magazine concerning
recent developments in the law, or is hired by a local newspaper to
write a "what's new in the law" column? What if our disqualified
investment adviser decides to continue to publish subscription
newsletters? Can the SEC charge the adviser with giving investment advice without a license and enjoin all future publications?
This was the issue posed to the Supreme Court in Lowe v. SEC.300
Christopher Lowe, whose registration under the Investment Advisers Act had been revoked by the SEC, nevertheless continued to
publish financial advice through subscription newsletters and a
telephone hotline207 The SEC sought an injunction against these
activities, viewing them as simply the continuation, through the
printed (and the taperecorded) word, of a profession Lowe was no
longer entitled to practice. The district court denied the injunction
against the newsletters, 08 concluding that, because subscription
being in possession of a state license or from engaging in the provision of personalized services to clients.
315 See, e.g., Aman, supra note 299; McChesney, supra note 300.
-- 472 U.S. 181 (1985).
307Id. at 184.
"I SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The district court did issue injunctions, however, against providing advice by telephone, individual letter or in person. Id. at
1371. As Chief Judge Weinstein offhandedly observed, "[tihe offer ... to provide current
information by telephone goes beyond impersonal communication. It creates dangers of personal advice." Judge Brieant, dissenting from the Second Circuit's reversal in Lowe, see
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newsletters were protected by the first amendment, the Investment

Advisers Act had to be narrowly construed to permit Lowe's regis-

tration for the purposes of publishing such newsletters."0 9
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed.3 10 Judge Oakes, writing
for the majority, characterized Lowe's publications as "potentially
deceptive commercial speech. '311 Given the past misconduct that
had led to the revocation of Lowe's license as investment adviser,
Judge Oakes concluded that the SEC was acting appropriately to

try to prevent harm to investors before it occurred. The court assumed that if the first amendment applied at all, it was through
that the
the application of the commercial-speech doctrine, 1 2 and
31 3

SEC could bar Lowe's newsletters under that analysis.

infra note 313 and text accompanying note 321, agreed about the dangers of the telephone.
The risk, he concluded, is that the caller receives "timely non-public advice, usually individualized, by which he hopes to gain an 'edge' on others in the market. By reason of its clandestine or confidential character, such advice is particularly susceptible to fraud or manipulation." 725 F.2d 892, 903-04 (2d Cir. 1984) (Brieant, J., dissenting).
It is admittedly difficult to police what goes on in a telephone communication. The "hot
line" was offered for subscribers who wanted personalized advice; Lowe used the telephone
as a means of providing professional investment advice. However, if such "hot line"
messages were prerecorded (similar to "dial a joke" or daily horoscopes), they would seem
conceptually indistinguishable from the newsletters. See infra notes 326-28.
3"' Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at 1369. This approach seems misconceived. Judge Weinstein mistakenly assumes that because Lowe has a right to publish his newsletter, the SEC is obligated to register him as a professional investment adviser under the Investment Advisers
Act, at least for the limited purpose of publication of such newsletters. The two, however,
are quite distinct. Lowe's right to publish does not entail a right to a state license. Moreover, the right to publish may itself not be subject to licensing requirements. In fact, the
first amendment would bar even Judge Weinstein's proposed limited-purpose registration. It
is highly doubtful that the state can require licensing of individuals engaged in the publishing and distribution of publications offered and sold to the general public. See, e.g., Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1937) (discussing unconstitutionality of city licensing
ordinance requiring permit for distribution of handbills); see also Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-46 (1936) (discussing unconstitutionality of state tax imposed
upon owners of newspapers for privilege of selling advertising); T. EamasoN. supra note 19,
at 650-52; Mayton, supra note 187, at 247-49.
725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984).
311 Id. at 901.

Id.
3'3 Judge Brieant, dissenting, characterized the newsletters as the publication of investment opinion (analogous to PreventionMagazine in the health care field) that did not require registration on the part of the publisher. Id. at 903. While rejecting the commercial
speech label, he concluded that even if commercial speech were involved, the SEC's attempt
to enjoin publication was a prior restraint "Investment opinion, in my opinion, is as much
speech protected from prior restraint as is political opinion, philosophy or gibberish . Id. at 907.
312
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide "the important
constitutional question whether an injunction against the publication and distribution of [Lowe's] newsletters is prohibited by the
First Amendment.

'3 14

Nevertheless, the majority opinion, written

by Justice Stevens, avoided the constitutional issue by engaging in
rather strained statutory interpretation.315 The Court distinguished between personalized and impersonal investment advice,
and concluded that Congress intended to include impersonal advisory publications, such as Lowe's newsletters, within the statutory
exemption for "bona fide" publications "of general and regular circulation."31 Justice White, concurring in the judgment, believed
the constitutional issue was unavoidable since, in his view, Congress intended to include newsletters like those Lowe published
within the definition of investment adviser. 1 Justice White was
prepared to bite the bullet: "the Act may not constitutionally be
applied to prevent persons who are unregistered (including persons
whose registration has been denied or revoked) from offering impersonal investment advice through publications such as the newsletters published by [Lowe]." '
Unless Congress amends the Investment Advisers Act to overrule Lowe and include impersonal subscription advisers, the Court
may have placed the regulation of subscription newsletters beyond
the regulatory reach of the SEC.319 Nevertheless, a difficult and
important constitutional question hangs in the air and needs to be
addressed: at what point does regulation of the verbal work of advisory professionals in the securities industry become a restriction
upon protected expression?
314 472 U.S. 181, 189 (1985). Lowe did not challenge the district court's injunction as to
the use of the telephone "hot line" for those seeking personalized service. Id. at 189 n.23.
"' Professor Aman, among others, deplores the Court's decision to engage in "statutory
gymnastics" rather than confront the difficult and inescapable constitutional questions.
Aman, supra note 299, at 96.
31615 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1)(11)(D) (1988).
31 472 U.S. at 223 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
318 Id. at 236. In Justice White's view, "at some point, a measure is no longer a regulation
of a profession but a regulation of speech or of the press; beyond that point, the statute
must survive the level of scrutiny demanded by the First Amendment." Id. at 230.
31'Whether other antifraud measures, such as remedies under § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, or actions under the federal mail and
wire fraud statutes are in fact available, as the majority suggested in Lowe, 472 U.S. at 209
n.56, is, as Justice White remarked, "in some doubt." Id. at 225 n.9. (White, J., concurring
in the judgment). See infra text accompanying note 342.
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Although they followed different analytical paths, the opinions
of Judge Weinstein,3 20 Judge Brieant 21 (dissenting from the Court
of Appeals ruling), and Justices Stevens 22 and White 323 all drew a
distinction between Lowe's impersonal subscription newsletters
and personalized investment advice. In evaluating whether this is a
viable, constitutionally defensible line, it is necessary to consider
the competing interests of the speaker, the audience (the investing
public) and the state.
Let us begin from the perspective of the investing public. The
Investment Advisers Act is premised on the principle that investor-clients need to be protected from possible abuse of trust by
investment advisers. When an investment adviser communicates
with a client, a fiduciary relationship is created.3 2' The client has
certain expectations based, in part, on the adviser's avowed expertise and license; he is seeking an investment strategy tailored to his
particular financial circumstances and goals. A relationship based
on the adviser's superior knowledge and the element of trust, plus
the confiding of personal and financial information, creates an atmosphere where "[t]he dangers of fraud, deception, or overreaching that motivated the enactment of the statute" 21 come into play.
Is the recipient of an impersonal subscription newsletter equally
in need of state protection? Although certain susceptible individuals may be unduly influenced by its contents, the first amendment,
in my view, requires that the state act from the standpoint not of
.the exceptionally gullible3 26 but of the reasonably intelligent and
skeptical recipient of a standardized subscription newsletter. Such
a recipient knows that whatever recommendations are contained in
the newsletter were not drawn to fit his or her particular financial
posture and goals. Although publishers of such newsletters may
have to answer for fraud,32 7 the recipient takes a chance by acting
upon such general recommendations.32 8
. 556 F. Supp. at 1365.
"1 725 F.2d at 903 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
32
472 U.S. at 211.
-- Id. at 232-33 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
1 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 210.

Id.
-6 An exception would be regulation directed to the protection of minors or the intellec325

tually handicapped. See supra note 157.

For a discussion of the proper scienter standard, see infra note 337.
Professor Aman disagrees:
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The state, however, approached Lowe's refusal to stop publishing from what Professor Aman calls a purely "regulatory perspective. ' 329 Lowe had repeatedly engaged in misconduct in the past
and his license to render investment advice had been revoked, 8 0
The SEC, therefore, was attempting to fulfill its mission as guard-

ian

of

professional

standards33 '

by

prophylactic

regula-

tion-preventing Lowe from providing any (even impersonal) investment advice in the future, whatever the medium of
communication. To that end, the SEC asked a court to tell Lowe
that he could never again publish a newsletter concerning securities investment.3 32
[The newsletters] did not arrive in an individual's home unannounced or uninvited. They were personally subscribed to by individuals who found his advice
useful and relevant to their own circumstances. While Lowe may not have
dealt personally with each of his subscribers, his views certainly were capable
of being treated and relied on as personal advice by his subscribers. They knew
of Lowe, and, presumably, they knew what kind of advice they wanted. That is
why they were willing to pay the subscription price in the first place. To say
this is not personal advice is to view this only from Lowe's perspective. The
advice was very personal indeed to those who used it.
Aman, supra note 299, at 135-36. It is hard to see, under this view, why a subscription to
any specialized periodical would not be transformed into a "personal" communication of
advice. Indeed, even a newspaper of general circulation can be subscribed to, received daily
at home, and its various columns (including Jean Dixon's horoscope, Dear Abby, Dr. Joyce
Brothers and any other "advice" columns by known individuals) relied upon by the reader.
However great the desire to rely upon such impersonal advice, undue reliance thereon would
be unreasonable.
I'l See generally id. at 101-09, observing there are three perspectives through which Lowe
could have been decided: (1) a "regulatory perspective" holding the SEC action a presumptively legitimate regulatory response to past misconduct; (2) a "first amendment perspective" holding the SEC action a presumptively unconstitutional prior restraint of free expression; and (3) a "commercial speech perspective"--a constitutional middle ground-involving
a somewhat deferential balancing of competing interests.
330 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 183 (1985).
331 Like the SEC, Professor Aman believes that such newsletters constitute "the actual
practice of. .[the investment adviser's] profession" and therefore "the government's interest is not just the future well-being of consumers but the integrity of the profession itself."
Aman, supra note 299, at 146.
332 Judge Oakes in the Court of Appeals at great pains explained that Lowe was:
not prohibited from publishing a newspaper of general interest and circulation.
Nor is he prohibited from publishing recommendations in somebody else's
bona fide newspaper as an employee, editor, or writer. What he is prohibited
from doing is selling to clients advice and counsel, analysis and reports as to
the value of specific securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing or selling or holding specific securities.
SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984). It is unclear, however, why the propriety of giving
specific recommendations should turn on whether or not Lowe is a publisher or the em-
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Under the first amendment, however, neither the SEC nor any
other arm of government has the power to prevent willing speakers
from addressing the general public with recommendations on any
subject, if they can find subscribers willing to pay the fee. The
Constitution commands us to find an accommodation between the
individual's right to express (and be paid) for his views and the
state's regulatory jurisdiction over the conduct of professionals.
The point at which such accommodation is reached should depend
on the personalized or general nature of the information imparted,
as well as the nature of the relationship between the disseminator
and recipient of the information.
At some point during the relationship between a professional investment adviser and a client, a particularized course of conduct
will be advocated by the professional. The client relying on such
personalized advice is singularly at risk of harm from professional
malpractice; on occasion, he may feel pressured to follow the retained expert's recommendations, or to overcome reservations and
make a decision with little opportunity to reflect. The state may
justifiably concern itself with such personalized encounters not because the communications lack first amendment protection, but
because they present opportunities for abuse of the professional's
position of trust, overreaching, and fraud."'

ployee of a publisher, unless, as Judge Brieant points out, the majority assumes that the
owner will exercise control sufficient to prevent fraud. Id. at 908 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
However, as the Winans affair revealed, even so prestigious and well-run a publication as
the Wall Street Journalwas unable to prevent one of its reporters from engaging in a fraud.
See infra text accompanying note 339. Fraud, when it is discovered, can be dealt with either
under existing provisions or by enacting narrowly tailored laws to that end. What cannot be
tolerated is for a court to tell a speaker-publisher what subjects he may or may not discuss
in the future in the pages of his generally available (for a price) publication.
= The attorney solicitation cases by and large support this view. In Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, the Court upheld state bar association disciplinary regulations that prohibited in-person solicitation for remunerative employment by attorney. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
Although the Court reiterated its prior holdings that advertising by attorneys was constitutionally protected (albeit second-class "commercial speech"), the decisive factor in Ohralik
was the increased likelihood that fraud could occur during an in-person solicitation. See also
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985) ("In-person solicitation
by a lawyer... was a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy,
the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud."). Contrasting in-person solicitation
with print advertising, Justice White explained in Zaudererthat print advertising "in most
cases ...will lack the coercive force of the personal presence of a trained advocate.... [It]
is not likely to involve pressure on the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer."
Id. at 642.
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The immediacy of the interaction, then, coupled with the fiduciary nature of the relationship, justifies the state's involvement.""4
However, as the immediacy of the relationship (and hence the vulnerability of the recipient of the advice) diminishes, the protected
nature of the adviser's expressive communications begins to tip the
balance away from the protective goals of regulation. At that point,
the state's interest in prophylactic regulation 335 of the expression

of nonpersonalized investment advice is outweighed by the
speaker's first amendment interests.
Moreover, to the extent that unregistered publishers of generalized investment advice do not hold themselves out to be licensed
investment advisers, the state's interest in the integrity of its professional licensing scheme is unimpaired. The public will be put on
notice that the publishers of such newsletters have not qualified
for licenses from the government, and should consider the caliber
of the source in deciding whether and to what degree to rely on the
advice contained in such publications.
Finally, let us turn to the expressive rights of the defrocked professional. The speaker's interest in expressing his opinions to the
public is, if anything, magnified by the general distribution of
those views. Unlike an investment adviser engaged in one-to-one
consultations with a series of clients, the writer of a subscription
newsletter has, as it were, joined the ranks of the press. The publication of his opinions about investments (including specific securities) should be treated no differently from the publication of his
opinions about the relative merits of particular restaurants, artists,
books, political candidates or any other subject. The state cannot,
consistent with the first amendment, require the publishers of
newspapers or specialized periodicals to obtain a license in order to
publish; neither can it impose such a requirement on anyone inclined to publish an advisory newsletter about securities.

3 See Investment Advisers Act § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1988), prohibiting investment
advisory contracts that: (1) provide for certain formulae for calculating compensation; (2) do
not include a "no assignment" clause, unless consent of the client has been obtained; (3) do
not require notice to the client of any change in partnership membership of the investment
adviser, if appropriate. See also § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1988) (requiring adviser to obtain
informed consent of client to any transactions in which adviser acts as principal or broker of
third party).
"' Newsletter publishers may be held accountable, of course, for fraudulent representations contained in their publications. See infra note 337.
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Of course, the publisher cannot misrepresent personal qualifications (i.e., by falsely claiming to be a licensed investment adviser) 3 6 And the speaker is subject to the same post-expression
liability for fraud or libel as would apply to publications of general

circulation.

337

(iii) "Scalping" and Trading on Nonpublic Information. As a
result of Lowe's exemption of publishers of standardized subscription newsletters from the scope of the Investment Advisers Act,

the antifraud provision of that statute is no longer available to police their fraudulent advisory practices. The state is thus left with
a difficult regulatory problem: how to control the improper use of
such newsletters (and the financial press in general) to manipulate
stock prices.
Consider the following scenario. The publisher of an advisory
newsletter may buy shares of a particular security intending to recommend it to readers for investment in the immediate future. The
favorable recommendation, if believed, is likely to result in increased trading that will cause the price of the shares to rise. The
adviser waits until the price has risen and then sells, making a
profit. The actual investment advice concerning the particular security may be completely truthful and nonmisleading. What the
adviser has omitted to tell the readers, however, is that the advice
serves the adviser's purpose at least as much as their own: he is
trading for his own account in the same securities and using his

" Presumably, any unregistered newsletter publisher who falsely holds himself out as a
registered adviser is engaging in false advertising and can be prohibited from continuing to
do so. It would therefore be permissible to compel such an offender to carry a corrective
disclaimer.
37 The liability of newspapers of general circulation for misrepresentation, as opposed to
libel, remains unsettled. The issue comes up in the context of public reliance on weather
reports, restaurant reviews, and the like. Certainly, intentional fraud working concrete injury should be actionable. Whether a lesser standard of culpability should suffice is unclear.
As developed above, see supra text accompanying notes 170-73 & 183-86, the "actual malice" rule, derived from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is designed at
least in part to protect particularly fragile speech that society wishes to encourage. Arguably, subscription newsletters, like newspaper restaurant reviews, are produced under sufficiently strong incentives to preclude Sullivan protection solely on these grounds. However,
it can be argued that liability for negligent publication raises first amendment questions
even where speech is relatively hardy. Given the absence of injury to reputational interests,
the attenuated claim of reasonable reliance on the part of the reader, and a particular first
amendment concern (evidenced in part by the press clause) with shielding the press from
liability, there would appear to be a strong case for insisting on either intentional or reckless
misrepresentation before damages may be assessed or fines imposed.
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clients' reliance on his advice to drive up the price for his private
and secret33 8 gain. This practice is commonly referred to as
"scalping.,

Financial reporters in newspapers of general circulation are able
to engage in similar manipulation.3 3 9 A reporter knows which com-

panies and securities are going to be the subject of columns,
whether or not those columns will be favorable and when those
columns are going to appear in print. The reporter is able, therefore, to purchase securities scheduled for favorable review before
the good news reaches the public. When the stock rises, the reporter will sell and make a profit. As with scalping by subscription
advisers, the investment information may be entirely accurate.
Scalping resembles insider trading in that one in possession of
material nonpublic information s40 (and privy to the timing of its
338 Courts have upheld attempts to penalize scalping under the Investment Advisers Act
and the Exchange Act. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
181 (1963) (scalping operates as a "fraud and deceit" within the meaning of Investment
Advisers Act); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1979) (scalping constitutes violation of rule lOb-5). Not surprisingly, the greater the number of advisees, the more
successful the scheme. Therefore, the publishers of widely distributed newsletters will be
better able to "scalp" than those who advise a small number of clients on a personalized
basis.
Until Lowe, the Investment Advisers Act was presumed to regulate scalping by subscription advisers, imposing, as it does, specific duties with regard to adviser-client conflicts of
interests. § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1988) (discussing investment adviser's duty to inform
client of conflict of interest in writing before affecting client's account through purchase or
sale of security). But see SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (discussing
violation of Investment Advisers Act by publisher of investment newsletter). The penalties
for scalping might include damages (perhaps treble damages such as are available under the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988)), and/or an injunction
against future trading without prior disclosure.
"3 A recent (and notorious) example of manipulation by the financial press involves R.
Foster Winans, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the Street" column.
Winans was aware of the subjects and dates of future columns and (with coconspirators) was
able to manipulate to his own advantage the likely effect on the market of the column he
was writing. Winans and his codefendant were convicted of violating § 10(b) of the 1934
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) and rule lob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989); and of
violating federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1988). United States
v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), af'd sub nom. United States v. Carpenter, 791
F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), af'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (Court split 4-4 on "misappropriation"
theory of 10b-5 liability).
340 A working definition of "nonpublic" information is (a) "information that investors
may not lawfully acquire without the consent of the source" and (b) "information which,
although it may lawfully be disseminated, is not yet generally available." Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 322 & n.2 (1979). In the case of scalping, the nonpublic information typically concerns
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disclosure) trades prior to that disclosure. In fact, financial reporters and newsletter publishers could be engaging in two forms of
securities fraud: (1) scalping (by withholding information about
their trading positions in the securities they are recommending),
and (2) unlawfully trading on nonpublic information concerning
the securities themselves, in anticipation of the price increase after
its disclosure. After Lowe, subscription advisers who scalp have
been exempted from the antifraud provisions of the Investment
Advisers Act.3 41 The Lowe majority suggested, however, that SEC
rule 10b-5 and the federal mail and wire fraud statutes would still
be available to punish those who scalp. 4 2
the adviser's personal interest in the securities he is recommending to the public, whereas in
the insider trading context, the nonpublic information concerns the securities themselves.
The first amendment issue is identical whether the SEC seeks to penalize a reporter for
"outsider" trading on nonpublic information about securities or for trading on the effect of
his recommendations without informing his readers. This Article will, therefore, discuss
"scalping" only, unless there is some distinction between the two types of nondisclosures.
341 See supra text accompanying notes 314-18. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
the Court held that the Investment Advisers Act antifraud sections could be utilized to
punish scalping by the publisher of an investment advisory newsletter and to require him
"to make full and frank disclosure of his practice of trading on the effect of his recommendation." 375 U.S. 180, 197 (1963). Since the Investment Advisers Act presumably would not
apply after Lowe, as Justice White observed, Capital Gains has been effectively overruled.
Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 225 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
m42For technical reasons, rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989), may not be available.
Reporters and subscription advisers are not corporate "insiders" within the common meaning of the term. Corporate insiders are typically members of the board of directors, officers,
and controlling shareholders. In addition, under current interpretations of rule 10b-5. individuals who have a special or fiduciary relationship with the shareholders, see, e.g., Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980), and tippees who know or should know that the
confidential information they have received from an insider was disclosed in breach of a
fiduciary relationship, see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), must either disclose that information or refrain from trading upon it. It is not at all clear, however, that financial reporters
(or publishers of newsletters exempted from the Investment Advisers Act) have the requisite fiduciary relationship with their readers to subject them to liability except under the
theory (not yet accepted by the Supreme Court) that they have misappropriated information not belonging to them (the "misappropriation theory"). This possibly explains why the
SEC withdrew its claim that Winans had breached a duty to his readership. Note, The
Inadequacy of Rule 10b-5 to Address Outsider Trading by Reporters, 38 STAm L. RE. 1549,
1555 n.35 (1986). Indeed, by the same reasoning, the continuing vitality of Zweig u. Hearst
may be in doubt 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). See generally Peskind, Regulation of the
FinancialPress:A New Dimension in Section 10(b) and Rule IOb-5, 14 ST. Louis UJ.,J. 80
(1969).
Carpenter suggests, however, that federal wire and mail fraud statutes can be used to
reach financial reporters employed by newspapers. 484 U.S. at 28. The Court held that Winans' conduct in leaking information about the columns to coconspirators and in trading on
that information before it appeared in the Journal constituted a scheme to defraud the
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Whatever the applicable regulatory mechanism (either existing
or to be enacted), would the first amendment rights of advisory
newsletter publishers or financial reporters be violated if the state
were to impose liability for their trading, without disclosure to
their readers, on the securities discussed in their investment
recommendations?
There is no serious basis, in my view, for contending that a disclosure requirement imposed upon members of the financial press
would violate the editorial integrity of the press by analogy to
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 4a Tornillo addressed a
right-of-reply statute that required a newspaper to choose between
printing views with which it disagreed or being completely silent
on the issue. Thus, unlike our hypothetical regulation, the regulation in Tornillo was directed at speech rather than conduct: the
"or else" was to refrain from speaking. By contrast, the "disclose
or abstain" rule to reach scalping suggested above leaves a newspaper's editorial judgment unimpaired. It merely requires a newspaper to disclose certain facts to its readers or else to refrain from
trading. The rule does not require the newspaper (or reporter) to
choose between disclosure and publishing. Therefore, the statute in
Tornillo, with its commandment to "allow others to speak or else
be silent" poses a direct speech-related burden not present in the
scalping context.3 44
2. The Regulation of Expressive Speech: Proxy Solicitation. In

newspaper, by depriving it of its property right to its exclusive use prior to publication. Id.
This conspiracy to defraud the newspaper by trading on its confidential information was a
"scheme ... to defraud" within the meaning of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1988).
3.3

418 U.S. 241 (1974).

One commentator has suggested that Congress should enact legislation making it unlawful for the publisher of any newspaper to trade prior to publication of pertinent financial
articles unless the newspaper itself publishes a disclosure statement such as "Information
contained in this paper may or may not have been the basis for the trading of securities by
our employees." Publication of such a legend would immunize the newspaper (and their
employees) from any liability for scalping and constitute only minimal interference with
editorial freedoms. Note, supra note 342, at 1570-73.
The disclaimer could be readily avoided: a newspaper could simply adopt a "no trading"
policy and itself abstain from trading. Under ordinary rules of agency, it would incur no
liability for the unknown, unauthorized and intentional wrongs of an employee. If, however,
the newspaper itself engaged in the fraudulent practice, the first amendment would afford
no refuge. Cf. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) ("The publisher of a
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws.").
31
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addition to factual information concerning matters such as upcoming meetings, board nominees, and directors' and executives' compensation, proxy statements also set forth and purport to evaluate
the solicitor's3 5 (and sometimes opposing shareholders') proposals

for shareholder action, with the purpose of persuading the shareholder-voters to vote their proxies in support of those proposals.
Despite the expressive nature of much of what transpires in the
solicitation process, proxy solicitors are subjected to a regulatory
scheme that (1) requires prior filing with the SEC of all solicitation
materials; (2) mandates disclosure of such materials (including
compelled dissemination of certain shareholder proposals management opposes); and (3) punishes false or misleading statements.
(a) The Statutory Scheme. In section 14(a) of the Exchange
Act,3 46 Congress sought to prevent corporate management (the
most frequent solicitor) from soliciting proxies without first fully
informing shareholders about the matters to be decided at the
meeting.3 4 7 The provision seeks to protect shareholders' rights to
control the decisions entrusted to them by state law.3 48
Accordingly, under the authority of section 14(a), the SEC
promulgated a regulatory scheme based on full disclosure, analo1,The solicitor is most often the management of the corporation, but discontented
shareholders may mount independent proxy contests. Moreover, qualified shareholders can
sometimes compel management to include their (the shareholders') proposals for action in
the corporate proxy materials. See infra text accompanying notes 403-11.
34 The statute provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name
to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any [registered,
nonexempt] security....
1934 Exchange Act, § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
M Prior to the passage of the Exchange Act, "[t]he stockholder was merely invited to
sign his name and return his proxy without being furnished the information essential to the
intelligent exercise of his right of franchise." 2 L Loss, SEcuRarrms RGrLA-oN 858-59
(1961). See also H.R REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). To the extent shareholders were kept uninformed about corporate
policy decisions ostensibly to be made by them, they were denied "fair suffrage." HR. REP.
No. 1383, at 13-14.
3' See, e.g., Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 680-81 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (discussing shareholder rights under Exchange Act proxy rules that require proxy
statements to include shareholder resolutions), vacated and remanded for dismissal as
moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
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gous to the registration and disclosure scheme required for distributions of securities under the Securities Act. Regulation 14A" 40
contains detailed rules concerning the steps to be followed in order
to solicit

50

a shareholder's proxy.3 51 Prior to (or at the time of)

solicitation, each person to be solicited must have received a proxy
statement, 52 and the statement (together with the form of proxy
and supplemental materials) must have been filed with the SEC. 03 3
Until recently, all proxy statements had to be filed first in preliminary and then later in definitive form. 4 However, the SEC has

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 to 14a-13; Sched. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1989) (specifying
required contents of proxy statement); Sched. 14B, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102 (1989) (specifying required contents of statement to be filed by "participant" in contested board election).
311 A "solicitation" is defined very broadly, to include, in pertinent part:
(i) Any request for a proxy whether or not accompanied by or included in a
form of proxy;

(ii) Any request to execute or not to execute, or to revoke, a proxy;
(iii) The furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication to security
holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a proxy.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(j) (1989).
"' The word "proxy" is herein used as shorthand for the definitional triad "proxy, consent or authorization." A proxy is defined to include "every proxy, consent or authorization
within the meaning of section 14(a) of the [Exchange] Act. The consent or authorization
may take the form of failure to object or to dissent." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(e) (1989).
32 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (1989). A proxy statement is a document containing all the
information required by Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1989). The SEC has recently applied the principles of its more flexible integrated disclosure system to proxy statements. See Disclosure of Certain Relationships and Transactions Involving Management,
Exchange Act Release No. 18,878, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,236
(July 9, 1982); Proxy Rules-Comprehensive Review, Exchange Act Release No. 23,789,
[1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,044 (Oct. 10, 1986). However, a
considerable amount of information must still be disclosed, including details about the
meeting, the revocability of the proxy, dissenters' rights of appraisal, the identity of the
solicitor, personal interests of various parties in the matters to be voted upon, and detailed
information about any and all matters to be acted upon at the meeting and for which proxies are being solicited (such as proposed slates of directors, management compensation, independent accountants, issuance or alteration of outstanding securities).
353 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1989).
I" See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (1989) (preliminary filing ten days prior to distribution of
definitive copies); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(b) (1989) (preliminary filing of additional materials
two days prior to distribution of definitive copies); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(c) (1989) (definitive copies filed with SEC not later than date of distribution to shareholders). In addition,
materials to be used in personal solicitations (such as instructions for telephone solicitations
or personal letters) must be filed with the SEC five days before they are distributed to the
individuals who will be making the solicitations. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(d) (1989).
Perhaps in anticipation of first amendment challenges to come, speeches, press releases
and radio or television scripts need not be filed with the SEC prior to the date of actual first
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eliminated the filing in preliminary form proxy statements concerning meetings at which only certain routine matters are to be
decided. 55 Where applicable, the preliminary filing requirements
apply to all solicitations, 3 e whether by management or shareholders intent on waging a proxy contest.

If management is the solicitor, and the meeting at which the
proxies are to be voted is the annual meeting (or a meeting in lieu
of the annual meeting) at which the board of directors is elected,
each proxy statement must be accompanied or preceded by a copy
of the corporation's annual report to the shareholders. 5 Moreover,

use. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(h) (1989). See infra text accompanying note 381.
11 The affected meetings are those where "the only matters to be acted upon are the
election of directors; the election, approval or ratification of auditors; and/or shareholder
proposals.... This exclusion does not apply if the registrant comments upon or refers to a
solicitation in opposition in connection with the forthcoming meeting in its proxy materiaL"
Proxy Filing-Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 25,217, (1987-88 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 184,211 at 88,951 (Dec. 21, 1987) [hereinafter Final Rules].
The shareholder proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8, mentioned above, are subjected to a separate review procedure. See infra text accompanying note 358.
The SEC has eliminated preliminary filings where meetings deal with ordinary matters in
order to "relieve registrants and the Commission of unnecessary administrative burdens and
preparation and processing costs associated with the filing and processing of proxy material
that is currently subject to selective review procedures, but ordinarily is not selected for
review in preliminary form." Final Rules, supra,at 88,951. From a first amendment perspective, however, these changes effect no cure because matters that are the subject of debate
and controversy among shareholders remain subject to the preliminary filing requirement
under the current uneven (but generally overly inclusive) interpretation of "solicitation."
See infra text accompanying notes 377-95.
3- Rule 14a-2 provides certain exemptions from the rules for, inter alia, solicitations involving securities in the solicitor's name, or of which he is the beneficial owner. Newspaper
advertisements (analogous to the tombstone security advertisements, see supra text accompanying notes 236-41), that do no more than provide information concerning a source from
which proxy statements, proxy forms and other material can be obtained are also exempt.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(a)(6) (1989).
There is also a subset of exempt solicitations (to which, however, rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-9 (1989), the general antifraud rule, applies) involving: (1) the solicitation of no
more than ten shareholders, or (2) the provision of disinterested voting advice by an adviser
with whom the shareholder has a business relationship. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1), (2)
(1989).
"5 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (1989). The annual report must contain financial information
including balance sheets and income statements for two and three years, respectively, prepared in compliance with Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (1989), and managements discussion
and analysis of financial condition and results of operations, description of business, and
other information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(1) (1989). It must also offer to provide a copy of
the 10-K annual report to each person solicited, without charge. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(1)
(1989). Copies of the annual report must be submitted to the SEC either on the date the
report is sent to security holders or on the date preliminary copies of the proxy statement
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the corporation must include within its proxy statement certain
qualifying shareholder proposals, whether or not it approves of
them.3 58 The content and format of the annual report," 9 the proxy
statements8 0 and the form of proxy itself 38 1 are prescribed. Moreover, virtually all solicitations3 6 2 are subject to a general antifraud

are filed with the SEC, whicheveris later. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(c) (1989). The report is
"solely for [the SEC's] information" and is not deemed "soliciting material" or "filed" so as
to subject the corporation to liability under § 18 of the Exchange Act (liability for making
and filing misleading statements), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988).
The annual report, although much of it is essentiall nonexpressive descriptive historical
information involving minimal editorial discretion, also contains analytic and evaluative elements that closely resemble expressive speech, such as the management's discussion and
analysis of financial condition. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1989) (setting forth contents of
annual report). The SEC also "encourage[s], but [does] not require[]" corporations to include "forward-looking" information, such as is covered by safe harbor rules under both the
Exchange and the Securities Acts. Id. at instruction 7. See supra text accompanying notes
256-58.
31' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1989). Rule 14a-8 permits shareholders who have been, for
at least one year, record or beneficial owners of at least one percent (or $1,000 market value)
of the voting securities to request the corporation to include within the corporate proxy
statement an appropriate proposal and supporting statement not to exceed five hundred
words in length. This rule enables shareholders to propose certain actions to their fellow
shareholders (but not to solicit proxies from them) without having to undertake the considerable expense and effort of an independent proxy solicitation. Management is permitted to
include its own (unlimited as to size) statement in opposition to the proposal.
The rules specify categories of proposals that management may omit from its proxy statements including, inter alia, proposals for actions "not a proper subject for action by security
holders" under state law; proposals for illegal action; proposals that are false or misleading
under rule 14a-9; proposals dealing with personal grievances or claims; proposals relating to
the ordinary business of the corporation; proposals not significantly related to corporate
business; proposals beyond the power of the corporation to effectuate; and proposals duplicative of another proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1)-(13) (1989). Shareholders may not
utilize this procedure to nominate candidates for election to the board. See rule 14a-11, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1989); Schedule 14B, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102 (1989). If the corporation
intends to omit a proposal under these exclusions, it must notify the SEC (and the shareholder) of its intention to do so. The SEC will typically notify the corporation by letter
whether it contemplates taking "no action" in the event the proposal is omitted from the
corporate proxy statement. The constitutionality of the shareholder proposal provision is
considered infra text accompanying notes 403-11.
"' See supra note 357.
860 See supra note 352.
3"' See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)-(e) (1989). The rule requires identification of the solicitor
(in bold-face type); a space for the date; description of each matter to be decided (together
with boxes enabling the person solicited to choose between approval, disapproval or abstention); and the names of nominees for the board (together with a means to withhold votes for
any and all of them). The proxy must also indicate that it will be voted on at the meeting.
Id.
362 See supra note 350.
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provision,36 3 and violations of the regulations are punishable by
both civil and criminal penalties.3
(b) Constitutional Issues. (i) Regulating Expressive Communication in the Service of Shareholder Voice. The federal system of
proxy regulation has gone virtually unchallenged on first amendment grounds since its inception. 6 5 The regulatory scheme

presents difficult constitutional questions, however, because the expressive interests of corporate management and shareholders are
plainly at stake.
Although proxy contests are waged through the exchange of protected speech, it is not always possible to know definitively who
the speaker is. Typically, the voice we hear is that of a majority of
the incumbent managers; it is their corporate proxy statement,
their proposed slate of directors, their set of proposals for shareholder action. And yet, the final slate of directors and the approved corporate actions must reflect the will (or at least the acquiescence) of the majority of the shareholders.
The federal proxy system reflects the reality that, although at
Rule 14a-9 provides in pertinent part:
(a) No solicitation subject to [Regulation A] shall be made by means of any
proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication,
written or oral, containing any statement which at the time and in the light of
the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to
any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct
any statement in any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of
a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has become false or
misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1989).
I" See 1934 Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988) (civil liability for false and
misleading statements); 1934 Exchange Act § 21(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988) (availability of injunction to enjoin violations); 1934 Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988)
(criminal penalties available for violations of Act).
36' See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978) ("Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the First
Amendment, such as... corporate proxy statements."). The legislative history of the Exchange Act is devoid of debate concerning the first amendment implications of proxy regulation. Moreover, until recently, the cases assumed virtually without discussion that the
scheme was constitutional See, e.g., SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123, 124 (2d Cir. 1956) (finding
petitioners' claims that proxy regulations "are unconstitutional as unauthorized delegations
of legislative power and otherwise ... have no merit") (emphasis added). The "and otherwise" referred to the argument that the regulatory scheme, insofar as it interfered with free
"campaign" debate during a proxy contest, violated the first amendment. See L Loss, supra
note 155, at 454; Spear, Einhorn & Walsh, Do Proxy ClearanceProcedures Violate the First
Amendment?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 29 & n.1, col. 4.
3"
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common law there was no mechanism for voting by proxy, 300 in the
modern corporate world of centralized management and widely
dispersed shareholders, shareholder voting by proxy has become
indispensable. 6 7 Indeed, as Professor Loss has observed, the separation of ownership from management "puts the entire concept of
the stockholders' meeting at the mercy of the proxy instrument. ' 36 8 In addition to enabling interested shareholders to communicate with widely dispersed fellow shareholders,36 9 the regulatory system also compels corporate managers to communicate with
their shareholders. In short, the proxy system provides the primary
vehicle for communication between corporate managers and their
absentee shareholder-principals, and for ensuring accountability in
management.
But what about the corporate speaker's interests? Under the

361

See generally Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MICH. L. REv. 225 (1942). All states now

permit corporations to solicit shareholder votes by proxy, although their regulation of the
process "is still a virtual void." L. Loss, supra note 155, at 449 n.1. See also Ruder, Protections for Corporate Shareholders: Are Major Revisions Needed?, 37 U. MIAMI L, REv. 243,
253 (1983).
'17 Although shareholders do not under state law "manage" the day-to-day operations of
these corporations, see, e.g., DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1988), they do elect the members
of the board of directors and typically vote to approve or disapprove various fundamental
matters such as mergers, amendment of the articles of incorporation and bylaws, voluntary
dissolution and sale of corporate assets. Proxy solicitations involve those matters entrusted
by state law (or management) to shareholder decisionmaking.
368 L. Loss, supra note 155, at 449. See also Ruder, supra note 366, at 249-50 (stating that
"control of the proxy machinery means control of the corporation").
It has been said in the past (with some validity) that shareholders do not read, let alone
reflect upon, the issues raised in proxy materials as long as dividends are paid. See Liberty
Fund, Inc. Symposium on the First Amendment and Securities Regulation, 20 CONN. L.
REv. 383, 395-397 (1988) (exchange between Professors BeVier and Wolfson). There are,
however, indications that this pattern of shareholder passivity is changing. Cherno &
Zelenty, Solicitationsin Proxy Contests, 17 REv. SEc. REG. 965 (1984). Not all shareholders
must read these disclosure materials in order to affect the decisionmaking process, particularly in light of the disproportionate potential for influence of a relatively small number of
institutional investors having substantial holdings.
369 See infra text accompanying notes 403-11 (discussion of shareholder proposals and
solicitations of other shareholders' proxies).
Because proxies are signed prior to the actual meeting, shareholders wishing to contest a
board election or to oppose a proposal for corporate action "can only address the assembled
proxies which are lying at the head of the table." Securities and Exchange Commission
Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before House Comm. on
International& Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) (statement of SEC Chairman Purcell). The distribution of solicitation materials enables shareholders to communicate with each other prior to the execution of proxies.
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proxy regulations, the corporation must disclose particular information, 70 include within its own proxy statement shareholder proposals with which it disagrees, 3 second guess itself with regard to
3 72
communications that might be deemed misleading by the SEC
and file its proxy materials with the SEC prior to their distribution.3 73 Given the expressive nature of so much proxy-related
speech, why isn't the entire regulatory system an impermissible in37 4
fringement of free expression?
For reasons suggested above,37' 5 the overall system of proxy regulation does not impinge upon free speech principles. Government
may establish processes for ensuring that agents act with the authority of their principals. In the context of shareholder decisionmaking undertaken by means of proxy solicitation, the corporate
speaker's expressive interests have not yet become fully cognizable.
We cannot be completely certain that the corporate voice we hear
is that of management acting on behalf of (and with the informed
consent of) the shareholders, and not that of a wayward agent.
Congress perceived a real danger that, in fact, corporate management could use the legally created proxy mechanism to deceive and
manipulate the votes of trusting and uninformed (because physically absent) shareholders. 7
Yet even if government may act to ensure "fair corporate suffrage," that does not mean all of the SEC's regulatory apparatus is
necessarily constitutionally permissible. As with other schemes impacting upon protected expression, there comes a point at which

1o

See supra text accompanying notes 359-61.

31 See supra text accompanying note 358.
372 See supra text accompanying notes 357 & 363.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 353-55.
3'

For a view to this effect, see Wolfson, supra note 59, at 281. See also Wolfson, Use

FirstAmendment to Call Off the SEC Censors, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1988, at 26, cOL 3. "The

SEC can get an injunction from a court to alt any disclosure it and the court deem erroneous, and it can request the Justice Department to start criminal proceedings. In effect, this
means that the SEC has a monopoly on the content of financial information." Id.
375See supra text accompanying notes 365-69.
376 S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934).
[Tihe [proxy] rules and regulations will protect investors from promiscuous
solicitation of their proxies, on the one hand by irresponsible outsiders seeking

to wrest control of the corporation away from honest and conscientious officials; and on the other hand, by unscrupulous corporate officials seeking to
retain control of the management by concealing or distorting facts.
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regulatory concerns are outweighed by speaker interests. Accordingly, the state must confine itself to those measures narrowly tailored to further its compelling interest. In this respect, several aspects of the regulatory scheme do raise very substantial first
amendment concerns.
(ii) Definition of "Solicitation."The basic definition of "solicitation" includes "the furnishing of a form of proxy or other communication to security holders under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement, withholding or revocation of a
proxy. ' 37 7 This language has been construed to encompass any
writings (whether or not they mention or explicitly solicit a proxy)
that are "part of a continuous plan ending in solicitation and

which prepare the way for its success. "378

This expansive definition leads to overregulation: the imposition
of the regulatory scheme on expressive communications far removed from the SEC's legitimate regulatory concern for the impact on shareholders, such as messages concerning corporate management and policy that are directed to the general public, and
make no mention of proxies, proxy contests or upcoming shareholder meetings. 7

17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(j)(1) (1989). See supra text accompanying note 350.
SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d Cir. 1943) (finding that letter mailed to shareholders after meeting scheduled, asking them not to sign any proxies for utility company or to
revoke proxies already signed, is a "solicitation" within meaning of the Public Utility Holding Company Act). Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, explained that expansion of
the rules to include even communications received prior to formal solicitation by the solicitor was necessary to carry out Congress' regulatory goals. Otherwise, "one need only spread
the misinformation adequately before beginning to solicit, and the Commission would be
powerless to protect shareholders." Id. at 786.
"' See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985) (question of
fact whether advertisement addressed to general public urging that utility company be publicly owned, and that appeared during proxy fight between company and proponents of public ownership, was proxy solicitation and therefore subject to proxy rules); Trans World
Corp. v. Odyssey Partners, 561 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (communications to press and
financial community "in an effort to influence shareholder opinion" subject to proxy rules).
See infra text accompanying notes 382-95. See also Cherno & Zelenty, supra note 368. The
decisive factor, from the SEC's perspective, is whether the ultimate purpose of the communication is to influence shareholder decisionmaking. See Brief of the SEC, Amicus Curiae, at
8, LILCO v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1984) (No. 85-7890) (factors to be considered in
determining purpose of communication include content, audience to whom addressed, timing with regard to related proxy contest, and connection or common interest between
speaker and proxy contestants). See also Brown v. Chicago Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 328
F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1964) (finding advertisement that did not mention future proxy solicitation and did not solicit proxies was not solicitation under § 14(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act).
377
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Although corporate managements may be closely regulated when
they seek to elicit authorization from the firm's widely dispersed
owners, it is doubtful, especially after the Supreme Court's decision in Bellotti, 0 whether the state-even in the service of corporate suffrage-may bar communications directed to the public at
large. The proxy rules themselves reflect some sensitivity to the
dangers of regulating these public communications.38 ' Such piecemeal limitations on the applicability of particular rules, however,
inadequately protect the first amendment right to communicate to
the general public through the vehicle of the paid editorial advertisement, which is put at risk by the SEC's expansive interpretation of the "solicitations" governed by its proxy rules.
A good example of the problem is Long Island Lighting Co. v.
Barbash (LILCO).2 LILCO involved a political advertisement,
published during a proxy contest, that criticized the management
of LILCO and advocated its replacement. The advertisers included
a candidate for public office (whose campaign was openly critical of
LILCO) who was also a LILCO shareholder engaged in the proxy
contest for control of the board."8 No mention of proxy solicitation or of the upcoming shareholders' meeting appeared in the advertisement; indeed, the advertisement was directed to LILCO's
ratepayers and suggested that they would be better off if a state38
run agency replaced current management. '
LILCO, alleging that these advertisements were false and misleading, sought to enjoin further solicitation of proxies. Chief
Judge Weinstein, for the district court, granted summary judgment
to the defendant advertiser/solicitor on the ground that an advertisement appearing in a newspaper of general circulation that was

11 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Rule 14a-6(h) provides that solicitation "in the form of speeches, press releases and
radio or television scripts... need not... be filed ... prior to use or publication." 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-6(h) (1989). Although prefiling is not required, definitive copies of the material
must be filed no later than the date they are used or published. Moreover, the SEC has
always permitted corporate spokespersons to answer questions from the press, so long as the
questions were not "planted" by someone seeking proxies. See L Loss, supra note 155, at
45.
'u'

-2 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985).

Id. at 794. Another group of defendants, the Steering Committee of Citizens to Replace LILCO, was attempting to replace LILCO with a municipally owned utility company.
Id.
3" Id.
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not directly addressed to shareholders could not be a "solicitation"
subject to the proxy rules. 86 On appeal, the Second Circuit disagreed, concluding that the rules can apply to general and indirect
communications to shareholders, and remanded for a determination whether or not this particular advertisement was a "solicitation" under the SEC regulations. 86
Although the constitutional issue was not reached in LILCO, any
attempt by the SEC to apply its proxy rules to the political advertisement would seem highly problematic. LILCO involved a public
utility company embroiled in political controversy; the advertisements themselves were "addressed solely to the public. . .mak[ing]
no mention either of proxies or of the [upcoming] shareholders'
meeting"; 387 the issues were "quintessentially matters of public political debate . . . . published in the middle of an election campaign in which LILCO's future was an issue";388 and the advertis-

ers were critics of management (not entrenched incumbents or
controlling shareholders able to exert undue influence on
shareholders).
Even when corporate management is the speaker,3 89 state regulation of advertisements addressed to the public, making no reference to proxy solicitations, is in tension with Bellotti390 and Pacific

Gas. 9 ' Corporations are full-fledged speakers free to communicate
their views to the public on any subject; the state may not seek to
suppress -these communications out of concern that they will be
received by (and perhaps influence) shareholders in the audience.
The first amendment necessarily restrains excessively paternalistic
regulatory impulses. Reasonably skeptical shareholders among the
public may be expected to distinguish even spirited general com-

625 F. Supp. 221 (1985).
38. LILCO, 779 F.2d at 796.
385

'l

Id. at 798 (Winter, J., dissenting).

388 Id.
3189Opponents of management cannot be afforded greater expressive latitude under the

rules than supporters of the incumbent board of directors. Such disparate treatment would
itself distort the dynamic of the debate and the flow of information to the shareholder electorate. Cf. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (incumbent union cannot agree to
limits on organizational literature because their rivals cannot be similarly restrained).
3,0 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See supra notes 72-79 and
accompanying text.
3" Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). See supra notes
209-14 and accompanying text.
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mentary from targeted messages that seek to motivate specific
shareholder action. 9 2 In my view, a communication that is directed
to the general public (not corporate shareholders as such), that
does not refer to proxies, board elections, shareholder meetings,
proposed actions or the like, may not constitutionally be subjected
to regulation as a "solicitation" within the meaning of the Exchange Act.
Some line-drawing is necessary to distinguish between communications directed to the general public and those which are part of a
campaign to sway shareholders. Because of the presence of speaker
expressive interests and the strong first amendment interest in
shielding communications to the public from government scrutiny,
the test should be as objective as possible, eschewing direct inquiry
into motive. At least two factors present themselves. The first is
the scope of the putative audience. If the audience for the message
is limited to shareholders, this will ordinarily be strong evidence of
a "solicitation" regulable by the SEC. 9 The second is the timing
of the communication. 9 4 When a meeting has been scheduled, specific proposals and nominees are being considered, and opposing
forces have engaged in a struggle for control-this is the time when
shareholders' opinions will imminently influence decisionmaking,
and it is essential that those shareholders have complete and accurate information. They are entitled to know precisely who is addressing them, and whether the speaker has an interest in the
eventual decision 3 9 5-information of the sort required to be dis-

392 An analogy might be made to the distinction between publishers of subscription advisory newsletters and personalized investment advice. See supra text accompanying notes

320-28.
S93The issue cannot be decided by the choice of medium alone. Editorial advertisements,
when published in media of general circulation, whether newspapers or other publications,
or broadcast over television or radio, should be presumed not to be "solicitations" as long as
they refrain from referring to proxies or shareholder votes. So, too, for direct mailings to
populations which may include but are not limited to shareholders. However, letters-even
if explicitly addressed to "Residents of Long Island" or "LILCO ratepayers"--may nevertheless be deemed solicitations if they are in fact sent only to shareholders.
31,It has been suggested that the SEC recognize a presumptive "safe harbor" from proxy
regulation for shareholder communications if, for example, no specific shareholder meeting
is pending within two months. Cherno & Zelenty, supra note 368, at 972.

" The rules already recognize that small groups of shareholders may consult each other

without subjecting.themselves to regulation. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1989) (exempting
from regulation-except for the rule against fraud-solicitations of not more than ten shareholders). The rule applies to nonmanagement solicitations only, and facilitates the align-
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closed by the proxy rules. At this stage, the state's justification for
intruding upon the dissemination of expressive speech is at its
strongest.
By contrast, when no meeting has been scheduled, the issues are
only beginning to take shape, and the speaker is seeking to influence views on corporate affairs rather than induce impending
shareholder action, the state is shorn of the corporate suffrage justification for regulating intracorporate communications. It has no
cause for concern that an uninformed (or misinformed) vote will
take place in reliance on the communications. When the meeting is
scheduled, the parties (if they decide to do combat in the proxy
arena) will have ample opportunity for campaigning under the
watchful eye of the SEC; government will then be able to ensure
that appropriate disclosures are made, at a time when a vote is
imminent.
(iii) Preliminary Filing Prior to Distribution. In the securities
advertising context, we concluded that prior restraints do not necessarily violate the first amendment.3 9 With the regulation of
proxy solicitation, however, the state is burdening the rights of
speakers engaged in expressive communications, 397 and first
amendment concerns cannot be so easily dismissed.
The SEC rules require those engaged in the solicitation of proxies to file all relevant materials in preliminary form and await SEC
approval before they distribute copies to shareholders or engage in
any "solicitations." 98 The waiting period before distribution permits the SEC to review the materials for compliance with disclosure requirements and to detect and challenge any false or misleading communications before they reach the shareholders. The
government's justification for imposing a prefiling requirement is
undermined by the current selectivity of preliminary review,39 9
ment of opposing factions, which may or may not eventually engage in an actual proxy
solicitation. See L. Loss, supra note 155, at 459 (analogizing this mechanism to the Securities Act exception for preliminary negotiations with underwriters).
391See supra text accompanying notes 187, 196, 265-67 & 272-85.
397 Although there may be little reason to fear that the SEC will be acting out of hostility
to any particular point of view, Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1265-67, there is cause for concern
that the bureaucratic imperative of the agency will lead to excessive regulation of protected
speech. See supra text accompanying notes 114-20.
"'
See supra text accompanying notes 352-56.
Although the prefiling requirement persists, the actual review practice has been substantially changed. Since 1980, routine examinations of all preliminary materials have
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however, and is weakened still further by the array of postexpression remedial weapons at its disposal in the event incomplete, false
40 0
or misleading solicitation materials are distributed.
Nevertheless, given the unique nature of the proxy mechanism, 0 1 justifying as it does substantial state regulation on behalf
of shareholders vulnerable to long-distance, informational manipulation, these minimally intrusive prefiling requirements increase
the regulatory burden on expressive speech only slightly.40 2 Prefiling requirements of communications intended to influence shareholder action at a particular upcoming shareholder meeting, standing alone, do not violate the first amendment.
(iv) Rule 14a-8: Compulsory Inclusion of Shareholder Proposals. Apart from the objective information disclosure requirements
that are the backbone of the securities acts, the proxy rules contain

one most unusual provision: rule 14a-8. 403 This rule, which requires
corporations to include within the corporation's proxy statement
(and, therefore, subsidize the dissemination of) disfavored proposals by qualifying shareholders, 0' presents an interesting constituceased. See L. Loss, supra note 155, at 459. The SEC recently amended the preliminary
filing requirement to eliminate solicitations involving routine annual meetings partly in recognition that no substantive review is undertaken anyway. See supra text accompanying
note 355. Moreover, where proxy contests are under way, definitive material is still subject
to review. Indeed, the SEC may review definitive materials when it reviews the Form 10-K if
it discovers material deficiencies or if opposing solicitations begin after the definitive materials have been filed. Amendments to the Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 25,217,
[1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,211 (Dec. 21, 1987).
400 The SEC has injunctive power, under section 21(e) of the 1934 Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1988), ranging from enjoining the use of improperly solicited proxies to
possibly setting aside a transaction approved under improperly solicited proxies. See Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970) ("[p]ossible forms of relief will include
setting aside the merger"); Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). Presumably, therefore, intermediate actions, such as ordering postponement of a scheduled meeting
and dissemination of corrective solicitation material, would also be available. L.Loss, supra
note 155, at 493.
401 See supra text accompanying notes 365-69.
4'
This conclusion would not follow to the extent the agency's regulatory apparatus applies to instances where speaker interests outweigh more attenuated corporate suffrage concerns, i.e., expressive communications concerning corporate policy questions, but not directed at shareholder action at an upcoming shareholder meeting. See supra text
accompanying notes 380-95.
The rules already exempt speeches, press releases and broadcasting scripts. See supra
text accompanying note 381.
403

See supra note 355.

4o For the view that rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1989), is inconsistent with the
SEC's regulatory mission and imposes costs on issuers (and the SEC) that outweigh its ben-
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tional issue concerning the speaker's right to refuse to distribute
expressive messages with which it disagrees. Unlike nonexpressive
disclosure documents, these shareholder proposals plainly involve
expressive speech-often expressing heated political and ideological concerns of shareholders regarding issues of corporate
governance.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Pacific Gas, 40 analogized the
agency order in that case (compelling Pacific Gas to insert a thirdparty's adversarial communications into its billing envelopes) to
the workings of rule 14a-8. In his view, the proxy rule is a clearly
constitutional mechanism for providing access "for certain limited
and approved purposes" to the shareholders. '
Should the first amendment (fiercely resistant, outside the
sphere of advertising, to measures that attempt to compel an unwilling speaker to disseminate the views of others"") tolerate this
rule mandating disfavored expressive speech in the shareholder
proxy context? Justice Powell identified part of the answer in Pacific Gas when he observed that proxy contests involve intracorporate speech ("speech by a corporation to itself ,,4o8). When management speaks to shareholders, and shareholders speak to
management and each other, all the speech is generated by members of a single enterprise. But more important, from a constitutional perspective, is the state's interest in ensuring that shareholders (who cannot reach their co-owners by simply attending the
meeting) have access to the voting machinery. While it is true that
any shareholder can undertake an independent proxy solicitation,
such a process involves substantial expenditures of time, effort and
money 409 far beyond the resources of most shareholders.
efits, see Dent, SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. Sci. L. REv. 1
(1985).
'0*Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 39 & n.8, 40 (1985) (Stevens,

J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 209-14.
401 Justice Stevens is on the right track when he distinguishes these shareholder proposals
from speech of a "commercial character." Id. at 39 n.8. However, it is the expressive nature
of the compelled messages (rather than political content) that distinguishes these proposals
from more commonplace nonexpressive informational notices concerning transactions, such

as billing or credit terms and warning labels on dangerous products.
401

See supra text accompanying notes 197-200.

410 Pacific Gas,

475 U.S. at 14 n.10 (emphasis in original).

409By contrast, a shareholder need have only one percent or $1,000 in market value of

voting securities in order to qualify to submit a proposal under rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R.
240.14a-8 (1989). See supra text accompanying note 358.
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The rule is, moreover, quite sensitive to the expressive rights of
corporate management. Inclusion of a shareholder proposal in the
proxy statement does not represent management endorsement of
the proposal; it is, rather, a means of placing the item on the "ballot," as it were, for shareholder consideration. The corporation is
not required directly to undermine its own position on any issue.
No proposal concerning an election contest or in opposition to a
current management proposal must be included,41 0 and management is free to urge shareholders to vote "no" on the shareholders'
proposals. Finally, no shareholders' proposals can overwhelm the
corporate management's message. 1 1
Given the rule's sensitivity to management's own expressive
rights, its requirement that only bona fide shareholders who have
demonstrated a minimum level of commitment to the enterprise
may insist on inclusion of their proposals, and the state's legitimate regulatory interest in "fair corporate suffrage," rule 14a-8
should survive scrutiny.
(b) Scienter. Under current case law, corporate liability for violating rule 14a-9 has been premised on negligent conduct.4 1 2 However, Judge Friendly, writing for the majority in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, 413 a leading case in the area, explicitly "le[ft] to
another day" the question whether under certain circumstances
strict liability for a false or misleading proxy statement would be
permissible.4 14
In my view, the level of culpability required for violations of the
proxy rules should depend upon the remedy being sought. To the
extent that shareholders were deceived or misled into executing
proxies, a court should be able to enjoin the use of those proxies,

411
411

See supra note 358.
See limitations on number and length of shareholder proposals, at supra text accom-

panying note 358.

412 See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973) (requiring complainant to establish scienter for violation of § 14(a) would be inappropriate); accord Gould
v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding proper liability standard for false or misleading proxy statements is not scienter but negligence). But see Adams
v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.) (scienter required in private suit to
impose liability on accountants), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
413 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).

414

Id. at 1301 (citing R.

MATERL Ls
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1358 (3d ed. 1972)). But see Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 775 F.2d 917

(8th Cir. 1985) (rejecting strict liability for innocent misstatements).
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order a resolicitation with corrected materials, perhaps even "undo
the deal" upon the simple showing that the original solicitation
materials were materially false or misleading, irrespective of management's state of mind in issuing the material misstatement. After all, the state's purpose is to safeguard the shareholders' exercise of their franchise. Authorization obtained through such
misstatements,
however innocent, is meaningless and may be
15
voided.
Where civil or criminal penalties are sought against the solicitor,
Gerstle seems to require at least a showing of negligence. Whether
such a showing should be constitutionally adequate to impose liability is a close question. Expressive "fragility," the theoretical
foundation of the Sullivan scienter standard,418 typically is not a
significant factor in the context of proxy solicitations.41 On the
other hand, factors arguing against liability on a lesser showing of
culpability include the fact that reputational interests are rarely
implicated,418 and the government is empowered to require resolicitation of proxies or rescission of the underlying transaction. On
balance, however, proxy solicitation does not appear to be the kind
of expression for which the first amendment demands the "strate'" An analogy might be drawn here to the NLRB's prior practice of overturning union
representation elections marred by misrepresentation. Such elections were considered invalid because material misrepresentation violates the "laboratory conditions" thought necessary for ensuring rational employee votes for or against union representation. In 1982, the
NLRB announced that it would no longer set aside the elections because of misrepresentations. See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127 (1982).
"' See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963) (promoting desirable but
"fragile" criticism of public officials by requiring actual malice for award of damages to
public officials for defamation).
," Fragility of speech may be a problem in some cases involving solicitation by shareholders critical of incumbent corporate management or expressing minority views on controversial public issues. However, the rules cannot be different for promanagement and antimanagement factions. See supra note 389. In the more typical situation, since incumbent
managements and their often well-heeled challengers both seek to win a prize of great commercial value to the victor, their expression is likely to prove hardy.
"I The rules are not insensitive to reputational interests. See rule 14a-9(b), 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-9(b) Note b (1989): "Material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or personal reputation, or directly or indirectly makes charges concerning improper,
illegal or immoral conduct or associations, without factual foundation" is an example of
language which "depending upon particular facts and circumstances ... may be misleading
within the meaning of [the antifraud] section."
In the event libelous statements are circulated concerning contestants in a proxy battle,
state law actions for libel (which, after Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
require at least some showing of fault) are available to redress injury.
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gic protection for falsehood" provided by a Sullivan-type malice

standard for liability.

19

III. Is IT WORTH THE CANDLE?
Professor Blasi suggests that, when considering the first amendment, courts should adopt "the pathological perspective."' 20 By
this he means that the first amendment disputes of today should
be resolved with the judicial eye firmly fixed upon the uncertain

future. Someday, he reasons, we may find ourselves in a period of
extreme ideological intolerance; at such a time, even the core values of the first amendment (e.g., the freedom to disagree with state
policy, the freedom of the press from licensing and censorship)
may be under attack. We will need a full-strength first amendment
to protect us from the force of governmental censorship directed at
those core expressive values. In order to ensure that the first

amendment retains its full vigor in "the worst of times,"'421 Blasi
suggests, we must avoid diluting its impact today. Presumably, we

risk such doctrinal dilution whenever we complicate, fragment and
extend the scope of first amendment doctrine.2 2 Blasi considers
the Court's current commercial speech doctrine (regarding commercial advertising) 423 and the four-part test set forth in Central

Hudson424 to be just such dilution and therefore "undesirable from
the standpoint of the pathological perspective.' ' 2
Professor Schauer has expressed somewhat similar concerns
419 Criminal penalties for negligent speech raise a much more difficult question and the
imposition of such penalties would be controlled by general principles that limit the state's
power to punish criminally offenses of negligence.
420 Blasi, supra note 24, at 449.
421 Id. at 450.
422 For this reason, Professor Blasi is disapproving of the gradual doctrinal development
of the first amendment. Although he recognizes that "simplicity of analysis is not easily
achieved in the realm of first amendment adjudication," he deplores the proliferation of
"talk of levels of scrutiny and ambits of application." Id. at 471. See also Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 285, 309 (suggesting that
first amendment doctrine rivals in complexity the Internal Revenue Code).
4'2See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
424 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
425Blasi, supra note 24, at 485. Professor Blasi believes that either full protection or no
protection of commercial speech would be preferable to the Court's "middle of the road"
approach in Virginia Pharmacy and Central Hudson. However, "no first amendment doctrine protecting commercial speech could be either uncomplicated or historically grounded."
Id. at 477.
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about the proper "architecture"42 of rules addressed to the first
amendment. He "assert[s] rather than argu[es]" that, however it
may be defined, commercial speech "lies outside the core or cores
of the freedom of speech protected by the first amendment."42 ' He
thus endorses Professor Blasi's admonition: "some existing first

amendment rule [might] lose some of its strength because of the
number of unacceptable applications it would generate when its
new applications were added."4 2
This somewhat pessimistic, risk-averse approach to first amendment doctrine strikes me as an inappropriate way to think about
speech. This imagery of the "core" surrounded by periphery, presupposes a theory of the first amendment capable of generating an
irreducible core without slighting other important values. Unless
we are very sure of the validity of our reductionist theories, we risk
diminishing the promise of the first amendment. By excluding
from protection commercial and commerce-related expression, we
risk depriving the public of necessary and valuable information
concerning the unavoidable decisions of everyday life. Indeed, it
seems reasonable to ask whether the political speech of various
sparsely populated fringe groups really is more important to society than the handbills of labor picketers in DeBartolo,42 the law2' Schauer, supra note 24, at 1181. Rulemakers should ask whether rules concerning particular substantive areas of law should
operate in linear progression, as a flow chart or decision tree, or should the
rules instead resemble a messy collection of potentially relevant concerns,
available for use or nonuse depending on the circumstances of the case?
Should the rules be set forth in advance of the occurrence of the problems with
which they are to deal, or should the rules be worked out as, and only as, the
problems actually arise?
Id.
427 Id. at 1185. Professor Schauer's first amendment "has not one but several cores, (centering on expression] with respect to which government has demonstrated such a proclivity
toward overregulation that compensatory underregulation is now necessary." Id. He would
include in these cores political, religious (and other ideological), artistic, literary, scientific
and academic communication. Commercial expression, he believes, "is not a central theoretical concern of the first amendment." Id. at 1186-87. If commercial speech is to be protected, however, it should be treated differently so that the full strength of the amendment
can be retained for "core" expression. The "architectural" risk of this approach is the
proliferation of subdivisions within the first amendment-a process that may undermine
even core areas in the future. Moreover, increased doctrinal complexity may render first
amendment principles "incomprehensible" to "non-legally trained front line soldiers in the
defense of the important first amendment." Id. at 1200.
428 Id. at 1194.
429 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
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yer's solicitation of Dalkon Shield victims in Zauderer,30 editorial

advertisements directed to LILCO's ratepayers in LILCO 31 or the
2
prescription drug pricing information in Virginia Pharmacy."
Moreover, even if we agree that, for example, political expression
and freedom of the press are paramount, these arguments concerning doctrinal dilution are based on a debatable empirical premise
that we can most effectively protect such expression by refusing to
extend the first amendment to new areas. It is by no means certain
that the best way to implement the "pathological perspective" is
narrowly to describe the circle of protected speech today.
Such a zone of doctrinal purity may not be the only, or even the
optimal, buffer zone possible. By gradually expanding the "protected zone," we may foster in the American people a broader and
deeper acceptance of first amendment principles. A society that
takes as given the protected nature of a broad zone of expression
might prove the most effective guardian of what Professors Blasi
And if that core is atand Schauer consider "core" expression.
tacked, lines drawn some distance from the nerve center will be no
less effective than fortifications just outside the gate. What, then,
can be accomplished by withdrawing from that protected zone today, in advance of the first rifleshot?
Like the judgment muscles, 43 4 the muscles that exercise and protect the freedom of expression may atrophy from disuse. People
who habitually receive all varieties of information, and have developed expectations based on a robust and pervasively vigilant defense of their informational freedoms will feel most acutely the loss
when those freedoms are threatened. Courts and social institutions
accustomed to respecting the expressive rights of others in diverse
contexts may be our best defense against repression in the worst of

U.S. 568 (1988).
430 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
4SI Long Island Lighting Co. v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1985).
4'2Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
433 Schauer, supra note 24, at 1202; see also X. REDISH. FRanEoo
op ExpazsoN. A Cm-.
CAL ANALYsis 7-8 (1984). Professor Schauer suggests that, if his architectural concerns are
misplaced, "it would be important to move the lines of battle far away from the core, recognizing that possibly weaker defenses one hundred miles away from headquarters are often
better than stronger defenses only three miles from headquarters." Schauer, supra note 24,
at 1202.
43'See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
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times.
A better response to the danger of doctrinal dilution than a kind
of first amendment triage is rededication to first principles, and to
the goal of analytic clarity. 43 When the Court arbitrarily limits the

reach of the first amendment by establishing categories of secondclass speech, we invite the very dangers Professors Blasi and
Schauer rightly deplore. First amendment adjudication must follow the rule of principled justification. If we restrict truthful
speech concerning lawful commercial activity today, we may one
day reclassify as "low value" (and, accordingly, freely regulate)
other subsets of hitherto fully protected expression.
Yes, in a Blasi-Schauer world the people have the right not to be
disabled by state censorship in the course of lawful private decisionmaking-but not necessarily in the commercial arena. The first
amendment protects the public's right to receive truthful information concerning lawful activity, but we can carve out substantial
exceptions to the rule and casually countenance the withholding of
such information in particular contexts.
If the first amendment is to be strong in the worst of times, it
must be "in training" today and tomorrow. If it is to protect
speakers and listeners from repressive government, the habit of
vigilance must be deeply ingrained in both our people and our legal system. A truly "fit" and robust first amendment doctrine will
suffer no diminution from being worked, and worked hard, to protect all the speech citizens in a system of limited government need
to function as autonomous decisionmakers.

' No one values needless doctrinal clutter or complexity, and to the extent that Professors Blasi and Schauer deplore the proliferation of meaningless classifications of speech and
open-ended, toothless balancing tests, I applaud their efforts. Indeed, analytical clarification, including the abandonment of rigid categorization of speech, is the goal (however Imperfectly realized) of this Article. But to the extent that the pathological perspective and

concern for doctrinal dilution imply that courts cannot deal with variations on a
theme-apply general principles to specialized circumstances that justify special outcomes-I must disagree. Professors Blasi and Schauer criticize the spread of doctrinal "clutter" (meaning unnecessary complexity and detail), but they include within that concept

complex, multicontextual first amendment analysis. The former should be avoided; the latter is unavoidable. And if our judges cannot be trusted to understand that speech in the
context of the armed forces is different from speech uttered in a proxy contest, which is
different from speech in a public school, which is different from speech by public employees,
etc.-and to take into account the special justifications that may or may not exist for regulation-then they are unqualified for the bench.

